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Preface 
The doctoral thesis at hand is a miscellany that comprises 7 sections. The motivation, conceptual framework, own 
contribution and the research questions of the thesis are outlined in the first section. In addition, the applied main 
methodological approach is shortly discussed. The subsequent five sections present the different research papers that 
I have written jointly with colleagues as well as a single author (see Table V1 for an overview and my own contribu-
tion). Finally, Section 7 summarises the main findings and draw policy implications on the basis of the conducted 
empirical research. Moreover, I discuss some limitations and point to future and open research. 
 
Table V1 Overview papers of the cumulative dissertation 
 Title Journal Co-Authors Own Contribution 
I A look behind the curtain: Measuring 
the complex economic effects of re-
gional structural funds in Germany 
Papers in Regional Science 
(2019), Vol. 98, 701-735 
Thomas Brenner (25 %), 
Timo Mitze (20 %) 
Main author (55 %) 
II Absorptive capacity, economic free-
dom and the conditional effects of 
German regional policy 
Submitted to: Journal of In-
stitutional Economics1 
Thomas Brenner (30 %), 
Timo Mitze (30 %) 
Co-author with sig-
nificant share (40 %) 
III Economic effects of regional fiscal 
equalisation – Empirical evidence 
from German labour market regions 
Submitted to: Journal of 
Economics and Statistics1 
 Single author (100 
%) 
IV Public research, local knowledge 
transfer and regional development: In-
sights from a structural VAR model 
International Regional Sci-
ence Review (2019), forth-
coming 
Thomas Brenner (15 %), 
Timo Mitze (10 %) 
Main author (75 %) 
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Phillip Boeing (30 %) Main author (70 %) 
1 Published as Working Papers on Innovation and Space 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Abstract 
Existing dissimilar economic conditions, which are observable in many countries worldwide, are 
economically inefficient and also imply important political and social challenges, for example, the 
increasing achievements of populist movements, particularly in economically underdeveloped re-
gions. Thus, supporting economically less prosperous regions is a highly important political objec-
tive. It is of great importance to identify drivers for economic growth and to apply efficient policy 
measures to spur regional development.  
Based on economic growth theory, the doctoral thesis at hand contributes to the identification of 
the complex outcomes of four German and one Chinese policy measures aimed at fostering regional 
development. The German policy measures are analysed on the level of labour market regions and 
comprise structural funding, regional fiscal equalisation and public research activities. The Chinese 
study investigates the economic effects of research and development (R&D) subsidies to firms on 
the level of provinces. Due to recent economic and structural changes, China is chosen as additional 
case study: the Chinese government is currently driving the transformation from a capital-based to 
an innovation-based economic system by applying a variety of innovation-enhancing policy 
measures. 
By providing novel empirical findings, the doctoral thesis at hand extends recent German and Chi-
nese studies. These studies examine the economic effects of public polices by mainly conducting 
partial effect analyses (singe equation models) and by mainly focussing on the effect on one par-
ticular dependent variable (usually the regional output). Indirect effects running through other eco-
nomic variables in a regional production system are disregarded, as are the effects on further eco-
nomic variables. Both of these shortcomings are accounted for in the thesis at hand. Furthermore, 
analysing several German policy measures allows the identification of unique characteristics and a 
     
 
 
deduction of concrete implications to foster the development of different economic variables. Fi-
nally, the thesis also examines the role played by regional conditioning factors for the working of 
public policies. Although each research paper provides specific research questions, the overarching 
research question of the thesis are as follows: 
1. What are the overall economic effects of the analysed policy measures in Germany and 
China on different regional input and output factors of a regional production function?  
2. Do the analysed German policy measures add to regional development via different 
transmission channels and can unique characteristics be identified? 
3. Do economic responses to an increase in German structural funding and regional fiscal 
equalisation funding depend on conditioning factors such as a region’s absorptive ca-
pacity, economic freedom and political-economic conditions?  
The first two research questions are related to unconditional effects, which are the estimated effects 
on the basis of all German regions and Chinese provinces, respectively. In this thesis, the method-
ological basis of the conducted analyses are vector autoregressive (VAR) models and a graphical 
impulse response function analysis. This approach explicitly allows emprirical researchers to de-
termine total effects on a set of defined economic variables that are triggered by a particular public 
policy measure. 
With regard to the unconditional effects (research questions 1 and 2), it can be stated that German 
structural funding increases can be linked to statistically significant positive effects on the gross 
domestic product (GDP) per workforce, human capital and employment rate. Conversely, German 
regional fiscal equalisation is solely associated with a statistically significant positive effect on the 
regional employment rate. The empirical results on the effects of German public research activities 
show that an increase in the publication rate of public research institutes is associated with signif-
icant positive effects on the regional physical capital investment and employment rate. Although 
     
 
 
no statistically significant effects can be identified for research activities of universities, an increase 
in the summarised public third-party funds allocated to universities and technical colleges com-
bined can be linked to statistically significant positive effects on the regional GDP per workforce, 
patent activity and employment rate. Finally, technical colleges seems to be locally more embed-
ded: allocated (public) third-party funds to technical colleges are associated with significant posi-
tive effects on the human capital, employment and physical capital investment rate.  
Using data from Chinese provinces, the empirical findings reveal that an increase of public R&D 
subsidies granted to Chinese firms results in a statistically significant decrease in private R&D 
investments. Thus, a first-order policy objective is not achieved. However, the conducted analysis 
also reveals a significant positive effect on the stock of private R&D personnel. Finally, an increase 
in the policy intensity also corresponds with statistically significant positive effects on the techno-
logical development and capital deepening (investment rates in physical capital and residential 
buildings). 
The analysis of the role played by regional conditioning factors (research question 3) emphasises 
the importance of regional absorptive capacity and economic freedom for the working of German 
structural funding. Regions with low levels of absorptive capacity and economic freedom benefit 
from German structural funding mainly through an increased investment rate in physical capital, 
while a positive effect on the development of regional technology and GDP cannot be identified. 
Conversely, in regions with high levels of absorptive capacity and economic freedom, the findings 
reveal significant positive effects of structural funding on the regional GDP and innovation activity. 
Finally, the research paper on effect heterogeneity of regional fiscal equalisation suggests statisti-
cally significant differences in the estimated effects only for single years. Regional fiscal equalisa-
tion is more effective in increasing physical capital investments in East German regions and the 
employment rate in West German regions. In addition, only an increase in the funding intensity in 
     
 
 
Christian Democratic Party/Christian Social Party (CDU/CSU) preferring regions is associated 
with significant positive effects on the human capital and physical capital investment rate. Con-
versely, a significant positive effect on the GDP is identified only in Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
preferring regions. 
The findings of this thesis emphasise the complex and reciprocal mechanisms of the analysed pol-
icy measures. They add to regional development in a multifaceted way and positively affect differ-
ent economic variables. That said, empirical analyses restricted to the effects on the regional output 
limit the interpretation of policy evaluation studies and neglect additional transmission channels. 
Moreover, the results reveal that policy makers have different options to spur regional development 
in different contexts. Finally, the empirical findings stress the prominent role of technological and 
institutional conditions, especially for the working of structural funding in Germany. Therefore, 
policy makers should provide more incentives to improve these conditions and they should direct 
public investments especially to regions with already proper initial conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In vielen Ländern auf der Welt herrschen ungleiche ökonomische Bedingungen. Diese werden als 
ökonomisch ineffizient betrachtet und implizieren zudem vielfältige politische und soziale Heraus-
forderungen. Ein Beispiel ist der zunehmende Erfolg von populistischen Parteien, vornehmlich in 
ökonomisch schwächeren Regionen. Daher stellt die Entwicklung von ökonomisch schwächeren 
Regionen gegenwärtig ein wichtiges politisches Ziel dar. Der Identifizierung von Treibern für öko-
nomisches Wachstum und, darauf basierend, der Entwicklung von effizienten regionalen Politik-
maßnahmen kommt dabei eine entscheidende Rolle zu.  
Auf Grundlage der ökonomischen Wachstumstheorie leistet die vorliegende Arbeit anhand von 
vier deutschen und einer chinesischen Studie einen Beitrag dazu, die komplexen Effekte von ver-
schiedenen Politikmaßnahmen zur Förderung regionalen Wachstums zu identifizieren. Die analy-
sierten Politikmaßnahmen in Deutschland werden auf Ebene der Arbeitsmarktregionen untersucht 
und umfassen die Strukturförderung, den regionalen Finanzausgleich und öffentliche Forschungs-
aktivitäten. Für China werden die Effekte von Forschungs- und Entwicklungssubventionen (FuE-
Subventionen) an Firmen auf der Ebene von Provinzen untersucht. China wurde dabei aufgrund 
der derzeit dort ablaufenden wirtschaftlichen Umbrüche als ergänzendes Fallbeispiel gewählt: auf-
grund von sinkenden Wachstumsraten treibt die chinesische Regierung über eine Vielzahl an Po-
litikmaßnahmen die Transformation von einer kapital- hin zu einer innovationsorientierten Wachs-
tumsstrategie voran. 
Durch neu gewonnene empirische Erkenntnisse erweitert die vorliegende Dissertation jüngste em-
pirische deutsche und chinesische Studien. Jene Studien untersuchen die ökonomischen Wirkungen 
von Politikmaßnahmen einerseits vor allem durch Teileffektanalysen (Eingleichungsmodelle) und 
beschränken sich, andererseits, hauptsächlich auf die Auswirkungen der Politikmaßnahmen auf 
eine bestimmte Output-Variable (häufig die regionale Produktionsmenge). Daher bleiben indirekte 
     
 
 
Effekte zwischen den einzelnen ökonomischen Variablen eines regionalen Produktionssystems so-
wie die Auswirkungen auf weitere wichtige ökonomische Variablen unberücksichtigt. Diese bei-
den bislang vernachlässigten Aspekte werden in der vorliegenden Arbeit aufgegriffen. Durch die 
Analyse von mehreren deutschen Politikmaßnahmen werden zudem Alleinstellungsmerkmale 
identifiziert und konkreter Implikationen zur Förderung verschiedener ökonomischer Variablen für 
Deutschland abgeleitet. Schließlich wird die Bedeutung von regionalen Kontextbedingungen un-
tersucht, welche die Wirkungen von öffentlichen Investitionen beeinflussen. Jede Fallstudie dieser 
Dissertation behandelt eigene Forschungsfragen. Diese fügen sich zu folgenden übergeordneten 
Fragestellungen zusammen:  
1. Welche Gesamteffekte haben die analysierten Politikmaßnahmen in Deutschland und China 
auf verschiedene regionale Input und Output-Faktoren einer regionalen Produktionsfunktion? 
2. Tragen die analysierten deutschen Politikmaßnahmen durch unterschiedliche Transmissions-
kanäle zur regionalen Entwicklung bei und lassen sich Alleinstellungsmerkmale identifizieren? 
3. Hängen die wirtschaftlichen Effekte der deutschen Strukturförderung und des regionalen Fi-
nanzausgleichs von regionalen Kontextbedingungen wie der Absorptionsfähigkeit, der Econo-
mic Freedom und den politisch-wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen einer Region ab? 
Die ersten beiden Forschungsfragen fokussieren auf nicht-konditionale Effekte von Politikmaß-
nahmen, welche als die geschätzten Effekte auf Grundlage der Grundgesamtheit der deutschen 
Regionen beziehungsweise der chinesischen Provinzen definiert werden. Die durchgeführten Ana-
lysen basieren auf vektorautoregressiven (VAR) Modellen in Kombination mit graphischen Im-
pulse Response Function Analysen. Dieser Ansatz erlaubt empirischen Wissenschaftlern ausdrück-
lich die Berechnung von ökonomischen Gesamteffekten auf mehrere definierte ökonomische Va-
riablen.  
     
 
 
Die Ergebnisse der Analysen belegen (nicht konditionalen Effekte), dass ein Anstieg der Struktur-
förderung in Deutschland mit statistisch signifikant positiven Effekten auf das Bruttoinlandspro-
dukt (BIP) pro Erwerbsperson, das Humankapital und die Beschäftigungsquote in Verbindung ge-
setzt werden kann. Dagegen lässt sich der regionale Finanzausgleich ausschließlich mit statistisch 
signifikant positiven Effekten auf die regionale Beschäftigungsquote verknüpfen. Die Resultate zu 
öffentlichen Forschungsaktivitäten zeigen, dass eine Erhöhung der Publikationsrate von öffentli-
chen Forschungsinstituten mit positiven Effekten auf die regionale Investitionsquote in physisches 
Kapital und die Beschäftigungsquote verknüpft ist. Während für Forschungsaktivitäten an Univer-
sitäten keine statistisch signifikanten regionalen Effekte identifiziert werden, haben öffentliche 
Drittmittel an Universitäten und Fachhochschulen positive Effekte auf das regionale BIP pro Er-
werbsperson, die Patentrate und Beschäftigtenquote. Zudem weisen die Ergebnisse auf eine stär-
kere lokale Einbettung von Fachhochschulen hin: Ein Anstieg der (öffentlichen) Drittmittel an 
Fachhochschulen geht mit positiven Effekten auf das regionale Humankapital, die Beschäftigten- 
und Investitionsquote in physisches Kapital einher. 
Die Analyse für chinesische Provinzen belegt, dass eine Erhöhung der öffentlichen FuE-Subven-
tionen die privaten FuE-Investitionen senkt und somit ein primäres Ziel der Politikmaßnahme nicht 
erreicht wird. Jedoch kann auch ein signifikant positiver Effekt auf den Bestand an privatem FuE-
Personal identifiziert werden. Darüber hinaus wirkt sich eine Erhöhung der FuE-Subventionen sta-
tistisch signifikant positiv auf die technologische Entwicklung und die Kapitalinvestitionen aus 
(Investitionen in physisches Kapital und Wohngebäude). 
In Bezug auf die dritte Forschungsfrage dieser Dissertation heben die Untersuchungen den Einfluss 
der regionalen Absorptionsfähigkeit und der Economic Freedom auf die Effizienz der deutschen 
Strukturförderung hervor. Regionen mit einer geringen Absorptionsfähigkeit und Economic Free-
     
 
 
dom profitieren von Strukturinvestitionen vor allem durch eine erhöhte Investitionsquote. Eine po-
sitive Entwicklung der regionalen Technologie und des BIPs tritt dagegen nicht ein. Weisen Regi-
onen dagegen eine hohe Absorptionsfähigkeit und Economic Freedom auf, lösen Strukturinvesti-
tionen signifikant positive Effekte auf das regionale BIP und die Innovationstätigkeit aus. Zudem 
lässt eine der durchgeführten Teilstudien zur Effekt-Heterogenität für den regionalen Finanzaus-
gleich in Deutschland darauf schließen, dass nur in einzelnen Jahren statistisch signifikante Unter-
schiede resultieren. Eine Erhöhung der regionalen Finanzausgleichszahlungen ist mit einem statis-
tisch signifikanten Anstieg der Investitionsquote in ostdeutschen und der Beschäftigungsquote in 
westdeutschen Regionen verbunden. Zudem belegen die Ergebnisse, dass ein Anstieg der Finanz-
ausgleichszahlungen nur in Regionen, welche vornehmlich die Christdemokratische Partei/Christ-
lich-Soziale Partei (CDU/CSU) unterstützen, mit positiven Effekten auf die Human- und Investiti-
onsquote einhergeht. Im Gegenzug lassen sich positive Effekte auf das BIP nur in Regionen iden-
tifizieren, welche besonders die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) unterstützen. 
Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Arbeit verdeutlichen die komplexen und wechselseitigen Wirk-
mechanismen der analysierten Politikmaßnahmen. Diese tragen in vielfältiger Weise zur regiona-
len Entwicklung bei, indem sie unterschiedliche ökonomische Variablen positiv beeinflussen. Da-
her greifen Analysen zu kurz, die ausschließlich die Effekte auf die regionale Produktionsmenge 
betrachten. Es wird zudem deutlich, dass Politiker zwischen verschiedenen Maßnahmen auswählen 
können, um die Entwicklung einzelner ökonomischer Faktoren zu fördern. Schließlich zeigt sich, 
dass regionale technologische und institutionelle Bedingungen die Effizienz von Politikmaßnah-
men positiv beeinflussen – vor allem der deutschen Strukturförderung. Politiker sollten daher mehr 
Anreize für bessere regionale Kontextbedingungen setzen und Investitionen vornehmlich in Regi-
onen mit bereits guten Bedingung lenken.  
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1. General introduction 
 “[…], if we can learn about government policy options that have even small effects on long-term 
growth rates, we can contribute much more to improvements in standards of living than has been 
provided by the entire history of macroeconomic analysis of countercyclical policy and fine-tun-
ing” (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p. 6). 
These words by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) emphasise the importance of well-founded policy 
impact assessments in order to provide efficient policy measures that increase individual incomes 
and living standards. Aggregate economic growth and development is widely seen as major factor 
to positively affect incomes, living conditions and the welfare of individuals. That said, it is key to 
identify drivers for different levels of aggregated economic output, development and growth (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  
Regional economic disparities, mostly expressed by differences in the per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) or the (un)employment rate, are well documented within the European Union (EU) 
(e.g. European Commission, 2017; Iammarino et al., 2017), as well as within single countries, such 
as Germany (e.g. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017) or China (e.g. Tsui, 2014; 
Yao, 2009).1 However, regional economic disparities are not immutable and are subject to persist-
ing public market interventions and provided policy measures: Predominant dissimilar regional 
incomes and living standards pose a challenging task for policy makers and give rise to lively 
debates on fruitful regional policies to trigger regional development: “[…], persistent territorial 
inequality is economically inefficient and, in the words of The Economist, has become too politi-
cally [and socially] dangerous to ignore” (Iammarino et al., 2017, p. 1). This is underlined by the 
                                                 
1 A study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports larger disparities between OECD 
regions compared to these between countries (OECD, 2009). 
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increasing success of populist movements, especially in declining and economically poorer regions 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2018) or the Gilet Jaunes protesters in France (The Economist, 2019).2 That said, 
implementing more equal economic conditions by accelerating regional development is seen as an 
important political target, in the EU as well as in Germany or China (e.g. Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017; European Commission, 2017; Yao, 2009). 
This thesis is composed of five research papers and aims to contribute to the scientific and political 
discussion by providing new insights into the working and economic outcomes of several policy 
measures in Germany and China. In doing so, the thesis identifies unique features of the analysed 
policy measures and differences between them. Additionally, the thesis connects economic, polit-
ical and geographical issues and applies an empirical research framework that explicitly regards a 
point of criticism by the economic geographer Ron Martin: Martin (2001) is concerned that the 
discipline does not sufficiently contribute to policy debates because it is often too focused on the-
oretical, cultural or linguistic issues with only a limited empirical (quantitative) focus and relevance 
for policy makers: “Yet the fact is that the impact of geography on the public policy realm has in 
general been disappointingly limited” (Martin, 2001, p. 191). 
Some of the analysed policy measures have a direct mandate to promote predominantly economi-
cally underdeveloped regions (structural funding and regional fiscal equalisation in Germany), 
while further analysed policies (public research activities in Germany and research funds to firms 
in China) are not restricted to lagging regions. However, they may also be important policy 
                                                 
2 In centralised France, strong regional economic inequalities are present. As argued by The Economist (2019), more decentralized 
Germany can be considered as counterexample to France as the economic and industry structure is more equally distributed. One 
reason are the so-called Hidden Champions, who are successful manufacturers and employers that are frequently located in small 
cities (The Economist, 2019). 
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measures to foster regional development. The first research paper of this thesis examines the out-
comes of the most powerful German structural funding programme for less developed regions (Al-
ecke et al., 2012, 2013; Deutscher Bundestag, 2014, for additional information), which is called 
“Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures” (GRW). In doing so, direct 
and indirect transmission channels on the GDP (regional output) as well as on the input factors of 
a region's production function are analysed (see Section 2). 
The second research paper deepens the analysis by determining potential conditional responses to 
German structural funding. The analysis particularly aims to deepen the insights regarding fertile 
regional conditions that may improve funding impacts (e.g. Becker et al., 2013; Breidenbach et al., 
2019; Fratesi and Perucca, 2014; Gagliardi and Percoco, 2017; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 
2015, in a European context). To this end, the thesis analyses whether economic responses to a 
GRW funding increase are uniform across regions or whether they depend on specific regional 
conditions that facilitate the transformation of GRW funding into higher economic outcomes (see 
Section 3). 
An additional German policy with high annual funding intensities are regional fiscal equalisation 
programmes (see Section 4). Empirical studies investigating economic secondary effects of re-
gional fiscal equalisation are rather scarce in the empirical literature (e.g. Henkel et al., 2018; Kalb, 
2010; Lehmann and Wrede, 2019). Thus, the third research paper of this thesis starts with an em-
pirical analysis of the general economic effects of regional fiscal equalisation. In addition, the re-
search paper also sheds light on potential conditional effects of the equalisation programmes and, 
eventually, compares the economic outcomes to these of structural funding in Germany. 
While the preceding research papers of this thesis are focused on investment and financial com-
pensation as a means to enhance regional private and public physical capital investments, the fourth 
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research paper can rather be linked to the concept of knowledge driven growth strategies (see Sec-
tion 5). Public research conducted at universities, technical colleges or public research institutes is 
considered an important component for regional development and particularly for regional inno-
vation processes (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999; Schubert and Kroll, 2013). In this context, potential 
mutual linkages between German public research activities conducted by different research actors 
and regional development are examined. 
After the analyses on three German policy measures, the effects of research and development 
(R&D) subsidies to Chinese firms are investigated at the provincial level (see Section 6). The case 
study of Chinese provinces and public R&D subsidies as a subject of investigation is particularly 
interesting in the context of the underlining economic growth theory framework because the current 
transformation from a capital-based to an intended innovation-based economy is strongly driven 
by the Chinese government. While surging physical capital investments paved the way for an aston-
ishing economic development in China after the economic opening processes in 1978 (Naughton, 
2007), China’s government aims to lean the future economic development on an innovation-based 
development strategy (Cao et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2011). To this end, firms are prominent drivers 
in implementing this agenda (Boeing, 2016).  
The described empirical research agenda chiefly extends the recent policy evaluation literature in 
mainly two ways: First, this thesis does not solely investigate the effect on a particular target vari-
able of each policy (implied transmission channel) or on regional output. Instead, the effects of 
various policy measures on all economic variables in a regional production system are investigated. 
Moreover, the applied econometric approach goes beyond partial effects analyses and allows re-
searchers to calculate the overall effects (direct and indirect) of these policies. To this end, the 
conducted analyses are mainly based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) approach and impulse-
response function (IRF) analyses (see Mitze et al., 2018, or Ramajo et al., 2017, for empirical 
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applications). Second, this thesis contributes to the empirical evaluation literature by investigating 
potential heterogeneities in the returns on German structural funding and regional fiscal equalisa-
tion payments. 
Despite the strong empirical focus of the thesis at hand, the selected public policies are soundly 
embedded and linked to economic growth theory (Crihfield et al., 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992; Ri-
vera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Romer, 1990). In doing so, the conceptual framework is mainly used 
for the formulation of a regional production function, a theory-guided selection of economic vari-
ables and the formulation of research hypotheses.  
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. In the subsequent parts of Section 1, a brief 
introduction of the conceptual framework is presented. Furthermore, the selected policy measures 
and their implied transmission channel(s) are linked to economic growth theory. Thereupon, the 
contribution and the overarching research questions of the thesis are briefly discussed. Section 1 
concludes with the presentation of the methodological approach and the applied data. This is fol-
lowed by five research papers in Sections 2 to 6. Section 7 summarises the key findings of the 
empirical analyses and discusses policy implications. Finally, some limitations of the conducted 
analyses and lines for future research are discussed. 
1.1 Conceptual framework: Nexus between economic growth theory and empirical policy 
evaluation 
Based on its inherent purpose, policy impact evaluation is an applied (empirical) strand of eco-
nomic research. However, impact analyses are commonly embedded in a sound theoretical frame-
work. From a conceptual perspective, economic growth theory provides insights into the transmis-
sion channels and expected effects of public policies on (regional) economic development (e.g. 
Alecke et al., 2012; Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008; Mohl and Hagen, 2010). Such a theoretical 
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embedding is useful for at least two reasons: First, it allows empirical researchers to specify esti-
mation functions explicitly from theory and thus to select proper theory-grounded variables.3 Sec-
ond, the explicit use of growth theories facilitates the derivation of ex-ante hypotheses regarding 
the assumed effects of public policies on different economic variables and, beyond that, allows an 
ex-post comparison with the expected parameters (Alecke et al., 2012). 
1.1.1 Economic growth theory  
The thesis draws on exogenous and endogenous growth models for variable selection and to com-
pose research hypotheses in the particular research papers. This section provides a brief review of 
the employed growth models.  
The seminal contribution by Solow (1956) is based on a neoclassical production function, charac-
terised by constant returns to rival inputs capital and labour as well as diminishing returns to each 
of these two private input factors.4 In this model, labour supply grows exogenously at a constant 
rate and physical capital accumulation is determined by a fixed saving rate of the produced output. 
Using the time paths of the physical capital stock and labour, the time path as well as the rate of 
current output can be derived (Solow, 1956). Solow’s seminal growth approach was extended in 
an influential work by Mankiw et al. (1992), who adopt the neoclassical production function but 
add human capital as additional input factor. Like the accumulation path of physical capital, they 
assume a constant rate of saved output that is invested in human capital, while both forms of capital 
are assumed to depreciate at an equal rate. Thus, dynamics of physical and human capital follow a 
similar accumulation mechanism and the time path of output depends on the accumulation mech-
anisms of both forms of capital (Mankiw et al., 1992). In a similar fashion, Crihfield et al. (1995) 
                                                 
3 Empirical studies based on a similar theoretical framework also facilitate cross-study comparisons. 
4 Please note that Swan (1956) developed (independently of Solow, 1956) an additional seminal and closely related growth model. 
Both can be considered pioneers of neoclassical growth models. 
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add public capital as an additional input factor to the production function, assuming an equivalent 
accumulation mechanism and depreciation rate for all three kinds of capital. Consequently, these 
growth models provide the rationale to derive hypotheses on the development of the different forms 
of capital and regional output in the provided research papers.  
The growth models above can be characterised by two essential features (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004): At first, they predict (conditional) convergence: if economies have similar steady state lev-
els, economies with an initial lower level of economic development will grow faster due to dimin-
ishing returns to capital. Second, due to the implied diminishing returns on capital, the long-term 
growth of per capita capital and output is ultimately ceasing without external shocks (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004). To overcome this deficiency, an exogenously given constant technological 
growth is presumed (Crihfield et al., 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992). However, this inherent property 
is unsuitable for deriving hypotheses about the impact of policy measures on technological growth. 
The unexplained technological growth gave rise to a future stage of growth models, also known as 
endogenous growth models. The main feature of this strand of growth models is that they aim to 
model long-term economic growth within the particular model (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Lucas, 
1988; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Romer, 1990).5 In doing so, the growth approaches by Romer 
(1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) explicitly model technological growth in a R&D sector, 
for which reason these two approaches provide a sound theoretical framework to derive hypotheses 
regarding the effects of policy measures on regional technological growth.  
Finally, the evolution of labour supply is assumed to grow exogenously (Crihfield et al., 1995; 
Mankiw et al., 1992; Solow, 1956) or is assumed to be fixed (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; 
                                                 
5 For additional information on (endogenous) growth models, I refer to the comprehensive textbook of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004).  
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Romer, 1990). As explained in more detail in the subsequent research papers, a constant growth 
rate of the population and a constant employment rate (in the long-term perspective) are assumed, 
while short-term variations in the employment rate are explicitly allowed. In order to derive hy-
potheses on the effects of public policy measures on the employment rate, this thesis refers to 
potential output and substitution effects between the input factors (e.g. Bade, 2012; Schalk and 
Untiedt, 2000, for additional information). 
1.1.2 Regional production function 
The thesis at hand mainly apply the following neoclassical production function (e.g. Crihfield et 
al., 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992) for a region i  
Yi = Kiα Hiβ Ziγ (Ai Li)1-α-β-γ,         (1.1) 
where Yi denotes regional output that is produced by the input factors physical capital (Ki), human 
capital (Hi), public physical capital (Zi), regional technology (Ai ) and labour (Li). Furthermore, 
diminishing returns to each form of capital are supposed, implying the restriction α + β + γ < 1 
(Crihfield et al., 1995).6 However, the presented growth approaches mainly disregard the role of 
labour (employment rate) for the dynamics of the per capita output. Thus, in this thesis, labour at 
time t (see Bräuninger and Pannenberg, 2002, for a similar extension) is defined as 
Li(t) = λi(t) × Pi(0)enit.            (1.2) 
In Equation (1.2), λi denotes the regional rate of employed population (Li/Pi) at time t (fixed in the 
long term), while the population Pi is exogenously growing with the rate ni. Applying this defini-
tion, the regional production function per capita can be written as 
                                                 
6 A neoclassical production function is applied as the empirical approach of numerous (international) policy evaluation studies is 
also based on neoclassical growth theory (see Alecke et al., 2012, 2013; Alecke and Untiedt, 2007; Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008; 
Darku, 2011; Ederveen et al., 2006; Eggert et al., 2007; Mohl and Hagen, 2010; Rhoden, 2016) and thus facilitates a comparison to 
these studies. 
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yi = kiα hiβ ziγ (Ai λi)1-α-β-γ.            (1.3) 
Equation (1.3) explicitly includes the effects of short-run variations in the employment rate on the 
regional (per capita) production process. 
1.1.3 Selected policy measures and link to the conceptual framework 
Each research paper examines a particular policy and its effects on regional growth and develop-
ment. The implied primary target variables of the selected policy measures cover almost all eco-
nomic input factors of the regional production function, as outlined in Equation (1.3).7 The arrange-
ment of the research papers takes the following structure: The first four research papers focus on 
German policy measures, while the fifth research paper changes the subject of study and applies 
an analysis at the provincial level in China. The research papers related to Germany are ordered 
according to their setting and the implied target variables that are discussed below. 
Figure 1.1 Selected policy measures in the thesis 
 
 
 
 
As outlined in Figure 1.1, the empirical analysis of the thesis sets in by investigating the effects of 
GRW funding in Germany (see Sections 2 and 3). The policy aims, on the one hand, to spur addi-
                                                 
7 Due to the different concepts, aims and target variables of the selected policies, a comparison of the estimated results and magni-
tudes is not always meaningful (especially between German and Chinese policies), but is carried out where it is considered useful 
(see Section 4). 
Paper I 
Structural fund-
ing (GRW) in 
Germany 
Paper II 
Structural fund-
ing (GRW) in 
Germany 
Paper III 
Regional fiscal 
equalisation in 
Germany 
Paper IV 
Public research 
activities in Ger-
many 
Paper V 
R&D subsidies 
to firms (LMEs)  
in China 
Sections 2 to 6 
Notes: Own illustration. 
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tional private sector investments and, on the other hand, to support investments in the local infra-
structure (Alecke et al. 2012, 2013; Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). Therefore, the GRW policy meas-
ure primarily targets the private and public physical capital variable in Equation (1.3). 
The third research paper sheds light on the unconditional and conditional effects of regional fiscal 
equalisation in Germany and, in addition, provides a comparison to GRW funding (see Section 4).8 
Although the settings and regulations of regional fiscal equalisation are different to the GRW, basic 
aims and applied instruments show some similarities and allow a comparison between the two 
policy measures: Regional fiscal equalisation also comprises a redistributive character by allocat-
ing public funds to financially weaker regions in order to increases their financial flexibility and to 
ensure the regional endowment of public goods (Lenk et al., 2013). However, in contrast to the 
GRW, regional fiscal equalisation does not have an immediate private sector target. Consequently, 
equalisation payments mainly affect the regional public physical capital as primary target variable 
in Equation (1.3). 
The fourth research paper draws attention to public research activities conducted in universities, 
technical colleges and public research institutes (see Section 5). To analyse their impact on the 
regional economy, the effects of various research activities (scientific publications, acquired third-
party funds) on economic development are investigated. In doing so, regional technology can be 
considered as the primary transmission channel of German public research activities (Fritsch and 
Schwirten, 1999; Schubert and Kroll, 2013). 
                                                 
8 In this thesis, unconditional effects are defined as the funding effects using the basic population of regions for analysis (full set of 
German or Chinese regions). In this setting, the regions are not subdivided according to regional characteristics (see Sections 2, 4, 
5 and 6). Conditional effects are defined as heterogeneous funding effects that depend on regional initial conditions: regions are 
subdivided according to regional characteristics and subsequently the magnitude of the estimated effects is compared across groups. 
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The fifth research paper examines the economic impacts of R&D subsidies allocated to firms in 
China (see Section 6). By applying Chinese data at the provincial level, the research paper contrib-
utes to the vibrant discussion on the outcomes of R&D subsidies to firms by examining how these 
subsidies affect several economic variables. Because innovation activities are human capital inten-
sive (Romer, 1990), the implied primary target variable of Chinese R&D subsidies is the provincial 
human capital (investment rate), which is proxied by private R&D investments and R&D personnel 
of firms. Figure 1.2 summarises the implied transmission channel(s) (target variable(s)) of each 
analysed policy measure in the thesis. 
Figure 1.2 Implied theory-grounded transmission channels of each policy 
 
Private physical capital ki 
Public physical cap-
ital zi 
Human capital hi Technology Ai 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Contribution and overarching research questions 
This section formulates three overarching research questions that emphasise the research focus of 
the thesis. Each research paper in the thesis deals with a specific policy, asks particular research 
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German policies and data Chinese policies and data 
Notes: Own illustration. *Please note that German structural funding also aims to improve regional employment via the (private) 
investment grants (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). 
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questions and derives separate hypotheses that aims to deepen the insights in the overarching re-
search focus of the thesis. In doing so, the thesis adds to recent literature in several ways. 
Besides the identified transmission channel(s) above, policy measures may emanate effects on fur-
ther economic input and output variables of a regional production function (see Fratesi and Wish-
lade, 2017, on the multifaceted character of European cohesion policy). To this end, this thesis does 
not solely investigate the policy effect on a specific economic variable in a single equation approach 
(with the particular target variable or regional output as dependent variable) but on all economic 
variables in Equation (1.3). Therefore, indirect policy effects, which may run through other varia-
bles in the production system, are also considered to calculate the overall effects of an increase in 
the policy variable on each economic input and output variable.9  
Recent empirical policy evaluation studies do not study the effects on a wide set of economic var-
iables of a production function and/or do not identify overall policy effects: With respect to the 
GRW policy, a large part of the empirical literature analyses solely the direct effects on regional 
output (e.g. Alecke et al., 2012, 2013; Alecke and Untiedt, 2007; Eckey and Kosfeld, 2005; Eggert 
et al., 2007; Mitze et al., 2015; Rhoden, 2016). Convserly, only one study by Schalk and Untiedt 
(2000) considers mutual dependencies between physical capital, employment and regional out-
put.10  
Furthermore, the number of empirical studies investigating the economic effects triggered by Ger-
man regional fiscal equalisation is rather low (e.g. Henkel et al., 2018; Kalb, 2010; Lehmann and 
Wrede, 2019) and a comprehensive analysis on the overall economic effects is missing in the em-
pirical literature so far.  
                                                 
9 See Section 1.3 for a detailed description on the taxonomy of policy effects in the thesis.  
10 The studies by Blien et al. (2003), Dettmann et al. (2016), Röhl and von Speicher (2009) and von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) also 
analyse the direct effects of the GRW on additional economic variables. 
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The same applies for empirical studies identifying the economic effects of public research activities 
on regional economic growth in Germany. Although recent empirical studies investigate the effects 
on a set of economic variables, they are often restricted to partial effect analyses (e.g. Fritsch and 
Slavtchev, 2007; Schubert and Kroll, 2013; Spehl et al., 2007).  
Finally, the empirical literature on the outcomes of Chinese R&D subsidies is mostly restricted to 
single equation models, investigating the impact on provincial R&D investments of firms (Chen, 
2018) or on the provincial patent activity (Fan et al., 2012; Li, 2009; Sun, 2000).11 Consequently, 
the thesis adds to the empirical literature by putting forward the following first overarching research 
question: 
1. What are the overall economic effects of the analysed policy measures in Germany and 
China on different regional input and output factors of a regional production function? 
(Unconditional effects) 
In addition to each individual research paper, the collection of four research papers on the working 
and economic outcomes of various German policy measures allows an overview and comparison 
between them. Hence, this thesis also aims to identify unique characteristics of policy measures: 
2. Do the analysed German policy measures add to regional development via different trans-
mission channels and can unique characteristics be identified? (Unconditional effects) 
Finally, the thesis adds to an innovative string of European policy evaluation studies that take po-
tential conditional effects of European policy measures into account (e.g. Becker et al., 2013; Brei-
denbach et al., 2019; Fratesi and Perucca, 2014; Gagliardi and Percoco, 2017; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Garcilazo, 2015).12 Based on these studies, potential heterogeneous returns to GRW and fiscal 
                                                 
11 Please note that the recent literature is discussed in each research paper in more detail (Sections 2 to 6). 
12 The first two research questions deal with unconditional funding effects. 
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equalisation funding in Germany are investigated (see Sections 3 and 4). So far, only the studies 
by Röhl and von Speicher (2009) and Rhoden (2016) regard potential regional heterogeneities in 
the economic returns to GRW funding, while the conditional effects of German regional fiscal 
equalisation have not been analysed. That said, the last overarching research question is as follows: 
3. Do economic responses to an increase in German structural funding and regional fiscal 
equalisation funding depend on conditioning factors such as a region’s absorptive capac-
ity, economic freedom and political-economic conditions? (Conditional effects) 
1.3 Empirical strategy 
In order to answer the research questions above, a (spatial) panel VAR approach and a correspond-
ing IRF analysis is applied.13 As pointed out by Rickman (2010), VAR models are so far hardly 
used by regional economists to analyse the complex outcomes of policy measures on several eco-
nomic variables. 
The application of a VAR approach has the following benefits for the presented research aim: First, 
the estimated effect in a single equation model may allow only insufficient conclusions because 
potential indirect effects are neglected. On the one hand, policy measures may affect an economic 
variable directly, which is indicated by the estimated coefficient of the policy variable in a single 
equation model. This is interpreted here as the direct effect. On the other hand, it is likely that 
policies affect a particular economic variable through other economic variables and mutual de-
pendencies in a regional production system.14 This is interpreted as indirect effect here. The applied 
                                                 
13 Please note that the applied spatial model can be referred to as time-space recursive model that includes besides the explanatory 
variables (lagged in time and time-space) a time as well as a time-space lag of the respective dependent variable (see Sections 2-5 
for a detailed description). Section 6 provides a panel VAR approach. 
14 A particular policy may positively affect, for example, the regional level of technology and, conversely, this increase of the 
technological level may subsequently affect regional GDP per capita. 
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VAR approach allows researchers to sum up direct and indirect effects to overall funding effects 
(see Rickman, 2010, for an overview on structural VAR models or Mitze et al., 2018, for an em-
pirical application).  
In addition, spatial lag variables are included as controls to the applied VAR models in Sections 2 
through 5. For a better understanding, the effect taxonomy has to be expanded here: Within the 
spatial econometric taxonomy, a spatially direct effect is defined as the impact of an increase in an 
explanatory variable (e.g. policy variable) on the particular dependent variable in the same region, 
while a spatially indirect effect indicates the impact of an increase in an explanatory variable (e.g. 
policy variable) on other regions (Elhorst, 2012, 2014; Mitze et al., 2018). This distinction of spa-
tially direct and spatially indirect effects can also be transferred to VAR models by calculating the 
respective overall spatially direct and indirect effects (Mitze et al., 2018). In doing so, the overall 
spatially direct and indirect effects are assumed to be mutually isolated and unlinked here (so-called 
short-term effects: see Elhorst, 2012, 2014). The conducted empirical analyses in the thesis are 
primarily focused to calculate and illustrate the overall spatially direct effects of policy measures.15 
Figure 1.3 summarises the taxonomy of policy effects in the applied spatial panel VAR approach 
(time-space recursive model). 
The second benefit of a VAR approach and an associated IRF analysis is that the described overall 
spatially direct effects can be calculated for all economic input and output factors of a regional 
production function. Thus, it explicitly accounts for potential multifaceted dimension of policies 
by considering mutual dependencies and unintended effects on variables other than the implied 
target variable(s). These unintended effects can be named as secondary effects or indirect impact 
                                                 
15 See Elhorst (2012, 2014) for additional information on short- and long-term effects in spatial panel models. 
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channels. Finally, an IRF analysis allows researchers to graphically illustrate the estimated overall 
effects to an increase in the particular policy variable (Lütkepohl, 2005).16 
Figure 1.3 Employed taxonomy of short-term policy effects in a time-space recursive spatial panel VAR approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4 Data 
The empirical analyses in Sections 2 through 5 are based on data for 258 German labour market 
regions from 2000 to 2011. To this end, the classification of labour market regions by the Federal 
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) is used (e.g. 
Alecke et al., 2012, 2013; Alecke and Untiedt, 2007). This classification aims to harmonise the 
place of residence and the workplace of the population, because at least some part of regional 
inhabitants commute to work in other regions. That said, this issue raises concerns regarding po-
tential measurement errors when constructing normalised variables (intensities) in the research pa-
pers (e.g. GDP per capita or workforce). In order to reduce such measured errors, the observed 
                                                 
16 Further applied methods are paper-specific and thus presented in the respective research paper (Sections 2 to 6). 
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commuting traffic across German small-scale regions is used to construct so-called labour market 
regions. This labour market region classification is seen as best functional definition of German 
regions for the purpose of the conducted analyses in the thesis. Moreover, they also represent the 
administrative level that is used to determine, for example, the eligibility of GRW structural fund-
ing receipts (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014).  
The conducted analysis in Section 6 is based on data for 31 Chinese provinces covering the time 
period 2000 to 2010. The administrative level of Chinese provinces is chosen as no consistent data 
is available on a smaller administrative level. Moreover, the chosen provincial level allows a com-
parison to other recent Chinese policy evaluation studies on the same administrative level (e.g. 
Chen, 2018; Fan et al., 2012; Li, 2009; Sun, 2000). 
All core variables in this thesis are used in form of intensities and are transformed by the natural 
logarithm. The associated data sources, the detailed construction of the applied variables and fur-
ther paper specific data issues are presented in each research paper separately.  
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2.1 Introduction 
German constitutional law postulates the creation of equivalent living conditions and equal oppor-
tunities across all German regions together with a uniform spatial development within the country. 
It is argued that a balanced development between structurally weak and strong regions fosters social 
balance, economic prosperity and development of the entire economy (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2014). The key policy instrument in Germany to support regional development is the “Joint Task 
for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures” (in German: “Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 
‘Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur’”, henceforth GRW). It is the goal of the GRW 
to foster investments in economic lagging regions in order to generate long‐term employment ef-
fects and stimulate economic growth. The GRW operates as a coordinated action framework be-
tween the federal government and the German states that jointly decide on the main regulations for 
financial assistance (e.g., the set of regions which is eligible for public support). With regard to its 
implementation, one distinct objective of GRW funding is to strengthen the private business sector 
in lagging regions – mainly through financial support to physical capital investment projects of 
private businesses with a high export activity as share of total turnover. Another objective is to 
build up the local public infrastructure to support regional business activities in these lagging re-
gions (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001, 2014). 
In times of persistent imbalances across European regions and scarce public funds, studying the 
effectiveness of regional policy at the European and national level is of major interest (studies 
analysing the effects of EU structural funds are, for instance, Breidenbach et al., 2016; Dall'erba 
and Le Gallo, 2008; Mohl and Hagen, 2010; Pellegrini et al., 2013; Pérez et al., 2009).17 Although 
                                                 
17 As we will discuss in greater detail later on when we address the policy relevance of our empirical findings, there is a very high 
thematic overlap between the goals and institutional setup of the German GRW and the EU Structural Funds. Thus, although our 
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the key focus in prior studies is thereby typically set on the partial analysis of productivity or in-
come growth effects, additional questions need to be posed and answered in order to gain a full 
understanding of the working of regional policy. Two key questions are: (i) what are the complex 
economic effects of GRW funding when considering indirect transmission channels on regional 
output running through the different input factors of a region's production function such as the 
capital intensity and knowledge inputs? and (ii) do the observed overall growth effects differ in 
their direction and quantity when decomposing overall funding into the two main focal areas of the 
GRW, namely private sector investment support and public infrastructure investments? 
These are still open research questions despite the bulk of existing empirical studies examining the 
economic effects of the GRW at the regional level (e.g., Alecke et al., 2012, 2013; Alecke and 
Untiedt, 2007; Blien et al., 2003; Dettmann et al., 2016; Eckey and Kosfeld, 2005; Eggert et al., 
2007; Mitze et al., 2015; Röhl and von Speicher, 2009; Rhoden, 2016; Schalk and Untiedt, 2000; 
von Ehrlich and Seidel, 2015).18 One reason is that prior studies provide ambiguous results as they 
are based on different conceptual frameworks and follow heterogeneous research designs (cross‐
sectional or panel data analysis), frequently ignoring spatial interactions across regions. For exam-
ple, none of the existing evaluation studies makes use of recent advances in dynamic spatial panel 
data modelling at a small scale level (258 German labour market regions), which is by now the 
mainstream approach for analysing regional income convergence and evaluating structural funds' 
effectiveness at the European level (see, for example, Bouayad‐Agha and Védrine, 2010; Mohl and 
Hagen, 2010). Furthermore, the potentially heterogeneous effects of the two main objectives of 
                                                 
results only provide evidence for the effectiveness of German regional policy, the main implications may be easily translated to the 
European case. 
18 von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) analyse the effects of the Zonenrandgebiet (ZRG) transfer scheme, which is based on GRW fund-
ing. 
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GRW funding (private sector investment support and public infrastructure investments) have pre-
viously only been decomposed in Blien et al. (2003). And finally, only the empirical identification 
approaches used by Schalk and Untiedt (2000), Blien et al. (2003), Röhl and von Speicher (2009), 
von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) and Dettmann et al. (2016) consider the impact on further socio‐
economic variables other than analysing direct productivity effects – mostly by means of partial 
analyses, though. This illustrates the heterogeneity and potential shortcomings of earlier contribu-
tions in trying to gain a comprehensive understanding of the regional effects of German regional 
policy as a valuable input for political decision making. 
Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to close these research gaps. To this end, we go beyond the 
scope of existing empirical approaches in several aspects: First, in order to robustly identify the 
effects of GRW funding we take advantage of a large panel data set on economic conditions at the 
small‐scale level of 258 German labour market regions and control for dynamic adjustment pro-
cesses and spatial spillovers in the regression approach to avoid estimation biases stemming from 
a correlation of residuals across time and cross‐sections (Debarsy et al., 2012; LeSage and Pace, 
2010). As outlined above, this research gap is particularly apparent in the German context, which 
lags behind the state‐of‐the‐art of evaluation approaches at the EU level. Second, we enhance pre-
vious partial analyses of GRW funding effectiveness by explicitly modelling all input and output 
factors of the production function − namely per capita output, gross employment rate, physical and 
human capital as well as technology (patents) − in a simultaneous equation approach. In order to 
properly consider the indirect funding effects running through various transmission channels of the 
regional economy, we apply a vector autoregressive (VAR) model in combination with an impulse‐
response function (IRF) analysis. To the authors' knowledge, flexible VAR models have not been 
used in the context of structural funds evaluation yet − neither at the national nor at the European 
level. Third, besides quantifying the overall effects of GRW funding, we also distinguish between 
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the working of its two main funding objectives focusing on the support of private sector and public 
infrastructure investments, respectively. 
The empirical results illustrate the importance of our comprehensive research approach: In fact, we 
are able to identify mutual economic effects of the GRW beyond the typically identified output 
effects. As such, we find that GRW support to private sector and public infrastructure investments 
emanate significant positive effects on the regional employment rate as well as on the regional 
human capital intensity – with the size of the estimated effects partly differing between the two 
funding channels. The identified effects are in line with theoretical growth model predictions indi-
cating that regional policy can increase a funded region's employment and per capita output level 
through medium‐run growth effects. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the main characteristics of 
the GRW policy instrument and review the current empirical literature dealing with an assessment 
of regional policy effectiveness in Germany. Section 2.3 discusses some theoretical aspects used 
to derive hypotheses about the complex effects of GRW funding from a growth model perspective. 
Afterwards, the data will be presented in Section 2.4, followed by a technical description of the 
VAR approach and the associated IRF analysis in Section 2.5. The empirical results are discussed 
in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 finally concludes the work and points to future research. 
2.2 The GRW Policy: Institutional setup and empirical evaluation studies 
2.2.1 The GRW policy 
The GRW was introduced in 1969 as a coordinated action of the German federal government and 
the German states in order to foster employment and economic growth through funding private                          
 29 
 
 
sector investment projects in economically lagging regions with locational disadvantages.19 The 
goal of GRW funding can thus be attributed to Article 72 of German constitutional law, which 
grants the German federal government the legislative power to establish equivalent living condi-
tions throughout the federal territory. After the German reunification in 1990, the GRW has been 
transferred to the new Laender in East Germany (Alecke et al., 2012, 2013). Accordingly, the GRW 
has become Germany's most powerful regional policy instrument to support regional development 
and equalize spatial differences in living conditions (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). Besides its mis-
sion as financial power horse, the distinct political relevance also comes from its function as im-
portant coordination framework for numerous policies in Germany that aim to foster the regional 
development (Alecke et al., 2012, 2013).20 
It is further worth noting that the GRW funding scheme is thematically and institutionally very 
closely related to the EU Structural and Investment Funds, particularly the European Regional De-
velopment Fund (ERDF).21 One central task of the ERDF, which is very similar to the goal of GRF 
funding, is that it tries to balance regional disparities within the EU by supporting lagging regions.22 
To this end, among others, the ERDF aims to foster economic growth and create additional em-
ployment by providing different types of investment aids to firms. In addition, the ERDF supports 
investments in different infrastructure measures: basic (transport), innovation, educational, social, 
                                                 
19 The programme is based on the GRW law, see Bundesregierung (1969). 
20 For further details on the institutional setup of the GRW see, for instance, Alecke et al. (2012, 2013) or Deutscher Bundestag 
(2014). 
21 The EU Structural and Investment Funds mainly operate through five distinct funds: ERDF, European Social Fund (ESF), Cohe-
sion Fund (CF), European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 
(European Union, 2013b). 
22 Slightly different from the definition of eligible regions for funding in the GRW scheme, the ERDF classifies regions into three 
categories: less developed regions (GDP per capita is less than 75% of the average level in the EU), transition regions (75%–90% 
of the average GDP in the EU) and more developed regions (above 90% of the average GDP in the EU). Regarding the investment 
volume for growth and employment, 52.45% of these funds are allocated to less developed regions (European Union, 2013b). 
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health or business infrastructure (European Union, 2013a). Due to this strong overlap, ERFD fund-
ing is included into the coordination framework of the GRW as an integral part of the overall fund-
ing scheme for less developed German regions (see Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). 
Two important funding channels of the GRW are direct grants to (export‐orientated) firms which 
are willing to invest in economically lagging regions (e.g., foundation, expansion and moderniza-
tion of commercial units) as well as investments into the regional public infrastructure stock (e.g., 
rebuilding of industrial areas, development of intra- and interregional transport links and formation 
of educational establishments and research parks). Financing of the GRW is subdivided into federal 
and federal state means: the federal budget provides money for 14 of the German federal states 
and, in turn, each of the federal states provides funding based on the principle of additionality (the 
two exceptions with no current GRW support are Baden‐Württemberg and Hamburg). Eligible 
regions for funding within the federal states are selected on the basis of a composite indicator eval-
uating the region's labour market and infrastructure situation relative to the rest of Germany 
(thereby considering the unemployment rate, gross salaries, employment predictions as well as an 
infrastructure indicator). The implementation of the GRW takes place at the level of federal states: 
That is, states can decide on the final allocation of funds among eligible projects, give notice of 
granting and control the compliance of regulations. Moreover, they are free to define the key target 
areas of regional development as framework for funding and its allocation (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2001, 2014). 
In the period 2000 to 2011, nearly 7.38 billion euro were granted within the GRW framework to 
develop the business oriented public infrastructure (68.75% to the New Bundesländer without Ber-
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lin) and around 16.91 billion euro to foster industrial investments (82.70% to the New Bundeslän-
der without Berlin).23 Figure 2.1 illustrates the spatial distribution of the GRW funding intensity 
(defined as GRW funding volume per GDP) in 2000 to 2011, distinguishing between private sector 
and public infrastructure investment support. The figure highlights the unequal spatial distribution 
of funding intensities in both target areas (private sector investment support, local public infra-
structure) across German labour market regions. However, as illustrated in Figure A2.1 in the Ap-
pendix, the GRW funding intensity decreased continuously in recent years. 
Figure 2.1 Spatial distribution of GRW funding intensities across German labor market regions (2000-2011) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own figures based on GRW data from the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA). 
                                                 
23 Own calculations based on data from Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), ERDF payments are 
included. 
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2.2.2 Overview of related evaluation studies 
Prior studies on the effectiveness of regional policy in Germany report ambiguous results. This 
ambiguity can mainly be explained by the different theoretical foundations used for model building 
and the heterogeneous empirical identification approaches used to isolate the causal effects of fund-
ing.24 While one stream of studies applies a quasi‐experimental approach (Dettmann et al., 2016; 
Mitze et al., 2015; von Ehrlich and Seidel, 2015), other studies try to identify effects through par-
ametric estimation of a single‐equation production function approach (Alecke et al., 2013) or apply 
a shift‐share method (Blien et al., 2003). The latter study is also the only one that analyses the 
particular effects of GRW funding along the two funding channels of private sector and public 
infrastructure investment support (the main findings from the recent literature are summarized in 
Table A2.1 in the Appendix). 
Moreover, while some studies rely on a cross‐sectional study design, others apply panel data esti-
mators. The panel data approach features more information, more variation over time and it in-
creases the degrees of freedom for statistical inference (Elhorst, 2003). The panel data approach 
also allows to account for (time‐invariant) latent region‐fixed effects (Islam, 1995). Furthermore, 
ignoring spatial dependence in the impact channels of GRW funding across regions may lead to 
inconsistent estimates (LeSage and Pace, 2010). To account for the presence of latent region‐fixed 
                                                 
24 Röhl and von Speicher (2009) employ an empirical model without explicit theoretical foundations. Schalk and Untiedt (2000) 
base their analysis on a simultaneous output and factor demand system using growth theoretical foundations. The empirical speci-
fication of Eckey and Kosfeld (2005) refers to models of regional development and endogenous growth, where the regional devel-
opment status is determined by key factors such as infrastructure, human capital, institutions, spatial and sectoral structure. Mitze 
et al. (2015), von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) and Dettmann et al. (2016) use a quasi‐experimental evaluation approach. While Mitze 
et al. (2015) and Dettmann et al. (2016) choose different factors that indicate regional conditions and affect the assignment status 
as control variables, von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015) include fixed effects and geographical coordinates of the municipalities. Finally, 
Alecke and Untiedt (2007), Eggert et al. (2007), Alecke et al. (2012, 2013) and Rhoden (2016) base their empirical specifications 
on a neoclassical growth model approach, which is also well established in the international empirical literature (examples are 
Ederveen et al., 2006; Dall'erba and Le Gallo, 2008; Mohl and Hagen, 2010; Darku, 2011). 
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effects and spatial spillovers, we adapt a dynamic spatial panel model approach as, for instance, 
applied in Mohl and Hagen (2010) and Breidenbach et al. (2016) for the analysis of the effective-
ness of EU structural funding. The use of dynamic spatial panel estimators appears to be the most 
robust method to identify the policy parameters of interest.25 
Building on this latter estimation framework, we extend the existing literature by applying a new 
methodological approach that accounts for simultaneity/endogeneity problems. Table A2.1 in the 
Appendix shows that the recent literature has mainly focused on analysing (labour) productivity or 
per capita income as outcome variables of interest when applying a single equation estimation 
approach. We denote this as the direct output effect of GRW funding. However, if the GRW has 
an additional indirect effect on, for example, the capital investment rate in a region, a single equa-
tion approach focusing on labour productivity as sole outcome variable would not be able to capture 
this indirect output effect running through an increase in the investment rate on economic output. 
Therefore, separate equations for all input factors involved in the production of economic output 
are needed to identify such indirect effects. To our knowledge, the only empirical study which 
applies a system approach to the analysis of GRW effectiveness is Schalk and Untiedt (2000). The 
latter authors conduct a simultaneous analysis of output and factor demand in a small multiple‐
equation system focusing on the supply side of the economy with structural equations for regional 
production and factor demand in physical capital and labour, respectively.26 
                                                 
25 Mohl and Hagen (2010) report a positive effect of EU Objective 1 funds, while the total sum of Objective 1, 2 and 3 funds is non-
significant or significantly negative, respectively. Breidenbach et al. (2016) find a negative correlation between EU structural funds 
and regional growth, mainly due to negative spatial spillovers of funding. 
26 At the international level, a variety of very similar studies on the effectiveness of capital investment support schemes have been 
published. Examples are Luger (1984) for the US, Faini and Schiantarelli (1987) for Italy, Harris (1991) for Northern Ireland and 
Daly et al. (1993) for Canada. 
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In this study, we investigate the mutual dependencies among regional economic variables and deal 
with their associated dynamics by applying a VAR model and associated IRF analysis. Due to this 
approach we are able to control for mutual endogeneity among the included variables and to ana-
lyse the effects of an isolated shock in GRW intensity on all other variables in our economic system. 
Variable selection is based on recent contributions in the field of growth theory, which also allows 
us to formulate hypotheses on the expected total (direct plus indirect) effects of GRW funding. 
These will be presented next. 
2.3 Theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
In growth models – either neoclassical (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992; Solow, 1956) or endogenous 
(e.g., Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990) – the dynamics of variables follow prescribed growth mecha-
nisms. To develop theoretically sound predictions used for variable selection in our flexible VAR 
approach and for the formation of prior expectations when interpreting our empirical results, we 
mainly refer to extended versions of the Solow model (Crihfield et al., 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992) 
and the endogenous growth model by Romer (1990). As starting point, we formulate the production 
function of region i at time t as (Mankiw et al., 1992): 
    Yi(t) = Ki(t)α Hi(t)β (Ai(t) Li(t))1-α-β,              (2.1) 
where Y denotes regional output, K and H are physical and human capital, respectively, A is the 
region's technology level and L represents regional employment. The coefficients α and β measure 
the returns to different types of capital and, under the assumption of decreasing returns to all capital 
types, the restriction α + β < 1 should hold. However, in the following, we deviate from the standard 
approach by Mankiw et al. (1992) and assume that the values determining the steady state income 
level change over consecutive time intervals and are thus not treated as constant for the entire 
period (Islam, 1995). 
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As public (infrastructure) investments are of major interest for our empirical model, we adopt a 
model extension introduced by Crihfield et al. (1995) (used, for instance, in a study by Brunow 
(2009)) and distinguish between private Ki(t) and public physical capital Zi(t). Adding the latter to 
the production function in Equation (2.1) then leads to: 
Yi(t) = Ki(t)α Hi(t)β Zi(t)γ (Ai(t) Li(t))1-α-β-γ,           (2.2) 
where γ measures the return to public capital. A commonly used assumption in empirical growth 
models is that labour grows simultaneously with population (Islam, 1995) or working‐age popula-
tion (Mankiw et al., 1992). However, for modelling regional growth in an aging economy such as 
Germany, this appears to be an unrealistic assumption. Bräuninger and Pannenberg (2002) have 
accordingly developed an extension of the Solow growth model that is based on a similar logic, 
although it is implemented in a slightly different way given that the focus of the latter authors is 
set on studying the effects of unemployment. For the purpose of this analysis, we define L as: 
     Li(t) = λi(t) · Pi(0)enit,           (2.3) 
where Pi(t) is the economically active population aged between 15 and 64 years, ni denotes the 
exogenous growth rate of this population and λi(t) represents the share of population employed 
(Li(t)/Pi(t)), which might fluctuate over time (denoted by li(t)), but is assumed to be constant in the 
long run. Straightforwardly, the production function in terms of per (economically active) capita 
can be written as: 
           yi(t) = ki(t)α hi(t)β zi(t)γ (Ai(t)λi(t))1-α-β-γ.27        (2.4) 
                                                 
27 Note that yi(t) = (Yi(t)/Pi(t)), ki(t) = (Ki(t)/Pi(t)), hi(t) = (Hi(t)/Pi(t)) and zi(t) = (Zi(t)/Pi(t)). We follow Crihfield et al. (1995) and 
Brunow (2009) by assuming constant returns to scale: The production function is still homogenous of degree one in the rival goods 
Ki(t), Hi(t), Zi(t) and Li(t). The properties of Zi(t) are quite similar to Ki(t), i.e. we assume the same marginal productivity. We 
additionally assume that the government utilizes public capital according to marginal productivity theory. However, Zi(t) is non‐
excludable (one may think about public highways or schools), but rival (it cannot be used simultaneously by different people at 
different places at the same time). Thus, the replication argument does not apply. Although public capital is an unpaid input factor 
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We take the extended production function in Equation (2.4) as benchmark specification for the 
selection of variables to be included in our empirical VAR model: that is, we use output per eco-
nomically active working population (y), technology (A), gross employment rate (λ), human capital 
(h), private physical capital (k) as well as public sector physical capital (z) per economically active 
population. Unfortunately, the regional physical capital stocks (private and public) as well as the 
regional technological level are difficult to measure empirically and they are subject to data limi-
tations. This may cause measurement errors. Therefore, we make use of private sector (sk) and 
public sector physical capital investments (sz) as well as technological growth (g), where the latter 
is proxied by the region's patent rate (defined as the share of patent applications per regional GDP) 
as variables for the specification and estimation of our empirical model. 
Before we proceed with a more detailed data description, we first derive explicit hypotheses for 
the expected relationship between GRW funding and the included behavioral variables from the 
perspective of regional growth theory by explicitly formulating a set of functional form equations 
for the input factors in the regional production function. 
2.3.1 Investment rates of private, public and human capital 
Based on the per capita production function in Equation (2.4), dynamic equations for output growth 
and capital accumulation can be formulated to arrive at hypotheses about the dynamic direct and 
indirect impact channels of GRW policy support. As such, growth rates of private, public and hu-
man capital stocks can be written as: 
                                                 
for private production, it is compensated indirectly by taxes. Thus, the profit of a representative firm can be defined as: π = (Y‐ψY) 
– wL – rHH – rKK, where w denotes wages, while rH and rK are the rates of return for human and physical capital, respectively; ψ 
are taxes. (Y‐ψY) can be interpreted as net output of firms and ψY as the public investment rate sz. Moreover, technology is defined 
as public good in the long run. Especially due to the non‐rivalry characteristic of technology, the replication argument and constant 
returns apply in the long run (Barro and Sala‐i‐Martin, 2004). 
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k
.
i
ki
 = sk,i[ki(t)α-1 hi(t)β zi(t)γ (Ai(t)λi(t))1-α-β-γ] – (ni+δ),  
   
z. i
zi
 = sz,i[ki(t)α hi(t)β zi(t)γ-1 (Ai(t)λi(t))1-α-β-γ] – (ni+δ),                     (2.5) 
and 
   
h
.
i
hi
 = sh,i[ki(t)α hi(t)β-1 zi(t)γ (Ai(t)λi(t))1-α-β-γ] – (ni+δ), 
where sk, sz and sh measure private, public and human capital investments, respectively. The de-
scription of the GRW policy above has shown that, on the one hand, GRW support to the private 
sector (henceforth, GRW industry investments) provides non‐refundable grants as an incentive for 
more physical investments by private firms. Thus, the GRW industry programme is expected to 
primarily accelerate the growth rate of the private sector physical capital stock due to a higher 
private investment rate sk,i (Ederveen et al., 2006). On the other hand, considering the GRW support 
to public infrastructure investments (henceforth, GRW infrastructure investments), funding recip-
ients are particularly administrative bodies in the regions or their municipalities itself (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2001, 2014). Thus, this latter type of investment grants is expected to mainly affect the 
public investment rate sz,i and, thus, the local public capital stock. However, the latter funding may 
also affect the private sector capital stock indirectly by establishing improved regional production 
conditions (higher marginal productivity of private capital). Thus, we can expect: 
Hypothesis 2.1 (H2.1): GRW industry investment support primarily stimulates additional 
private sector investments leading to a (temporarily) higher physical investment rate in the 
funded region. Similarly, GRW infrastructure investment support is expected to increase 
the public sector investment rate directly and has an additional indirect effect on private 
sector investment rate via an improvement of regional production conditions. 
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The dynamics of human capital formation is typically expected to differ from physical capital ac-
cumulation only through heterogeneous investment rates, while all capital forms are assumed to 
depreciate at the same rate (Mankiw et al., 1992). Thus, according to Equation (2.5), an increase 
of the per capita stock of public and private sector physical capital – given a constant investment 
rate in human capital sh,i – should accelerate human capital growth indirectly. 
However, although the augmented Solow model rules out a substitution effect, in the short run, 
human capital may be seen as a substitute to physical capital. That is, if physical capital becomes 
cheaper, the input of human capital could be reduced, especially if output remains constant. Hence, 
one may expect that GRW support to industry investments decreases human capital input, unless 
both types of capital can be seen as complementary. The situation is different for GRW support to 
infrastructure investments. These investments also aim at supporting educational and training fa-
cilities and research parks, so that they may well attract people with higher qualification levels to 
the region. Therefore, public physical capital investments are not direct substitutes to human capi-
tal, and we can expect: 
H2.2 The effects of GRW support to industry investments on regional human capital are 
ex‐ante unclear and depend on the nature of the relationship between human and physical 
capital (substitutive or complementary). GRW support to infrastructure investments is ex-
pected to have a positive effect on the regional stock of human capital mainly operating 
through public investments in education, training facilities and research parks. 
2.3.2 Technological growth rate 
Mankiw et al. (1992) assume that the technological growth rate is exogenously given and constant 
across economies. Relaxing this strong assumption, Temple (1999) describes the argumentation of 
theorists, economic historians or development historians that – at least – some ideas are secret 
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and/or protected, while others are difficult to absorb. Hence, he indicates that an equal technolog-
ical growth rate may hold for long‐run development, while it is a rather unrealistic expectation in 
the short run (Temple, 1999). Hence, we allow the regional technological growth rates gi to vary 
across German regions in the short run. However, to deduce theoretical predictions here, we refer 
to the endogenous growth model by Romer (1990). It is assumed that technological progress (new 
designs) is reached according to the efforts that are put into the research sector as: 
A
.
i = δHA,iAi and 
A
.
i
Ai
 = δHA,i.         (2.6) 
Whether GRW funds have a direct effect on technological progress (proxied through the patent 
rate) is a question of whether the funds change the share of resources that are put into the research 
sector or not. As already sketched above, reductions in the user costs of physical capital may pro-
vide an incentive to substitute human capital in favour of physical capital if both capital forms are 
characterized by a substitutive relationship. Differently, GRW support to public infrastructure in-
vestments has a focus, among others, on fostering research, technology or incubation units (see 
subsection 2.2.1). Therefore, we can expect: 
H2.3 Whether the impact of GRW support to industry investments on technological pro-
gress is positive or negative is a priori unclear and depends on its effect on human capital 
(see H2.2), while GRW support to public infrastructure investments is expected to exhibit 
positive effects on regional technological progress. 
2.3.3 Output 
Based on Equation (2.4), output growth is a function of the growth rate of human, public and private 
physical capital as well as the region's technological level and – in our extended model – the em-
ployment rate (constant in the long run). Hence, output growth can be expressed as: 
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y. i
yi
 = (1-α-β-γ) 
A
.
i
Ai
+ (1-α-β-γ) 
λ
.
i
λi
+ α
k
.
i
ki
+ β
h
.
i
hi
+ γ z. izi . 28                 (2.7) 
This implies that a higher physical capital accumulation – via the private as well as public sector 
physical capital stock – affects output, ceteris paribus, positively. In addition to these known ef-
fects, there may be other (latent) impact channels of GRW funding, which go beyond those repre-
sented by the included input factors (or are only partially captured by these factors). In the litera-
ture, these additional channels of structural funds are, for instance, associated with international 
trade or foreign direct investments (see, e.g., Katsaitis and Doulos, 2009). It is exactly this uncer-
tainty about the mutual impact channels of GRW support on the regional economy, which moti-
vates our choice of a flexible VAR approach. Therefore, we can expect: 
H2.4 The per capita output effects of both GRW investment types are positive and mainly 
run through an increase in the modelled factor inputs but may also stem from other latent 
transmission channels. 
Hence, given that the included input factors may only imperfectly cover all output effects, we use 
a flexible VAR approach to capture latent per capita output effects by including GRW funding as 
an additional regressor in the output equation as well. 
2.3.4 Employment rate 
With regard to employment, the usual assumption in the Solow growth model is that labour (labour 
supply is vertical) grows exogenously at the constant rate of working‐age population growth 
(Mankiw et al., 1992) or overall population growth (Islam, 1995). However, if the employment rate 
                                                 
28 Note that 
λ
.
i
λi
 is expected to be zero, on average, in the long run. 
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is allowed to vary over time, it can be regarded as an alternative production input as already dis-
cussed above. Assuming a competitive market setting, public subsidies could thus temporarily in-
crease the financial resources in the supported regions and induce the provision of additional pri-
vate investments. On the one hand, labour becomes more expensive relative to capital and is, ceteris 
paribus, replaced by capital (substitution effect). However, if the additional investments go along 
with an increase in output, labour input may increase as well through output effects (Bade, 2012). 
Schalk and Untiedt (2000) indicate two reasons for such output effects to occur: first, the reduction 
in the user costs of capital may attract firms in the supported regions to extend their production. 
Moreover, firms in non‐assisted regions are attracted by the lower user costs of capital and may 
thus shift their production to supported regions (Schalk and Untiedt, 2000).29 Both arguments lead 
to a higher demand for labour which, in turn, increases labour input, wages and may induce in‐
migration as well (permanent higher labour supply). Furthermore, it has to be taken into consider-
ation that – according to the GRW programme – firms are obligated to create or, at least, to protect 
existing jobs by regulation (Deutscher Bundestag, 2001, 2014). This puts some pressure on the 
recipients and we can expect that GRW support to industry investments fosters employment in the 
short run. 
In contrast, GRW support to public infrastructure investments does not foster the output of partic-
ular firms, but improves the regional public capital stock. If this improvement makes firms more 
successful in expanding their output, the effects of GRW infrastructure investments are positive as 
well. Obviously, such an effect scenario builds on the assumption that firms do not change the 
composition of factor inputs along the path of output expansion. Taken together, we can expect: 
                                                 
29 This argument also applies to human capital. 
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H2.5 Given positive output effects of funding and no change in the composition of factor 
inputs, we expect that the effects of GRW support to industry investments as well as to 
infrastructure investments on the regional employment rate are positive. 
2.4 Data and Variables 
For our empirical analysis we use panel data for 258 German labour market regions covering the 
period 2000-2011.30 The definition of labour market regions is based on the official classification 
of the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) 
(Status: 31.12.2014). The utilized variables and associated data sources are described in Table 
2.1.31 As the table shows, our main outcome variable in the region's per capita production function 
is GDP per economically active working population. All factor inputs are transformed into mean-
ingful rates, while GRW funding is measured as the intensity with regard to regional GDP levels. 
As outlined above, we decompose the total GRW intensity into industry and infrastructure support 
schemes, respectively. All variables are measured in logarithmic form. Summary statistics for each 
variable are given in Table A2.2 (Appendix). 
Given that our sample period is affected by the macroeconomic consequences of the global eco-
nomic crisis, we also construct a set of annual time dummies for inclusion in our empirical model. 
One should further note that the data is not free of errors: Especially data on the qualification of 
employees in Germany (IAB) but also regional investment rates are subject to missing values. 
Missing values for industry investments have been interpolated on the basis of an autoregressive 
                                                 
30 The time period used for estimation is limited by data availability. This limits the generalization of our results. However, studying 
the time before 2000 would be problematic due to the reunification of Germany and the tremendous restructuring processes in East 
Germany between 1989 and 2000. Particularly, East Germany faced a significant outmigration prior to 2000, which is likely to bias 
the estimation results with regard to certain outcome variables such as per capita GDP and the employment rate. 
31 Before taking the natural logarithm (ln), we replace zero values by a very small value (Alecke et al., 2012, 2013). 
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process with three lags. We assume that all data imperfections (qualification of employees' data) 
do not lead to systematic regional biases, so that they contribute to the random error term. 
Table 2.1 Variable descriptions and data sources 
Variable Description Data source 
 lgdp Nominal GDP per economically active working population (in 
ln) defined as:  
[GDP in € / (Population aged 15 to 64 years × 
Participation rate)] 
Note: Population data is based on the extrapolation of the census 
1987. The participation rate is based on the same population data 
until the year 2011. From 2011, the participation rate is calcu-
lated based on the population data of the census 2011. 
GDP: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder” (Status: Au-
gust 2015) 
Population aged 15 to 64 years: Re-
gionaldatenbank Deutschland (Based on the 
population census 1987) 
Participation rate: Statistik der Bundesagen-
tur für Arbeit / Indikatoren und Karten zur 
Raum und Stadtentwicklung (INKAR) 
linvq Private sector physical capital investment rate (in ln) defined as 
industry investments in the manufacturing, mining and quarrying 
sector as share of the nominal GDP:  
[Industry Investments in € / GDP in €] 
Note: Missing values are interpolated on the basis of an auto-
regressive process with 3 lags. 
Bundesinstitut für Bau‐, Stadt‐, und Raum-
forschung (BBSR), laufende Raumbeobach-
tungen, various issues 
lhk Higher education rate (in ln) defined as: 
[Employees with university degree / (Population aged 15 to 64 
years × Participation rate)] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), 
Nuremberg 
lemp Gross employment rate (in ln) defined as: 
[Employees total / (Population aged 15 to 64 years × Participa-
tion rate)] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), 
Nuremberg 
lpat Patent rate (in ln) defined as: 
[Patents / GDP in Mio. €] 
Own calculation from the PATSTAT data-
base (Version October 2014, European Pa-
tent Office) 
lgrw 
(lgrw_ind, 
lgrw_infra) 
GRW investment intensity (and sub‐components for industry 
and infrastructure investment support) (in ln) are defined as: 
[GRW funding volumes in € / GDP in €] 
Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Ex-
port Control (BAFA) 
w_X Spatial lags for each variable are constructed in absolute values 
using the STATA command splagvar. Thereupon, all spatial lag 
variables are normalized and ln‐transformed similar to the non‐
spatial variables above. 
 
Given the moderate to long time dimension of our data (T = 12), non‐stationarity of our variables 
may constitute a serious concern for estimation. To test the time‐series properties of variables prior 
to estimation, we perform a series of panel unit root tests as suggested by Im et al. (2003) (hence-
forth IPS). Table 2.2 highlights that the employment rate and human capital as well as their spatial 
lags show signs of non‐stationarity. In order to estimate a shot‐run VAR system for stationary 
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variables, we hence detrended those variables, whereupon we can reject the null hypothesis that all 
panel members contain a unit root (against the alternative that they are stationary for at least some 
panel members) for these variables. 
Table 2.2 IPS panel unit root test for variables 
Variable Number of regions 
Number of years 
(2000-2011) IPS test-statistic p-value 
lgdp 258 12 -4.1221 0.000 
lemp 258 12 -0.3447 0.3652 
lemp_detrended 258 12 -16.0799 0.000 
lhk 258 12 0.1299 0.5517 
lhk_detrended 258 12 -17.6164 0.000 
linvq 258 12 -17.5815 0.000 
lpat 258 12 -17.4463 0.000 
lgrw 258 12 -9.4251 0.000 
lgrw_ind 258 12 -11.1014 0.000 
lgrw_infra 258 12 -14.6072 0.000 
w_lgdp 258 12 -3.3759 0.0004 
w_lemp 258 12 -1.4097 0.0793 
w_lemp_detrended 258 12 -17.7560 0.000 
w_lhk 258 12 0.0105 0.5042 
w_lhk_detrended 258 12 -18.1141 0.000 
w_linvq 258 12 -15.1902 0.000 
w_lpat 258 12 -13.6908 0.000 
w_lgrw 258 12 -11.1076 0.000 
w_lgrw_ind 258 12 -13.3155 0.000 
w_lgrw_infra 258 12 -20.5042 0.000 
Notes: IPS: Im et al. (2003) panel unit-root test. H0: All panels contain unit roots. HA: Some panels are stationary. Suffix 
“_detrended” denotes detrended variable; see text for details. 
We also incorporate spatial lags of the different variables in the estimation approach as a way to 
account for spatial heterogeneity and underlying geographical spillovers among the variables. 
These spatial lags are calculated as the average values in the geographical surroundings of region 
i at time t. The creation of spatial lags thus needs a measure for the spatial association of regions, 
which is typically summarized in a spatial weighting matrix. In constructing such a spatial 
weighting matrix to control for spatial dependence across regions, we follow Eckey and Kosfeld 
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(2005) and use a binary first‐order neighborhood matrix. The construction of the weighting matrix 
WN proceeds as follows: 
w*ij = 0 if i = j and i and j ≠ common border 
    w*ij = 1 if i ≠ j and i and j = common border            (2.8) 
wij = w*ij/ ∑i w*ij, 
where w*ij is an element of a non‐standardized weighting matrix and wij is an element of a normal-
ized weighting matrix. We normalize the weighting matrix by dividing each element of w*ij by the 
column sum of the matrix. In contrast to the row‐normalization approach, we assume that the de-
gree of the spatial spillover depends on the sum of neighboring regions the radiating region has 
(see Elhorst (2014) for further information about the normalization of wij). 
As a further pre‐estimation test to assess the degree of spatial dependence in our data, we conduct 
a series of univariate tests based on Moran's I as a global indicator for spatial dependence across 
German regions (Moran, 1950). The test results shown in Table 2.3 point to the presence of positive 
and persistent spatial autocorrelation for almost all variables and sample years (with the exception 
of the employment rate).32 
 
                                                 
32 A likely reason for the non‐existing spatial dependence in the employment rate is its specific construction (See Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.3 Moran’s I test of spatial autocorrelation across German labor market regions  
Variable → lgdp lemp lemp_detrended lhk lhk_detrended 
Year ↓ 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
2000 0.474 12.401 0.000 -0.017 -0.344 0.366 -0.012 -0.210 0.417 0.225 5.924 0.000 0.232 6.118 0.000 
2001 0.446 11.663 0.000 0.003 0.188 0.425 0.013 0.445 0.328 0.207 5.472 0.000 0.222 5.848 0.000 
2002 0.422 11.059 0.000 0.012 0.420 0.337 0.029 0.841 0.200 0.198 5.239 0.000 0.219 5.790 0.000 
2003 0.395 10.361 0.000 0.012 0.408 0.342 0.032 0.926 0.177 0.190 5.016 0.000 0.218 5.742 0.000 
2004 0.379 9.929 0.000 0.008 0.300 0.382 0.032 0.939 0.174 0.180 4.768 0.000 0.216 5.695 0.000 
2005 0.373 9.771 0.000 0.020 0.613 0.270 0.050 1.385 0.083 0.164 4.353 0.000 0.206 5.447 0.000 
2006 0.342 8.965 0.000 -0.001 0.079 0.468 0.026 0.782 0.217 0.162 4.306 0.000 0.213 5.621 0.000 
2007 0.330 8.670 0.000 0.001 0.136 0.446 0.028 0.840 0.201 0.153 4.077 0.000 0.211 5.578 0.000 
2008 0.339 8.883 0.000 -0.000 0.090 0.464 0.029 0.858 0.195 0.149 3.969 0.000 0.212 5.595 0.000 
2009 0.312 8.198 0.000 -0.023 -0.503 0.307 0.003 0.186 0.426 0.152 4.040 0.000 0.222 5.862 0.000 
2010 0.300 7.891 0.000 -0.027 -0.609 0.271 -0.002 0.061 0.476 0.150 3.991 0.000 0.228 6.012 0.000 
2011 0.321 8.426 0.000 -0.012 -0.215 0.415 0.022 0.675 0.250 0.142 3.795 0.000 0.229 6.026 0.000 
Variable → linvq lpat lgrw lgrw_ind lgrw_infra 
Year ↓ 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
Mo-
ran's I Z(I) P-val. 
2000 0.114 3.070 0.001 0.311 8.920 0.000 0.700 18.199 0.000 0.705 18.331 0.000 0.628 16.364 0.000 
2001 0.118 3.153 0.001 0.508 13.337 0.000 0.702 18.257 0.000 0.702 18.238 0.000 0.665 17.318 0.000 
2002 0.161 4.297 0.000 0.298 8.602 0.000 0.686 17.833 0.000 0.686 17.848 0.000 0.670 17.435 0.000 
2003 0.129 3.471 0.000 0.389 11.099 0.000 0.692 17.986 0.000 0.690 17.932 0.000 0.573 14.941 0.000 
2004 0.138 3.678 0.000 0.362 10.290 0.000 0.708 18.413 0.000 0.715 18.592 0.000 0.554 14.451 0.000 
2005 0.048 1.351 0.088 0.323 9.076 0.000 0.698 18.153 0.000 0.703 18.276 0.000 0.671 17.468 0.000 
2006 0.107 2.881 0.002 0.384 10.876 0.000 0.712 18.502 0.000 0.711 18.479 0.000 0.641 16.697 0.000 
2007 0.100 2.698 0.003 0.375 10.952 0.000 0.704 18.289 0.000 0.704 18.290 0.000 0.605 15.783 0.000 
2008 0.189 5.022 0.000 0.525 13.730 0.000 0.692 17.990 0.000 0.694 18.051 0.000 0.639 16.639 0.000 
2009 0.087 2.367 0.009 0.348 10.600 0.000 0.691 17.967 0.000 0.704 18.299 0.000 0.626 16.301 0.000 
2010 0.154 4.098 0.000 0.234 7.242 0.000 0.694 18.044 0.000 0.698 18.152 0.000 0.530 13.825 0.000 
2011 0.187 4.960 0.000 0.302 9.252 0.000 0.684 17.793 0.000 0.685 17.820 0.000 0.548 14.295 0.000 
Notes: Details on the underlying spatial weighting matrix used to compute the Moran's I statistic are given in the main text; Z(I) = Moran's I test statistic. 
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2.5 Econometric Modelling 
2.5.1 Panel VAR approach 
VAR models have been developed as a flexible modelling tool for the analysis of multiple equa-
tions systems (Sims, 1980). One of the key features of the VAR approach is that it keeps theoretical 
restrictions imposed to the empirical model structure at a minimum. Although VAR applications 
have rapidly increased in fields such as macroeconomics and international economics, Rickman 
(2010) emphasizes that VAR models are still scarcely used by regional economists to forecast re-
gional economic relationships and conduct policy analyses with mutual outcome variables. How-
ever, compared to the inert use of the VAR approach for applied analyses in regional economics, 
the discipline has been quite active in extending the methodological foundations of the approach, 
for instance, by incorporating spatial dependency structures in spatial panel VAR (SpPVAR) mod-
els.33 
We will apply a SpPVAR model for the analysis of GRW effects. Therefore, we estimate a dynamic 
system comprising six equations with the following dependent variables: (i) per (economically ac-
tive) capita output; (ii) physical capital investment rate; (iii) higher education rate; (iv) gross em-
ployment rate; (v) patent rate; and (vi) GRW investment intensity. We apply a maximum lag length 
of “t‐1” so that our dynamic system of M equations (with M = 6) can be specified as (Mitze et al., 
2018) 
       y1,it= µ1,i+ τ1,t+ a1,1y1,it-1+ a1,2y2,it-1+…+ a1,MyM,it-1+ ε1,it 
    ...                 (2.9) 
     yM,it= µM,i+ τM,t + aM,1y1,it-1+	aM,2y2,it-1+…+	aM,MyM,it-1+ εM,it. 
                                                 
33 See Mitze et al. (2018) for additional information on methodical advancements in the field. Moreover, empirical application of 
spatial VAR specifications can be found, for example, in Beenstock and Felsenstein (2007), Di Giacinto (2010), Monteiro (2010), 
Ramajo et al. (2017) and Mitze et al. (2018). 
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In Equation (2.9), µm,i and τm,t (with m = 1, …, M) denote region‐ and time‐specific effects, respec-
tively, that are included in each of the mth equations, am,m are regression coefficients and εm, it is an 
i.i.d. error term (Mitze et al., 2018). Stacking over variables and regions, we can write the VAR 
system more compactly as (Mitze et al., 2018; Rickman, 2010) 
                     yt	=	µ	+	τt	+	A(L)yt-1+	εt,	                  (2.10) 
where µ and τt are now NM × 1 vectors of region‐ and time‐fixed effects, respectively; L is the lag 
operator and A(L) is a reduced‐form coefficient matrix relating past values t‐1 to current values t 
(Mitze et al., 2018; Rickman, 2010). Moreover, εt denotes an NM × 1 vector of reduced-form errors 
with Eεt =	0, Eεtε't = Σ and Eεtε't-h = 0 (for h	=	1,2,…), where Σ is an NM × NM variance-
covariance matrix (Mitze et al., 2018). 
One advantage of reduced‐form VARs is that they do not require imposing exclusion restrictions, 
however, at the same time they often face the problem of over‐parameterization and they disregard 
the economic structure. To overcome these shortcomings, the structural VAR (SVAR) model has 
been proposed, which uses economic theory or other a priori assumptions on the behaviour of the 
process to impose restrictions to receive orthogonalized shocks used for the computation of impulse 
response functions as well as variance decompositions (Rickman, 2010). Building on Rickman 
(2010), the corresponding SVAR to the reduced‐form specification in Equation (2.10) can be ex-
pressed as: 
     Byt	=	µ	+	τt	+	CLyt-1+	Det.	       (2.11) 
Following Rickman (2010), B denotes a matrix of contemporaneous structural parameters, while 
C(L) denotes a matrix of polynomials that relates time lagged to contemporaneous variables and 
D indicates the various contemporaneous responses of the endogenous variables to economic 
shocks. Premultiplying the equation with B−1 leads to the reduced‐form VAR as in Equation (2.10) 
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with A(L) = B−1 C(L) and εt = B−1et. For known B and D, the structural properties of the system 
could be revealed when calculating C(L) and et using the estimated reduced‐form model. However, 
given that B and D are unknown, certain restrictions have to be imposed on B in order to identify 
the various structural parameters and shocks (Rickman, 2010). As Di Giacinto (2010) argues, a 
regular method to arrive at an exactly identified specification is to assume a particular recursive 
causal ordering regarding the included endogenous variables. This ordering is also referred to as 
Wold causal ordering (Wold, 1954). Moreover, Di Giacinto (2010) states that this assumption of 
contemporaneous exogeneity is technically analogous to an orthogonalization of the error terms by 
performing a Choleski decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals 
from the reduced‐form VAR (see also Hamilton, 1994; Sims, 1980). 
2.5.2 Accounting for spatial spillovers 
The above presented Panel VAR approach can further be extended to capture spatial dependence 
in the data generating processes of the variable vector yt. We focus on the role played by local 
spillovers associated with the included right‐hand side regressors in each equation of the M‐equa-
tion system. We will quantify spatial spillover effects through the inclusion of spatial lags of yt, 
where the spatial lag for the m-th variable is defined as ∑ wijNj=1 ym,it (Mitze et al., 2018). For a 
standardized matrix WN (see Section 2.4) the individual elements wij thus measure the strength of 
association between region i and j in composing the spatial neighborhood around region i. Under 
the inclusion of spatial lags of yt, we can write the reduced‐form of the spatially extended 
SpPVAR(2.10) system as: 
           yt = µ + τt + ALyt-1 + HLWyt-1 + εt,	      (2.12) 
where W = IM⨂WN is consisting of an identity matrix I (with dimension = M) and WN, assuming 
that spatial weights do not differ across equations (Mitze et al., 2018). H(L) is a coefficient matrix 
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relating past values of the spatial lag terms to current values of yt as H(L) = IN⨂γ, where γ is a M 
× M matrix of regression coefficients γm,mM×M. The structural VAR specification of the spatially 
extended system is then a straightforward extension of equation (2.11) as: 
Byt	=	µ	+	τt	+	CLyt-1	+	GLWyt-1	+	Det,      (2.13) 
with H(L) = B−1 G(L). Since we are interested in the short‐term dynamics of the SpPVAR system, 
we can then interpret C(L) and G(L) as the direct and spatially indirect effects of changes in yt−1 
on yt based on the reduced form estimates of Equation (2.12) and conditional on the chosen causal 
ordering scheme. 
2.5.3 Estimation and impulse‐response function analysis 
Different approaches have been proposed in the recent econometric literature to estimate SpPVAR 
systems, which chiefly depend upon the degree of right‐hand side endogeneity involved. In the 
case of the reduced‐form specification of Equation (2.12), we follow the argumentation in 
Beenstock and Felsenstein (2007) that yt−1 and Wyt−1 are weakly exogenous (given that the above 
stated assumption on the model's residuals holds as Eεtε't-h = 0), which greatly simplifies the 
consistent estimation of spatially extended panel models to the use of standard methods such as the 
Fixed Effects (FE) estimator. However, one complicating factor is that the estimation of the 
SpPVAR involves time lags of the dependent variable as an additional regressor in each equation 
of the SpPVAR system. In this case, the FE estimator will yield biased coefficients for A(L) given 
a non‐zero correlation of the latter lagged endogenous variable with the model's error term (Nickell, 
1981). To account for this so‐called “Nickell” bias in the estimation of dynamic panel data models, 
different extensions to the (inconsistent) FE estimator have been proposed, which either rely on 
(analytical or bootstrap‐based) correction methods (Everaert and Pozzi, 2007; Kiviet, 1995) or 
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make use of weakly exogenous instruments such as the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) instrument 
variable (IV), the Arellano and Bond (1991) first‐difference generalized method of moments (FD‐
GMM) or the Blundell and Bond (1998) system‐GMM (SYS‐GMM) estimator. We apply the boot-
strap‐based corrected FE estimator suggested in Everaert and Pozzi (2007) to estimate the coeffi-
cients of the SpPVAR system in Equation (2.12). 
We then use IRFs to illustrate the reaction of one variable to (uncorrelated) shocks in the further 
variables of the regional system (Lütkepohl, 2005). Therefore, the model is rearranged into its 
moving average (MA) presentation that is expressed by the vector of structural uncorrelated errors 
and the estimated coefficient matrices (Mitze et al., 2018). Our focus in this study rests on compu-
ting IRFs on the basis of the coefficient matrix C(L), while the included spatial lag terms only 
serve the purpose of obtaining unbiased regression results here.34 We construct confidence intervals 
by conducting Monte Carlo (MC) simulations to evaluate the statistical significance of the partic-
ular IRFs (Love and Zicchino, 2006). We provide details on the specific causal ordering imposed 
on the SpPVAR system as well as the implementation of the MC simulations when discussing the 
empirical results in the following. 
2.6 Empirical results 
In the discussion of the empirical results, we primarily focus on presenting the associated IRFs for 
the different effects of a temporary, one standard deviation shock to the GRW intensity (both over-
all as well as decomposed into industry and infrastructure support) on per capita output and factor 
inputs. The underlying regression results for the VAR system including the overall GRW intensity 
used to run the IRF analysis are shown in Table 2.4, while regression results for the decomposition 
of GRW funding into industry and infrastructure support can be found in the Appendix (see Tables 
                                                 
34 Future extensions could focus on the computation of space–time IRFs (see, e,g., Di Giacinto, 2010). 
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A2.3 and A2.4).35 Furthermore, the full set of IRFs for all variables in the regional economic system 
is reported in Figure A2.2 in the Appendix as well. 
As outlined above, the specification of a structural VAR requires certain a priori restrictions. We 
make use of the Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix of the model's reduced form 
residuals to identify the individual effects in the IRF analysis and accordingly and impose the fol-
lowing, theory‐guided recursive causal ordering at time t: 
lgrwt       lhkt         lpatt         linvqt       lempt        lgdpt. 
The interpretation of this sequence of effects is as follows: variables more to the left affect the other 
variables in the system both contemporaneously and with a time lag, while variables more to the 
right only affect variables appearing earlier in the ordering only with a time lag. In other words, 
this ordering assumes that the GRW policy is the most exogenous variable in the model given that 
funding modalities are determined in a mid‐run planning process and are not affected by short‐run 
changes in economic conditions. For our structural VAR approach this implies that the policy var-
iable has a contemporaneous effect on all economic variables in the model, while potential feed-
back effects only take place with a lag structure over time. Further, we order input factors according 
to their short‐run flexibility (e.g., one can typically assume that decision on capital investments at 
time t are made on an ex ante basis, while the employment level can be adjusted continuously) and 
assume that factor inputs determine the state of per capita GDP as key regional outcome variable 
along the region's production process. 
                                                 
35 The Appendix also contains the results of residual‐based Moran's I tests to check for remaining spatial autocorrelation in the 
estimated equations of our SpPVAR system. As the results show, our spatial econometric approach is able to account for spatial 
autocorrelation in the systematic part of the SpPVAR in the majority of variable/year combinations. For details see Tables A2.5, 
A2.6, A2.7. 
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2.6.1 GRW: total investments 
The selected IRF results of the SpPVAR model in Figure 2.2 based on the estimation results re-
ported in Table 2.4 illustrate the temporary growth effects of a one standard deviation shock in the 
total GRW funding intensity (comprising both industry and infrastructure investment support) at 
time t on regional per capita output. The associated IRF in the upper left panel of Figure 2.2 shows 
that after a phasing‐in interval of roughly one to two years (note that time periods following this 
“GRW‐shock” are measured on the abscissa) we observe statistically significant and positive over-
all effects of GRW funding on regional per capita output (growth) with a peak in the effect being 
reached after roughly four years. In terms of the magnitude of the output effect, for this peak effect, 
we observe a 0.22% increase in regional per capita output. This result is in line with most early 
empirical studies on GRW effectiveness (for instance, Alecke et al. (2013) report output effects of 
0.3% for a 1% increase in GRW funding volume, see Table A2.1 for further details) and thus sup-
ports our hypothesis H2.4. 
As shown in the upper middle panel of Figure 2.2, the effect of a positive GRW shock on regional 
employment follows a similar pattern − though with a lower magnitude in terms of the associated 
marginal effect. As for the overall output effect, the temporary employment growth effects turn out 
to be positive and statistically significant after roughly one year of phasing in. The persistently 
positive (though decaying) employment growth rates over the displayed time horizon of 12 years 
accordingly translate into a permanently higher employment rate in funded regions. This result is 
in support of hypothesis H2.5. On the one hand, GRW (industry) investments are associated with 
some constraints regarding the funding recipients (see subsection 2.2.1); on the other hand, the 
evolution of per capita output and employment is very similar (see Figure A2.2). As argued above, 
the reported employment effect may hence be a reflex of the above identified output effect. 
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Table 2.4 Regression results for SpPVAR using total GRW funding intensities  
Dependent             Variable  →       
Regressors ↓ lgdp lemp lhk linvq lpat lgrw 
lgdp(t-1) 0.787*** 0.0355*** 0.0272* 0.267 0.770 -1.742 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.0148) (0.0719) (0.101) (0.0595) 
linvq(t-1) 0.00934*** 0.00339*** 0.00326* 0.445*** -0.220*** -0.146 
 (0.000113) (0.000689) (0.0493) (0.000) (0.000958) (0.252) 
lhk(t-1) 0.0292 0.00419 0.686*** 0.0910 -2.672** 0.628 
 (0.412) (0.736) (0.000) (0.731) (0.00156) (0.707) 
lemp(t-1) -0.279*** 0.506*** -0.156*** -1.286** 1.416 -2.394 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00630) (0.394) (0.421) 
lpat(t-1) 0.000907 0.000793** 0.00129** -0.0116 0.0768*** 0.000419 
 (0.220) (0.00855) (0.00500) (0.0522) (0.000) (0.990) 
lgrw(t-1) 0.00114** 0.000429** 0.000690** 0.00370 -0.00512 0.753*** 
 (0.00242) (0.00327) (0.00658) (0.230) (0.647) (0.000) 
w_lgdp(t-1) 0.0644* 0.0286* 0.0182 0.104 0.173 -0.953 
 (0.0479) (0.0218) (0.341) (0.645) (0.830) (0.519) 
w_linvq(t-1) -0.000146 0.000268 0.00463 0.0301 0.00808 0.111 
 (0.976) (0.885) (0.116) (0.405) (0.949) (0.637) 
w_lhk(t-1) -0.0629 -0.103*** -0.0667 -0.562 0.735 1.663 
 (0.431) (0.000806) (0.134) (0.340) (0.724) (0.661) 
w_lemp(t-1) 0.0170 0.108** 0.212** 0.491 2.105 -4.030 
 (0.872) (0.00628) (0.00135) (0.538) (0.458) (0.438) 
w_lpat(t-1) -0.00131 0.000379 0.00184 0.00728 0.399*** 0.326 
 (0.788) (0.830) (0.482) (0.829) (0.000628) (0.163) 
w_lgrw(t-1) -0.0000466 -0.000126 -0.000331 -0.00148 -0.000697 0.0606* 
 (0.928) (0.580) (0.328) (0.723) (0.960) (0.0301) 
Notes: Observations N = 2838. Number of regions i = 258. P-values are given in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
Coefficients for time dummies are not explicitly shown but can be obtained upon request. For estimation 250 bootstrap samples 
with i.i.d. resampling of the error are used to evaluate the bias of the fixed-effects estimator; the variance-covariance matrix is 
estimated by using the bootstrap approach and corresponding confidence intervals are calculated from the t-distribution. 
As the IRFs in the lower middle panel of Figure 2.2 illustrate, a positive GRW shock also signifi-
cantly affects the stock of human capital after two years. The negative albeit non‐significant effect 
in the first response year may be explained by a substitution effect between physical and human 
capital. Especially in the case of GRW support to industry investments, physical capital becomes 
cheaper relative to human capital. However, a shock in the GRW intensity leads to a significant 
higher human capital stock in the medium run, which is in support of the sketched transmission 
channel through investments in education, training facilities and research parks as outlined in H2.2. 
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We find that a positive shock to the GRW intensity also leads to an immediate positive effect on 
the physical investment rate, although the large standard error renders the effect statistically insig-
nificant. The empirical support for H2.1 is thus weak, which can be probably related to the heter-
ogeneity of funded physical investments and physical investment rates across regions. Finally, an 
increase in GRW funding also does not significantly affect the region's patent activity as shown in 
Figure 2.2. Thus, we do not find evidence for hypothesis H2.3 that GRW support exhibits some 
positive effects on regional technological progress. 
Figure 2.2 IRFs for response of variables to shock in total GRW funding intensity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions are calculated on the basis of the estimated coefficients of the SpPVAR model in Table 2.4. Solid 
lines are IRFs and dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals generated from Monte Carlo simulations with 200 reps. 
To test for the robustness of the results, we also estimate an augmented SpPVAR specification, 
which controls for differences in the age structure across regions and their change over time as a 
potential influencing factor of the region's labour market and economic performance (Fuchs, 
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2016).36 Given that prevailing differences in the age structure between East and West Germany 
may correlate with differences in GRW funding volumes, the augmented SpPVAR approach can 
hence be regarded as being less sensitive to a potential omitted variable bias.37 However, the esti-
mated linkages between the core variables of the SpPVAR system remain unaffected by the addi-
tional inclusion of the age structure. 
2.6.2 GRW: industry and infrastructure investments 
As stated earlier, we are specifically interested in studying the differences in the economic effects 
when decomposing overall funding intensities into GRW industry and public infrastructure invest-
ment support. As the IRFs in the upper part of Figure 2.3 illustrate, a positive shock to the GRW 
industry funding intensity goes along with a negative output effect in the very short run, which then 
turns into positive, albeit marginally statistically significant effects in the mid run. In comparison, 
the overall output effect of the GRW infrastructure intensity − as shown in the lower part of Figure 
2.3 − is found to be positive and significant in the first year after the GRW shock and then turns 
out to be statistically insignificant for the remaining time periods. 
Moreover, we get evidence that GRW support to industry investments is characterized by a longer 
phasing‐in interval reaching a peak in the effect after roughly four years compared to the immediate 
one‐year peak effect in the case of infrastructure investments. Further, the magnitude of the eco-
nomic effects of GRW industry investments is generally higher compared to the one from GRW 
infrastructure investments as measured by the percentage increase in per capita output to a one‐
                                                 
36 The variable age structure is defined as the region's percentage share of population aged 15-64 in total population relative to the 
corresponding population share in Germany. 
37 We highly acknowledge the comment from an anonymous reviewer pointing to this potential source of an estimation bias. 
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standard deviation increase in GRW funding categories. These results match our ex ante expecta-
tions as the industry‐focused part of the GRW programme supports private investments (private 
capital stock, respectively) directly, while GRW infrastructure investments rather support the pub-
lic capital stock (and the private capital stock only indirectly). Taken together, both results partly 
confirm hypothesis H2.4 indicating that a shock in both forms of GRW investment support has a 
(delayed) positive effect on per capita output, which is statistically significant only for GRW in-
frastructure investments. 
A related pattern is also shown for the induced economic effects on the employment rate. The 
employment effects to shocks in both GRW investment types turn to be significantly positive after 
roughly one year, which is in line with H2.5. Despite the formal constraints for the recipients of 
GRW support to industry investments, a one standard deviation increase in GRW infrastructure 
intensity goes along with similar positive effects on the regional employment rate. The obtained 
results for the employment rate effect may hence be seen as a further indication for the significant 
output effects that are induced by the GRW programme and accordingly translate into positive 
employment effects as well. This relationship is also highlighted in Figure A2.2 in the Appendix 
showing that a positive shock in per capita output is associated with a positive employment rate 
response. 
Furthermore, Figure 2.3 illustrates significant positive effects of GRW industry and infrastructure 
shocks on the stock of human capital, which turn out to be statistically significant after roughly one 
year (GRW infrastructure investments), respectively two years (GRW industry investments). As 
outlined above, this time delay in the transmission of the effects may be explained by the fact that 
GRW industry investments are more likely to substitute human capital, while GRW infrastructure 
investments primarily affect the public capital stock, which impacts on the production processes of 
firms more indirectly (for example due to the formation of educational establishments and research 
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parks). This may explain the initial negative human capital effects of GRW industry investment 
support. However, the response to a positive shock in GRW industry investments turns into a pos-
itive response to human capital in the medium run. Thus, regarding the GRW support to infrastruc-
ture investments, our results confirm hypothesis H2.2. 
With regard to the physical investment rate, the IRFs displayed in Figure 2.3 point to quite different 
transmission channels of funding. While we basically do not observe any effect for the case of 
infrastructure investment support, which is in line with our theoretical expectations, we observe a 
positive response of the physical investment rate when increasing GRW support to industry invest-
ments. However, as for the case of overall GRW funding in Figure 2.2, the estimated standard 
errors are quite large implying that we only find a marginally significant physical investment effect 
in the mid run according to hypothesis H2.1. Finally, the reported effects for the regional patent 
rate in Figure 2.3 indicate that the decomposition of GRW funding does not alter the finding of an 
insignificant effect on the regional patent activity as already observed for the overall GRW funding 
intensity in Figure 2.2 (significant negative for GRW infrastructure investments in the year of the 
shock).38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 For the most part, the presented results also hold if only regions are considered for estimation that were supported more than 6 
years during the period 2000 to 2011. However, the effects of total GRW investments on per capita output turn out to be insignifi-
cant, while we find significantly positive effects for GRW infrastructure investments. Results are available upon request. 
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Figure 2.3 IRFs for response of variables to shocks in decomposed GRW funding intensity 
a. GRW Support to Industry Investments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. GRW Support to Infrastructure Investments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions are calculated on the basis of the estimated coefficients of the SpPVAR models in Tables A2.3 
and A2.4. Solid lines are IRFs and dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals generated from Monte Carlo simulations with 200 
reps. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
The central aim of this paper was to contribute to the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
regional policy in Germany by identifying the complex effects of the German GRW policy on all 
factors involved in the determination of regional economic growth and development: Per capita 
output, physical capital investments, human capital, the employment rate and the regional patent 
rate (proxying technological growth). To deal with the inherent simultaneity across all variables of 
the regional production function, we have applied a flexible SpPVAR model and have illustrated 
the reaction of our endogenous variables in the economic system to shocks in the GRW intensity 
with the help of IRF analysis. Such a system approach to regional structural funds evaluation is 
still missing in the empirical evaluation literature and we thus hope that our approach can be seen 
as a valuable contribution to the latter. 
Our empirical results emphasize the complex nature of GRW effects on the regional economy over 
the period 2000-2011. In line with earlier empirical contributions we find positive effects of the 
GRW programme on per capita output of German labour market regions. Medium‐run output ef-
fects can be triggered by receiving a mix of GRW industry and infrastructure funding. Moreover, 
beyond the prevailing focus on output effects in the earlier literature, we also detect significant 
positive responses of the employment rate as well as the human capital intensity for an increase in 
GRW support. Another insight from our dynamic VAR modelling approach is that these effects 
often build up only in the medium run, while in the short run some negative effects can be found, 
possibly related to the gradual phasing of realized investment projects. Taken together, these find-
ings emphasize that considering indirect effects and the temporal dynamics of funding effects is 
highly important when studying the regional economic impact of policy programmes. 
Although the empirical results obtained here provide only evidence for positive economic effects 
of regional policy in Germany, given the close thematic and institutional similarities between the 
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GRW scheme and the ERDF at the European level, our results may also provide new input to the 
heated debate on regional policy effectiveness in the EU. In fact, as shown above, ERDF invest-
ments are included as an integral part in the overall GRW coordination framework in Germany. In 
this context, it can be expected that our optimistic results with regard to funding effectiveness of 
regional policy instruments running through private sector investment aids and support to local 
public infrastructure are, at least, transferable to less developed regions in countries with very sim-
ilar economic structures and institutional setup such as France, Scandinavia, the UK or Eastern 
European countries with structural similarities to the East German situation. However, due to dif-
ferent economic conditions and the quality of regional institutions, a generalization of our empirical 
results to all European countries should only be done with great care. However, our second contri-
bution to the literature, namely the application of the novel SpPVAR approach, could be easily 
transferred to all European countries or to the EU as a whole and should provide more knowledge 
about the generality of our results. 
Furthermore, an interesting question related to GRW funding is whether the funding programme 
only increases economic activity or whether funding is also able to trigger a structural change in 
the regions. Our results show that, besides the economic activity in form of per capita output and 
employment, also the human capital intensity is positively influenced by the GRW. This can be 
interpreted as an upgrading of jobs in supported labour market regions. Still, we do not find statis-
tically significant effects of GRW funding on the innovation rate (patents) of funded regions. 
Hence, the question to what extent GRW investments trigger structural changes remains to be an-
swered in future research. Finally, our analysis also raises new research questions regarding the 
conditional effects of the GRW programme. From a policy perspective it is of major interest to 
analyse whether the results of this study differ between different types of labour market regions or 
not and if there are regional conditions that make GRW investment support more or less effective. 
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Furthermore, from a methodical perspective, the method of impulse response function analysis 
could be extended to the computation of full space-time IRFs in the future. This extension would 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the spatial effects of structural funds in a system of connected 
regions. As for the other challenges addressed above, this issue will be left for future work. 
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A2. Appendix 
Figure A2.1 Temporal evolution of GRW funding intensities in West and East Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own figures based on GRW data from the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA).
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Table A2.1 Overview of recent empirical studies on the effectiveness of GRW funding 
 
 
 
 
 
Authors Data and econometric approach  Regional Units Dependent Variable(s) Effects of the GRW policy 
Schalk and Un-
tiedt (2000) 
Error‐correction model (ECM) for panel data (1978-
1989), mean values of the wages and interest rates of all 
other regions are included in the output function, Non‐
Linear Least Squares (NLS) Estimator 
327 Western Ger-
man administra-
tive districts 
(Kreise) 
Output (real value 
added), investments and 
employment 
Positive effects regarding the investment as well as the 
employment target. In contrast, the effects on productiv-
ity (output per persons employed) growth and conver-
gence are limited. 
Blien et al. 
(2003) 
Panel data incorporating a shiftshare‐approach (1993-
1999), no spatial model estimated 
113 Administra-
tive districts East 
Germany (Kreise) 
Employment Positive effects of the GRW industry investments on em-
ployment (infrastructure coefficient is positive, but non-
significant). Positive effects of total GRW investments. 
Eckey and 
Kosfeld (2005) 
Cross‐sectional data (2000-2002), spatial autoregres-
sively distributed lag model (SADL), Maximum Likeli-
hood (ML) Estimator 
180 German labor 
market regions 
Productivity (Gross 
value added per capita) 
The net effect is limited (just 4%). Neither the direct nor 
the indirect effects are statistically significant. 
Alecke and Un-
tiedt (2007) 
1. Cross‐sectional data (1994-2003), no spatial model es-
timated 
2. Panel data (1996-2003), no spatial model estimated, 
Arellano‐Bond‐Estimator (First‐Differenced GMM) 
225 German labor 
market regions 
Productivity (GDP per 
employable person) 
Positive effects on the GDP per capita growth rate and on 
the convergence process. 
Eggert et al. 
(2007) 
Panel data (only two time periods: 1994-1999, 2000-
2004), no spatial model estimated, Pooled Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) Estimator 
16 German States 
(Bundesländer) 
Productivity (GDP per 
capita) 
No statistically significant effects on the growth of the 
GDP per capita. 
Röhl and von     
Speicher (2009) 
Panel data (1996-2006), no spatial model estimated, 
Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) Estimator (four 
types of agglomeration are included as fixed‐effects in-
stead of individual fixed‐effects) 
113 Administra-
tive districts East 
Germany (Kreise) 
Industrial gross value 
added and employment 
Positive effects on the industrial gross value added (high-
est in agglomerations). Positive effects on employment in 
different sectors as well. 
Alecke et al. 
(2012) 
Cross‐sectional data (1994-2006) 
1. OLS Estimator for non‐spatial model 
2. Spatial Lag Model, Spatial Error Model, Spatial Dur-
bin Model, Spatial Durbin Error Model, ML Estimator 
225 German labor 
market regions 
Productivity (GDP per 
total employment) 
Positive effects on the convergence rate of supported re-
gions (largest in those regions further away from their 
steady state level). In turn, negative spatial spillover ef-
fects are observed (total effects are positive as long as re-
gions are far away from its steady state). 
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Table A2.1 (continued) 
 
Authors Data and econometric approach  Regional Units Dependent Variable(s) Effects of the GRW policy 
Alecke et al. 
(2013) 
Cross‐sectional data (1994-2006), spatially augmented 
multiplicative interaction model (Spatial Durbin Model) 
225 German labor 
market regions 
Productivity (GDP per 
total employment) 
Positive effects on the speed of convergence. The impact 
is higher if supported regions are further away from their 
steady state level and if more GRW investments are sup-
plied to neighboring regions (positive spatial spillovers). 
Mitze et al. 
(2015) 
1. Cross‐sectional data (1999-2004, 2003-2007, 2005-
2008) and pooled cross‐sectional data (1996-2008, three‐
year averages), propensity score (PS) matching, no spa-
tial model estimated 
2. Panel data (1993-2008, annual data and three‐year av-
erages), generalized propensity score (GPS) matching 
and use of a dose-response function, no spatial model es-
timated 
413 Administra-
tive districts Ger-
many  (Kreise) 
Productivity (GDP per 
worker) 
Positive effects on regional productivity growth. How-
ever, the policy is only effective to a particular funding 
level (about 105 000 € per labor‐unit) 
von Ehrlich and 
Seidel (2015) 
Cross‐sectional data (1984, 1985, 1986, 1988 and 2010), 
Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design (Spatial RDD), 
Fuzzy RDD, Two‐Stages Least Squares (2SLS) Estima-
tor 
4940 (1986) and 
4967 (2010) Mu-
nicipalities West 
Germany (Bound-
ary Sample: 3870 
(1986) and 3881 
(2010)) 
Income, Business tax 
base, population and em-
ployment per km2 
Private, Industrial Private 
and Public Capital Stock, 
Human Capital 
Positive effects on income, business tax base, population 
as well as on employment per km2 and private, industrial 
private as well as public capital. In turn, no effects on hu-
man capital are observed. However, due to the relocation 
of economic activities the net effects are rather small (di-
rect effects minus agglomeration and relocation external-
ities). 
Dettmann et al. 
(2016) 
Cross‐sectional data (2000-2006 and 2007-2013), RDD, 
Spatial control dummy variables (treated and non‐treated 
neighbors are included), 2SLS Estimator 
325 Administra-
tive districts West 
Germany (Kreise) 
Gross‐value added, 
productivity (gross‐value 
added per employee), 
employment and wage 
sum 
Positive effects on the gross value-added as well as on the 
productivity and no effects on wages and employment 
(period 2000-2006). No statistically significant effects in 
the period 2007-2013. Inter‐regional spillovers neither 
arise if the neighboring region is treated or non‐treated. 
Rhoden (2016) Cross‐sectional data (2000-2012) 
1. OLS Estimator for non‐spatial model 
2. Spatial Durbin and Spatial Durbin Error Model, ML 
Estimator 
402 Administra-
tive districts Ger-
many  (Kreise) 
Productivity (GDP per 
employee) 
Positive effects on regional productivity growth, while 
the funds have negative effects on neighboring regions 
(total effects are positive). 
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Table A2.2 Summary statistics for variables 2000 to 2011 
  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lgdp 3096 10.77384 0.2548694 10.04048 11.66673 
lemp 3096 -0.4980849 0.1449697 -0.9412167 -0.054104 
lemp_detrended 3096 -0.4883598 0.1443927 -0.860197 -0.0472641 
Lhk 3096 -2.983249 0.4620051 -4.16754 -1.576675 
lhk_detrended 3096 -3.221792 0.4775752 -4.312091 -1.909949 
linvq 3096 -3.827942 0.5522995 -5.910307 -1.496212 
lpat 3096 -5.397667 1.332901 -18.42068 -3.335155 
lgrw 3096 -13.17713 6.012474 -18.42068 -2.575852 
lgrw_ind 3096 -13.35975 5.845891 -18.42068 -2.853926 
lgrw_infra 3096 -15.0901 5.070834 -18.42068 -3.390138 
w_lgdp 3096 10.87333 0.2253164 10.24876 11.45012 
w_lemp 3096 -.4412998 0.0860433 -0.7334062 -0.1873686 
w_lemp_detrended 3096 -.4320978 0.0892868 -0.7239823 -0.1842588 
w_lhk 3096 -2.721685 0.3560248 -3.796473 -1.802598 
w_lhk_detrended 3096 -2.951084 0.3576126 -3.955346 -2.156658 
w_linvq 3096 -3.822068 0.3798358 -5.172833 -2.373494 
w_lpat 3096 -5.138939 0.607518 -7.92644 -3.865051 
w_lgrw 3096 -11.15047 5.458338 -18.42068 -3.835927 
w_lgrw_ind 3096 -11.43041 5.298607 -18.42068 -4.020495 
w_lgrw_infra 3096 -13.07163 5.201032 -18.42068 -4.500458 
Notes: Zeros in the normalized variables are replaced by a very small number before taking the ln (lpat, lgrw, lgrw_ind, lgrw_infra, 
w_lgrw, w_lgrw_ind, w_lgrw_infra). Suffix “_detrended” denotes detrended variable; see Table 2.1 for details on variable description. 
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Table A2.3 Regression results for SpPVAR using GRW support to industry investments 
 Dependent Variable  →       
 Regressors ↓ lgdp lemp lhk linvq lpat lgrw_ind 
lgdp(t-1) 0.786*** 0.0354*** 0.0269* 0.267 0.763 -1.486 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.0157) (0.0695) (0.104) (0.110) 
linvq(t-1) 0.00932*** 0.00339*** 0.00326* 0.445*** -0.220*** -0.141 
 (0.000120) (0.000711) (0.0498) (0.000) (0.000971) (0.253) 
lhk(t-1) 0.0290 0.00408 0.686*** 0.0887 -2.675** 0.859 
 (0.414) (0.743) (0.000) (0.738) (0.00154) (0.639) 
lemp(t-1) -0.276*** 0.506*** -0.155*** -1.278** 1.423 -2.076 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00709) (0.391) (0.522) 
lpat(t-1) 0.000884 0.000785** 0.00128** -0.0117 0.0769*** -0.0226 
 (0.233) (0.00939) (0.00558) (0.0517) (0.000) (0.531) 
lgrw_ind(t-1) 0.000937* 0.000400** 0.000588* 0.00394 -0.00673 0.714*** 
 (0.0156) (0.00807) (0.0189) (0.210) (0.552) (0.000) 
w_lgdp(t-1) 0.0651* 0.0288* 0.0181 0.112 0.173 -0.987 
 (0.0447) (0.0213) (0.342) (0.624) (0.830) (0.540) 
w_linvq(t-1) -0.000318 0.000243 0.00457 0.0306 0.00822 0.186 
 (0.947) (0.895) (0.121) (0.401) (0.948) (0.381) 
w_lhk(t-1) -0.0640 -0.103*** -0.0675 -0.571 0.751 3.293 
 (0.422) (0.000777) (0.132) (0.332) (0.719) (0.439) 
w_lemp(t-1) 0.0150 0.107** 0.210** 0.488 2.092 -9.016 
 (0.886) (0.00662) (0.00145) (0.541) (0.461) (0.110) 
w_lpat(t-1) -0.00124 0.000393 0.00192 0.00658 0.400*** 0.328 
 (0.798) (0.825) (0.464) (0.846) (0.000621) (0.124) 
w_lgrw_ind(t-1) -0.0000839 -0.000130 -0.000339 -0.000294 0.00135 0.0760** 
 (0.869) (0.544) (0.306) (0.945) (0.921) (0.00475) 
Notes: Observations N = 2838. Number of regions i = 258. P-values are given in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
Coefficients for time dummies are not explicitly shown but can be obtained upon request. For estimation 250 bootstrap samples 
with i.i.d. resampling of the error are used to evaluate the bias of the fixed-effects estimator; the variance-covariance matrix is 
estimated by using the bootstrap approach and corresponding confidence intervals are calculated from the t-distribution. 
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Table A2.4 Regression results for SpPVAR using GRW support to infrastructure investments 
 Dependent Variable  →       
 Regressors ↓ lgdp lemp lhk linvq lpat lgrw_infra 
lgdp(t-1) 0.783*** 0.0341*** 0.0255* 0.250 0.786 -0.818 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.0231) (0.0910) (0.0951) (0.566) 
linvq(t-1) 0.00949*** 0.00350*** 0.00345* 0.446*** -0.221*** -0.403* 
 (0.000103) (0.000463) (0.0356) (0.000) (0.000921) (0.0416) 
lhk(t-1) 0.0279 0.00263 0.684*** 0.0750 -2.663** -2.670 
 (0.434) (0.832) (0.000) (0.777) (0.00155) (0.320) 
lemp(t-1) -0.276*** 0.506*** -0.156*** -1.254** 1.412 2.946 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00769) (0.395) (0.541) 
lpat(t-1) 0.000928 0.000822** 0.00133** -0.0115 0.0761*** -0.0721 
 (0.211) (0.00630) (0.00438) (0.0551) (0.000) (0.242) 
lgrw_infra(t-1) 0.000463 0.000316** 0.000546** 0.000534 -0.00290 0.170*** 
 (0.103) (0.00335) (0.00279) (0.803) (0.659) (0.000) 
w_lgdp(t-1) 0.0647* 0.0291* 0.0193 0.108 0.177 -1.198 
 (0.0458) (0.0203) (0.310) (0.630) (0.826) (0.614) 
w_linvq(t-1) -0.000909 -0.00000214 0.00428 0.0277 0.0111 -1.012* 
 (0.849) (0.999) (0.142) (0.442) (0.929) (0.0119) 
w_lhk(t-1) -0.0586 -0.101*** -0.0645 -0.553 0.719 -14.43* 
 (0.462) (0.000939) (0.142) (0.348) (0.730) (0.0151) 
w_lemp(t-1) 0.0143 0.104** 0.209** 0.437 2.132 20.74* 
 (0.892) (0.00833) (0.00160) (0.584) (0.452) (0.0126) 
w_lpat(t-1) -0.000629 0.000677 0.00222 0.00987 0.396*** 0.741* 
 (0.897) (0.698) (0.389) (0.770) (0.000678) (0.0368) 
w_lgrw_infra(t-1) -0.000264 0.000171 -0.0000753 0.00302 -0.000706 0.0441 
 (0.469) (0.229) (0.741) (0.253) (0.943) (0.0933) 
Notes: Observations N = 2838. Number of regions i = 258. P-values are given in parentheses. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. 
Coefficients for time dummies are not explicitly shown but can be obtained upon request. For estimation 250 bootstrap samples with 
i.i.d. resampling of the error are used to evaluate the bias of the fixed-effects estimator; the variance-covariance matrix is estimated 
by using the bootstrap approach and corresponding confidence intervals are calculated from the t-distribution. 
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Table A2.5 Residual-based Moran’s I test (overall GRW funding intensities) 
Dependent Variable →  lgdp   lemp   lhk  
Year ↓ Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. 
2001 0.094 2.556 0.005 0.096 2.707 0.003 0.077 2.120 0.017 
2002 0.119 3.204 0.001 0.171 4.665 0.000 0.047 1.333 0.091 
2003 0.057 1.589 0.056 0.197 5.253 0.000 0.142 3.806 0.000 
2004 0.054 1.606 0.054 0.090 2.443 0.007 -0.013 -0.240 0.405 
2005 0.011 0.408 0.342 0.380 9.979 0.000 0.085 2.331 0.010 
2006 0.111 3.013 0.001 0.244 6.438 0.000 0.158 4.192 0.000 
2007 0.060 1.666 0.048 0.184 4.922 0.000 0.114 3.060 0.001 
2008 0.101 2.759 0.003 0.213 5.628 0.000 0.173 4.617 0.000 
2009 0.170 4.519 0.000 0.359 9.457 0.000 0.184 4.910 0.000 
2010 0.045 1.286 0.099 0.136 3.657 0.000 0.006 0.259 0.398 
2011 0.042 1.200 0.115 0.183 4.867 0.000 0.161 4.275 0.000 
Dependent Variable →  linvq   lpat   lgrw  
Year ↓ Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. 
2001 0.000 0.112 0.455 0.059 1.674 0.047 0.104 2.832 0.002 
2002 0.056 1.554 0.060 -0.093 -2.847 0.002 0.135 3.799 0.000 
2003 -0.068 -1.708 0.044 -0.122 -3.501 0.000 0.097 2.761 0.003 
2004 0.104 2.831 0.002 -0.115 -3.716 0.000 0.019 0.617 0.269 
2005 -0.027 -0.611 0.271 0.093 2.851 0.002 0.156 4.317 0.000 
2006 0.037 1.073 0.142 0.109 3.441 0.000 0.025 0.791 0.214 
2007 -0.033 -0.771 0.220 0.096 3.477 0.000 0.094 2.595 0.005 
2008 0.019 0.601 0.274 0.202 5.620 0.000 0.018 0.586 0.279 
2009 0.031 0.907 0.182 -0.035 -0.991 0.161 0.069 1.928 0.027 
2010 0.055 1.542 0.062 0.080 2.691 0.004 -0.017 -0.358 0.360 
2011 -0.081 -2.013 0.022 -0.090 -2.800 0.003 0.035 1.071 0.142 
Notes: Details on the underlying spatial weighting matrix used to compute the Moran's I statistic are given in the main text; Z(I) = Moran's test statistic. 
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Table A2.6 Residual-based Moran’s I test (GRW support to industry investments) 
Dependent Variable →  lgdp   lemp   lhk  
Year ↓ Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. 
2001 0.094 2.544 0.005 0.096 2.703 0.003 0.077 2.098 0.018 
2002 0.115 3.106 0.001 0.172 4.709 0.000 0.048 1.348 0.089 
2003 0.060 1.656 0.049 0.199 5.300 0.000 0.143 3.819 0.000 
2004 0.055 1.647 0.050 0.090 2.435 0.007 -0.013 -0.234 0.407 
2005 0.012 0.441 0.330 0.380 9.997 0.000 0.084 2.310 0.010 
2006 0.111 3.003 0.001 0.246 6.484 0.000 0.158 4.206 0.000 
2007 0.060 1.666 0.048 0.184 4.914 0.000 0.114 3.056 0.001 
2008 0.100 2.724 0.003 0.213 5.635 0.000 0.175 4.667 0.000 
2009 0.170 4.531 0.000 0.359 9.461 0.000 0.183 4.873 0.000 
2010 0.043 1.218 0.112 0.135 3.613 0.000 0.004 0.215 0.415 
2011 0.045 1.278 0.101 0.184 4.897 0.000 0.162 4.311 0.000 
Dependent Variable →  linvq   lpat   lgrw_ind  
Year ↓ Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. 
2001 0.001 0.127 0.450 0.059 1.664 0.048 0.074 2.079 0.019 
2002 0.056 1.552 0.060 -0.093 -2.849 0.002 0.149 4.171 0.000 
2003 -0.068 -1.701 0.044 -0.121 -3.493 0.000 0.127 3.533 0.000 
2004 0.105 2.847 0.002 -0.114 -3.710 0.000 0.010 0.363 0.358 
2005 -0.027 -0.613 0.270 0.093 2.852 0.002 0.123 3.410 0.000 
2006 0.038 1.086 0.139 0.109 3.444 0.000 0.053 1.565 0.059 
2007 -0.034 -0.776 0.219 0.096 3.470 0.000 0.115 3.148 0.001 
2008 0.018 0.573 0.283 0.203 5.623 0.000 0.013 0.467 0.320 
2009 0.032 0.925 0.177 -0.035 -0.986 0.162 0.061 1.720 0.043 
2010 0.055 1.535 0.062 0.081 2.697 0.004 -0.020 -0.453 0.325 
2011 -0.082 -2.026 0.021 -0.090 -2.808 0.002 0.095 2.678 0.004 
Notes: Details on the underlying spatial weighting matrix used to compute the Moran's I statistic are given in the main text; Z(I) = Moran's I test statistic. 
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Table A2.7 Residual-based Moran’s I test (GRW support to infrastructure investments) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable →  lgdp     lemp     lhk   
Year ↓ Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. 
2001 0.090 2.453 0.007 0.091 2.579 0.005 0.081 2.207 0.014 
2002 0.118 3.174 0.001 0.185 5.052 0.000 0.058 1.602 0.055 
2003 0.064 1.764 0.039 0.200 5.323 0.000 0.135 3.622 0.000 
2004 0.056 1.659 0.049 0.104 2.816 0.002 -0.007 -0.072 0.471 
2005 0.013 0.468 0.320 0.377 9.922 0.000 0.084 2.313 0.010 
2006 0.108 2.914 0.002 0.229 6.036 0.000 0.150 4.006 0.000 
2007 0.064 1.773 0.038 0.173 4.636 0.000 0.113 3.028 0.001 
2008 0.104 2.835 0.002 0.210 5.554 0.000 0.176 4.701 0.000 
2009 0.170 4.535 0.000 0.359 9.460 0.000 0.174 4.645 0.000 
2010 0.038 1.085 0.139 0.133 3.561 0.000 0.002 0.148 0.441 
2011 0.050 1.407 0.080 0.187 4.957 0.000 0.166 4.423 0.000 
Dependent Variable →   linvq     lpat     lgrw_infra   
Year ↓ Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. Moran's I Z(I) P-val. 
2001 0.006 0.250 0.401 0.058 1.651 0.049 0.111 3.011 0.001 
2002 0.059 1.630 0.052 -0.093 -2.861 0.002 0.035 1.020 0.154 
2003 -0.070 -1.770 0.038 -0.123 -3.531 0.000 0.054 1.507 0.066 
2004 0.104 2.816 0.002 -0.115 -3.734 0.000 0.061 1.701 0.044 
2005 -0.029 -0.655 0.256 0.093 2.855 0.002 0.120 3.244 0.001 
2006 0.035 1.001 0.158 0.108 3.431 0.000 0.051 1.441 0.075 
2007 -0.033 -0.759 0.224 0.096 3.483 0.000 0.026 0.777 0.218 
2008 0.018 0.560 0.288 0.201 5.579 0.000 0.017 0.543 0.294 
2009 0.030 0.888 0.187 -0.035 -1.004 0.158 0.020 0.634 0.263 
2010 0.056 1.547 0.061 0.082 2.726 0.003 0.023 0.711 0.239 
2011 -0.076 -1.869 0.031 -0.090 -2.804 0.003 -0.056 -1.364 0.086 
Notes: Details on the underlying spatial weighting matrix used to compute the Moran’s I statistic are given in the main text; Z(I) = Moran’s I test statistic. 
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Figure A2.2 Full set of IRFs for response of variables to isolated shocks in the other variables of the SpPVAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions are calculated on the basis of the estimated coefficients of the SpPVAR model in Table 2.4. Solid lines are IRFs and dashed lines are 95% confidence 
intervals generated from Monte Carlo simulations with 200 reps. 
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3. Absorptive capacity, economic freedom and the conditional effects of German regional 
policy 
 
Notes: The paper was submitted to Journal of Institutional Economics (16 May 2019). The paper is co-authored by 
Thomas Brenner and Timo Mitze. Related versions of the paper were published as Working Papers on Innovation and 
Space (Vol.01.16 and Vol.03.18).  
  
Abstract:  This paper analyses the role played by regional absorptive capacity and economic freedom for the working 
of German regional policy. We construct synthetic composite indicators to measure differences in conditioning factors 
across German regions and categorise regions ac-cording to their indicator rankings. We then estimate the subsample-
specific transmission channels of regional policies in a structural vector-autoregressive (VAR) framework and compare 
the direction and magnitude of effects across groups by impulse response function (IRF) analysis and ex-post t-tests. 
The empirical results point to two main channels of policy impact: While regions with low levels of absorptive capacity 
and economic freedom benefit from public funding only in terms of a traditional funding channel (i.e. higher invest-
ment rates), the link running from regional policy to technology growth and GDP development is weak for this group 
of regions. In comparison, our findings reveal significant positive policy effects on regional GDP and innovation ac-
tivity through a knowledge-based funding channel for regions with high absorptive capacity and economic freedom. 
This underlines the role of technological and institutional conditions for the direction and magnitude of funding effects 
from regional policy. Hence, regional institutional quality should be considered by policy makers as a means to trigger 
policy effectiveness. 
Keywords: Regional development, regional policy, absorptive capacity, economic freedom, structural VAR, impulse 
response functions 
JEL Classification: C33, R11, R58, O47 
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3.1 Introduction 
A central objective of the European Union (EU) and its member states is to support the socio-
economic development of less prosperous regions to foster territorial cohesion (e.g. European 
Commission, 2017). In Germany, the “Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional Economic 
Structures” (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur, henceforth 
GRW) is the central instrument of regional policy to support a well-balanced economic develop-
ment across space by stimulating additional investments in lagging regions (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2014). The study at hand builds on and extends a recent work by Eberle et al. (2019) that models 
regional policy transmission channels in a small scale economic system. The main aim of this work 
is to analyse the conditional economic effects of GRW funding, i.e. the heterogeneity of policy 
effects on regional outcome variables in the light of underlying technological, entrepreneurial and 
institutional differences across German regions.  
While several prior investigations on the regional effects of GRW funding are available, a main 
contribution to the empirical literature is that we explicitly account for the multifaceted nature of 
regional policy which aims at addressing multiple socio-economic objectives (e.g. Fratesi and 
Wishlade, 2017, in the context of EU regional policy). We do so by means of identifying policy 
effects on the basis of a small-scale econometric systems approach that allows capturing the mutual 
transmission channels of GRW funding on regional economic outcomes. Specifically, we estimate 
a structural spatial panel vector-autoregressive (SpPVAR) model and use Impulse Response Func-
tion (IRF) analysis to assess the direct and indirect GRW funding effects for the regional economy. 
Although our analysis cannot distinguish among the whole range of policy fields addressed by the 
GRW, we are nonetheless able to separate the working of its two main pillars, namely, investment 
grants to private firms (GRW industry funding), on the one hand, and investment support to the 
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local public infrastructure (GRW infrastructure funding), on the other hand. In the empirical anal-
ysis, we combine this VAR approach to regional policy analysis to provide a comprehensive picture 
of the transmission channels of funding by policy field. 
The key novelty and contribution of this paper is the identification of heterogeneous responses to 
GRW funding, which chiefly depend on the regions’ ability to transform (policy) inputs into eco-
nomic outcomes. In doing so, we start from the burgeoning empirical literature on the role of ‘con-
ditioning factors’ for regional growth and the success of funding programmes stressing the im-
portance of the regions’ technological and entrepreneurial basis as well as institutional quality. 
While one strand of the related literature directly relates conditioning factors to regional growth 
performances (see, for instance, Bologna et al., 2016, and Spruk and Kešeljević, 2018, for the link 
between economic freedom and regional economic development), another strand of the literature 
focusses their role for policy effectiveness, e.g., related to foreign aid (e.g. Burnside and Dollar 
2000), federal spending in the United States (e.g. Suárez Serrato and Wingender, 2016) or – most 
closely related to the study at hand – the EU Structural Funds (see Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 
2005; Ederveen et al., 2006, for country-level evidence as well as Becker et al., 2013; Breidenbach 
et al., 2019; Cappelen et al., 2003; Fratesi and Perucca, 2014; Gagliardi and Percoco, 2017; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015, for regional analyses). These studies widely suggest that re-
gional conditioning factors matter and − as also emphasised in Iammarino et al. (2019) − that public 
policy measures thus should be more tailored and attuned to differences in regional structures. 
However, despite this growing evidence on the importance of the regional context for funding suc-
cess, very little is known about the role of conditional effects in the German regional policy context 
so far.  
Based on this novel contribution, three central research questions can be formulated: 1) To what 
extent do economic responses to regional policy funding depend on underlying conditioning factors 
 82 
 
 
such as a region’s absorptive capacity and economic freedom? 2) Does this potential conditionality 
of policy effects vary across the different socio-economic outcome variables covered in our small-
scale regional economic system? 3) Do conditional effects also arise in the context of different 
funding instruments of the GRW, i.e. do the identified transmission channels of investment support 
to private firms and public infrastructure support work differently in specific regional contexts? 
Providing answers to these three questions can be seen as particularly helpful for policy makers as 
it can effectively contribute to future policy design or, as Fratesi and Wishlade (2017, p. 819) phrase 
it: “[…] knowing that some policies have a greater impact in certain contexts can provide a basis 
for more efficient use of funds”. Particularly in times of stagnating or even decreasing funding 
volumes for regional policy in the EU and Germany, this analysis may guide policy makers on 
creating fertile regional conditions that can improve funding effectiveness or focusing the available 
funds on regions with higher effectiveness. Finally, the empirical approach presented here may be 
seen as a blueprint for the analysis of regional policy effectiveness in other countries or at the EU 
level. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of recent 
empirical studies related to our empirical identification strategy. Section 3.3 presents the underly-
ing theory and develops research hypotheses on the role of regional conditioning factors for policy 
effectiveness. Thereafter, the econometric approach (Section 3.4) and the data (Section 3.5) are 
introduced. Section 3.6 presents the empirical results together with a series of robustness tests. 
Finally, Section 3.7 summarises and concludes the paper. 
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3.2 State of debate 
The regional policy in focus, the GRW, is the most relevant and financially powerful policy frame-
work in Germany to accelerate the general development of economically suffering and poorly de-
veloped regions. In doing so, the GRW includes financial means from the European Regional De-
velopment Fund (ERDF) and primarily seeks to spur local private physical capital investment ac-
tivities as well as to improve the local infrastructure (e.g. Alecke et al., 2012, 2013; Eberle et al., 
2019). Alecke et al. (2012, 2013) and Eberle et al. (2019) show that GRW investment grants are 
particularly allocated to the economic weaker regions in the Eastern part of Germany.39 
So far, little is known about the conditional effects of German regional policy as regional hetero-
geneities are mainly disregarded in the empirical evaluation literature on regional funding effec-
tiveness.40 Some first explorative evidence on the role of the regional context is − to a limited extent 
− reported by Röhl and von Speicher (2009), who correlate regional growth and GRW funding for 
data on 113 East German regions over the period 1996-2006 using a four-type classification of 
regional settlement structures as conditioning factor. While the authors find positive correlations 
for all four different types of German regions on sectoral gross value added (GVA) in the manu-
facturing sector, their magnitude is observed to differ across region types with the highest effect 
observed for highly agglomerated regions followed by rural areas (Röhl and von Speicher, 2009). 
The study of Rhoden (2016) runs a cross‐sectional analysis for 402 German regions over the ag-
gregated time period 2000-2012. Different from Röhl and von Speicher (2009), however, Rhoden 
                                                 
39 For additional details on the institutional setup, the connection to EU structural funds (ERDF) and the budgetary framework of 
GRW funding, we refer to studies of Alecke et al. (2012, 2013) and Eberle et al. (2019). 
40 Prior empirical GRW studies include Alecke et al. (2012, 2013), Alecke and Untiedt (2007), Blien et al. (2003), Dettmann et al. 
(2016), Eberle et al. (2019), Eckey and Kosfeld (2005), Eggert et al. (2007), Mitze et al. (2015), Rhoden (2016), Röhl and von 
Speicher (2009), Schalk and Untiedt (2000) and von Ehrlich and Seidel (2015). Eberle et al. (2019) provide a detailed survey of 
methods, used data and results of this studies. 
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(2016) does not find evidence for significant differences in the relation between GRW funding and 
regional growth across region types with different settlement structure. 
Looking beyond the scarce literature on German regional policy, there is a growing international 
literature that stresses the role of the conditional effects in the working of public funding and trans-
fer programmes (e.g. Becker et al., 2013; Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2005; Breidenbach et al., 
2019; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2003; Ederveen et al., 2006; Fratesi and Perucca, 
2014; Gagliardi and Percoco, 2017; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015, see Table A3.1 for ad-
ditional information). Most closely related to the scope of this study is the large evaluation literature 
on EU Structural Funds effectiveness. Ederveen et al. (2006) analyse the conditional effects of EU 
Structural Funds on national economic growth using institutional quality (institutional quality in-
dex, inflation, trust, openness and corruption) as important national context indicator. The authors 
conclude that EU funding has higher effects in countries with proper institutions, a higher openness 
and less corruption (Ederveen et al., 2006). Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) consider the degree 
of corruption of countries and conclude, different from Ederveen et al. (2006), that the results do 
not indicate significant effects of the national degree of corruption on GDP growth. 
At the regional level, Cappelen et al. (2003) analyse the conditional effects of EU Structural Funds 
for NUTS1/NUTS2 regions in 10 EU countries over the period 1980 to 1997 by means of changing 
sample design: Specifically, the authors contrast the estimation results for the full sample of regions 
with a restricted sample which excludes regions from Spain, Greece and Portugal. The results point 
to stronger effects of EU Structural Funds in the restricted sample, thus indicating a more efficient 
use of EU Structural Funds in regions within a more advanced economic environment (Cappelen 
et al., 2003).  
More recent studies on EU Structural Funds effectiveness further refine the use of conditioning 
factors by employing measures for the absorptive capacity of regions (Becker et al., 2013), regional 
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territorial capital (Fratesi and Perucca, 2014), regional government quality (Breidenbach et al., 
2019; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015) and settlement structure (Gagliardi and Percoco, 
2017).41 Becker et al. (2013) analyse the conditional EU funding effectiveness for NUTS2 regions 
over three different multi-annual funding periods between 1989 and 2006. As conditioning factor 
the authors employ different measures for the regions’ absorptive capacity, proxied by human cap-
ital endowments and the quality of government. The authors find that a sufficient level of regional 
absorptive capacity is crucial for translating Objective 1 payment from the EU Structural Funds 
into higher per capita GDP growth and investment rates. Similarly, the authors find that social 
capital, proxied through voter turnout at European Parliamentary Elections, has a similar condi-
tioning role on the effectiveness of EU regional policy in different regional contexts (Becker et al., 
2013). 
The findings by Becker et al. (2013) are supported by Fratesi and Perucca (2014) as well as 
Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) and Breidenbach et al. (2019) indicating that the presence of 
territorial capital in the region and a high quality of government increase policy effectiveness. 
Gagliardi and Percoco (2017) show that regional settlement structures also matter for funding ef-
ficiency as economic growth triggered by Objective 1 payment is found to be most significant in 
rural regions close to a city. This result, which points at the role played by access to agglomeration 
forces in the geographical proximity to large urban agglomerations as a means to productively use 
                                                 
41 Iammarino et al. (2019) also emphasise the importance of institutions as driver for economic development. Di Cataldo and Mo-
nastiriotis (2018) analyse the influence of the congruence between the regional need and fund allocation in the UK. The authors 
find evidence that a vertical misalignment measure has no influence on regional GDP growth, while a horizontal misalignment 
measure indicates negative growth effects. They claim to address regional disadvantages by providing more tailored policy measures 
(Di Cataldo and Monastiriotis, 2018). 
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funding inputs, is broadly in line with earlier findings for German GRW funding as reported by 
Röhl and von Speicher (2009).42 
3.3 Theoretical considerations and research hypotheses 
Consistent with the well-established literature on VAR modelling, we deliberately keep the theo-
retical underpinnings of our regional economic model at a minimum. Specifically, we use elements 
from growth theory to highlight variable selection and to formulate research hypotheses, while we 
avoid making (false) assumption on the functional relationship among certain variables in the sys-
tem. To start with, we specify a regional production function (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019) as 
     Yi(t) = Ki(t)α Hi(t)β Z(t)iγ (Ai(t) Li(t))1-α-β-γ.                    (3.1) 
In Equation (3.1), Yi(t) expresses output of region i at time period t, Hi(t) indicates regional human 
capital, while Ki(t) and Zi(t) are private and public physical capital stocks, respectively, Ai(t) de-
notes the regional level of technology and Li(t) is labour.43 Based on Crihfield et al. (1995), dimin-
ishing returns to capital are assumed (α + β + γ < 1) and production is homogenous of degree one 
in Ki(t), Hi(t), Z(t)i and Li(t). In addition, technology Ai(t) is considered as public good and labour-
augmenting (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). By multiplying Equation (3.1) with Pi-1, where Pi defines 
the economically active population (henceforth workforce), we can state the production function 
in intensive form as 
    yi(t) = ki(t)α hi(t)β zi(t)γ (Ai(t)λi(t))1-α-β-γ.                   (3.2) 
                                                 
42 Most of the above findings for the conditional effects of EU regional policy are also consistent with the broader international 
literature on funding and transfer programmes (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000, or Suárez Serrato and Wingender, 2016). 
43 Following Eberle et al. (2019), we define Li(t) as: Li(t) = λi(t) × Pi(0)enit. Based on this definition, Pi(t) expresses the economically 
active population at the age of 15 to 64 years that grows exogenously with the rate ni and λi(t) represents the ratio of employed 
population (Li(t)/Pi(t)), which is constant in the long-run perspective (Eberle et al., 2019). 
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While Equation (3.2) describes a production process where private and public inputs are combined 
to create yi(t), the dynamics of a regional economy is typically much more complex and character-
ised by mutual feedback relationships. We capture this dynamics by specifying additional func-
tional equations for each input variable included in Equation (3.2). This results in a six variable 
system including GDP per workforce (yi), the human (hi), private physical (ki) as well as public 
physical capital (zi) per workforce, regional technology (Ai) and the employment rate (λi).44 
The central objective of this analysis is to shed light on the conditional effects of changes in the 
GRW investment support to private firms and local public infrastructure on the economic growth 
dynamics of a regional economic system (implied primary target variables of GRW funding are 
the private physical and public physical capital investment rates). As the literature review has 
shown, these differences may chiefly depend on the regions’ ability to transform (public) inputs 
productively into output, in other words, regions should have a sufficiently high absorptive capac-
ity. As Becker et al. (2013) argue, an essential dimension of absorptive capacity relates to the re-
gions’ equipment with human capital as a low amount of high skilled workers in the region may 
cause a low return on public funding: “A particularly interesting source of heterogeneity in transfer 
treatment response is the absorptive capacity of recipients” (Becker et al., 2013, p. 30). A similar 
argumentation holds for the case of the region’s technology level. One way to include these latter 
effects in the dynamic presentation of a regional economic system, as outlined above, is to extent 
the underlying equations for private and public physical capital accumulation as stated in Eberle et 
al. (2019) by an efficiency parameter θi as 
                                                 
44 Interpretable regional data for the physical capital stocks (private and public) and the technological level is unavailable. For this 
reason, we apply data for private (sk,i) and public physical capital investments (sz,i) and the patent rate as proxy for the regional 
technological growth rate (gi) (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019). 
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k
.
i
ki
 = θi [sk,i (ki(t)α-1 hi(t)β zi(t)γ (Ai(t)λi(t))1-α-β-γ)] – (ni+δ)                   (3.3) 
and  
z. i
zi
 = θi [sz,i (ki(t)α hi(t)β zi(t)γ-1 (Ai(t)λi(t))1-α-β-γ)] – (ni+δ).  
δ denotes the depreciation rate of ki and zi, respectively, and θi measures the degree of region i’s 
ability to use investments efficiently, e.g. due to the level of available absorptive capacity. This 
implies that the real share of saved and invested income sk,i and sz,i depends – among other effi-
ciency enhancing regional conditions – on the region’s absorptive capacity: A fully efficient region 
(θi = 1) exploits the complete saved income and follows the predicted growth path of the Solow 
model (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). Conversely, regions with lower levels of absorptive capacity (θi 
< 1) are not able to fully exploit the total saved income due to inefficiencies. 
Consequentially, these differences in the growth rate of private and public capital stocks have ad-
ditional effects on the remaining variables of the system (see Eberle et al., 2019 for a detailed 
exposition of this issue). In addition, the moderating role of absorptive capacity for a region’s de-
velopment path may also run through additional channels such as efficient learning and knowledge 
diffusion, thereby affect the regions’ technology, employment and output growth (e.g. Roper and 
Love, 2006).  
Taken together, the following hypothesis (H) on the role of absorptive capacity for regional eco-
nomic development can be formulated: 
H3.1: Regional policy has larger effects in regions with higher levels of (technological and 
entrepreneurial) absorptive capacity as these regions experience higher returns on public 
and private physical capital investments. Together with further transmission channels such 
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as efficient learning and knowledge diffusion, this carries over into positive socio-economic 
development. 
Another strand of the theoretical and empirical growth literature stresses the role of institutional 
quality and economic freedom as an important conditioning factor for economic development. At 
the country level, the institutional environment (economic freedom) is found to be a key driver for 
human capital investment (Feldmann, 2017) and economic growth (e.g. Doucouliagos and Uluba-
soglu, 2006, or Williamson and Mathers, 2011). Based on a meta-analysis of the contemporaneous 
empirical literature on the nexus between economic freedom and growth, Doucouliagos and Uluba-
soglu (2006) find evidence for an overall positive direct connection between the national economic 
freedom and economic growth together with a positive indirect effect running through the stimu-
lation of physical capital. Although institutional characteristics are typically more homogeneous at 
the regional level, Bologna et al. (2016) for the United States and Spruk and Kešeljević (2018) for 
Germany have recently shown that a higher regional economic freedom is associated with a higher 
per capita income and economic growth. Accordingly, it can be expected that economic freedom 
acts as a similar catalyst for regional economic development as absorptive capacity does, mainly 
by increasing the regional efficiency in utilising physical investments, labour market capacities and 
the available knowledge stock. That said, we refer to parameter θi in Equation (3.3) also as a proxy 
for the economic freedom of region i and thus we can extend H3.1 to the case of economic freedom 
as: 
H3.2: Regional policy has larger effects in regions with higher levels of economic freedom 
as these regions experience higher returns on public and private physical capital invest-
ments. Together with further transmission channels such as efficient learning and knowledge 
diffusion, this carries over into positive socio-economic development. 
 90 
 
 
3.4 Identification and econometric strategy 
3.4.1 Pre-estimation – identification strategy 
In the empirical estimations, we aim at comparing the regional economic effects of GRW funding 
for regions with low and high levels of absorptive capacity and economic freedom. In a first step, 
we therefore construct composite indicators for both concepts and group regions into subsamples 
based on the median of both indicators. As a robustness check to this type of regional classification, 
we also partition regions along the quintiles of the distribution in order detect potential non-linear-
ities in the moderating role of absorptive capacity and economic freedom for funding effectiveness. 
Moreover, to warrant comparability to previous GRW studies (Röhl and von Speicher, 2009, and 
Rhoden, 2016), we also group regions into subsamples on the basis of region type categories of-
fered by the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development 
(BBSR) as an additional robustness check.45 
In order to measure regional absorptive capacity as a multi-dimensional construct, we follow 
Becker et al. (2013) who identify regional human capital (education) as a central conditioning fac-
tor for the region’s ability to efficiently transform inputs into regional output. Additionally, Bald-
win and Okubo (2006) argue that the most efficient firms typically tend to sort themselves into 
urban agglomerations, while public subsidies mainly attract the less efficient firms to relocate to 
the periphery. Hence, we use the population density as second measure for regional absorptive 
capacity as we expect that firm productivity is higher in urban compared to rural regions. Similarly, 
the regional patent intensity and start-up rates in high-tech, medium high-tech manufacturing sec-
tors and knowledge intensive services (KIS) are used as further input factors for the construction 
                                                 
45 The BBSR groups regions according to their settlement structure in 258 labour market regions (Status: 31.12.2014). 118 (45.74 
%) of the labour market regions are classified as urban regions, 61 (23.64 %) as rural regions with some agglomeration tendencies 
(intermediate regions) and 79 (30.62 %) as rural regions. 
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of a composite indicator for regional absorptive capacity. We interpret these variables as proxies 
for the efficient use of knowledge stocks and high business dynamics.  
With regard to the measurement of economic freedom, we essentially use the regions’ overall tax 
revenues, regional public debt levels and the share of public employment as key input factors iden-
tified in the related literature (e.g. Bologna et al., 2016; Potrafke, 2013; Spruk and Kešeljević, 
2018). Additionally, we include voter turnout at federal elections as an indicator related to the 
regions’ social capital, i.e. the predisposition to exert individual rights (Becker et al., 2013). The 
latter variable can also be linked the large literature on individual rights and economic freedom. 
While government ideology could be considered as a further source for differences in economic 
freedom (i.e. right-wing governments are typically found to propagate higher economic freedom), 
Potrafke (2013) has shown for German federal states that this relationship only holds for West 
Germany but cannot be extended to East Germany. Since East German regions are significant re-
cipients of GRW funding, we do not include the shares of votes for right-wing parties as an addi-
tional indicator in order to avoid a too strong overlap between the policy variable and the condi-
tioning factor.46 
In order to construct (synthetic) composite indicators for absorptive capacity and economic free-
dom, we apply principal component analysis (PCA).47 Groups of regions with high and low levels 
of absorptive capacity and economic freedom are then partitioned according the moments of the 
distribution of both indicators (median, quintiles).  
                                                 
46 Please note that analysing the conditional effects according to a corruption index using regional data for only one country is 
difficult. On the one hand, the differences within a country are expected to be much smaller as between countries and, on the other 
hand, it is difficult to collect such data on a small-scale regional level in Germany. 
47 Individual components are normalised to takes values between 0 and 1 prior to PCA application in order to correct for possibly 
exorbitant variation in the various components (see Spruk and Kešeljević, 2018, for additional information). 
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3.4.2 Estimation – SpPVAR approach and IRF analysis 
Based on this subsampling strategy, we run regressions for each selected group of regions using a 
six equation SpPVAR model including the following variables (in logarithmic transformation): 
GRW funding intensity {lgrw}, higher education rate {lhk}, patent rate {lpat}, physical capital 
investment rate {linvq}, employment rate {lemp} and GDP per workforce {lgdp}. As shown in 
Eberle et al. (2019), this econometric approach allows us to adequately deal with the system’s 
inherent space-time dynamics, the presence of feedback effects among variables and the existence 
of indirect impact channels of GRW funding. In its reduced form, each equation of the VAR model 
for the vector of dependent variables y = {lgrw, lhk, lpat, linvq, lemp, lgdp} has the following 
basic structure  
     yit = µi + τt + B1 yi,t-1 + B2 Wyi,t-1 + εit,                    (3.4) 
where µi are region- and τt are time-specific fixed effects (controls, e.g., for the business cycle and 
macroeconomic shocks), while B1 {β1, …, β6} and B2 {β7, …, β12} denotes a set of reduced-form 
coefficients of the six time- (yi,t-1) and time-space lagged (Wyi,t-1) endogenous variables and εit 
denotes the reduced-form error term (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019 for additional information).48 In Sec-
tion 3.6, we will use IRFs together with standard error belts calculated on the basis of Monte Carlo 
simulations (Love and Zicchino, 2006) to graphically analyse the responses of regional economic 
variables to a positive (structural) shock in the GRW intensity. We keep the technical description 
                                                 
48 Regression models are estimated with a bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator (see Everaert and Pozzi, 2007). Please note that the 
included spatial lag variables Wyi,t-1 are only included to identify unbiased estimates for the time-lagged variables yi,t-1  and spatially 
indirect effects are not analysed. Moreover, the included spatial lag variable Wyi,t-1 for the of the particular dependent variable is 
biased in our fixed effects model. Thus, we perform a robustness check by excluding Wyt-1 from the specific dependent variable in 
the models using the median and BBSR classification for subdivision. The results of the robustness check show that the bias is 
negligible and does not influence the estimation results and IRF analysis. 
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of the structural SpPVAR model at a minimum here (a technical exposition is given in Eberle et 
al., 2019, as a precursor to this analysis).  
Finally, it is important to note that we use a structural SpPVAR approach to properly identify policy 
effects by imposing the following causal ordering of variables in the model 
. 
The arrows indicate the direction of causality. Specifically, variables more on the left side (e.g. 
GRW funding) are allowed to contemporaneously affect variables to their right (at time t), while 
feedback effects from the latter to the former variables can only take place with a time lag (t+1). 
That said, the chosen causal ordering defines the GRW policy as the most exogenous variable in 
the regional economic system (provided that funding modalities are unaffected in the very short-
run perspective). Likewise, GDP is the most endogenous variable, which is determined by all input 
factors in period t. Feedback effects from GDP to these input factors are only allowed to happen in 
period t+1 (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019).  
3.4.3 Post-estimation – t-tests 
In order to detect statistical differences between regional subgroups in the estimated responses to 
a GRW shock in our SpPVAR model, we run a series of ex-post t-tests for each sample period t as 
     tt = 
IRFlow	-	IRFhigh
sd2low
Nlow
 +	sd2highNhigh
,                     (3.5) 
where IRFlow is the estimated response in below median regions in t, IRFhigh is the estimated re-
sponse in above median regions in year t; sdlow  and sdhigh denote the associated standard deviations 
(calculated from the simulated error bands) and Nlow and Nhigh  is the number of repetitions (= 200) 
in the Monte Carlo simulations. While the null hypothesis of these tests is that the estimated IRFs 
lgrwt lhkt lpatt linvqt lempt lgdpt
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between regions with low and high levels of absorptive capacity (economic freedom) do not differ, 
a rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the regional effects of GRW funding are sensitive 
to the regional context. Our identification and econometric strategy is summarised in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 Summary of identification approach and estimation strategy 
 
3.5 Data and PCA analysis 
The empirical analysis is conducted for 258 German labour market regions over the time period 
2000-2011. Labour market regions have been chosen as units of analysis as they depict the de facto 
administrative level used by German regional policy to decide on the eligibility of GRW funding 
receipt (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). Variables used for the SpPVAR specification have been gath-
ered from different data sources as shown in Table A3.2 in the Appendix. All variables are used in 
logarithmic transformation. 
 
Pre-estimation
Principal component analysis (PCA)
Calculation of absorptive capacity and economic freedom indicators
Building of subsamples according to the indicators
Estimation
   Estimation of subsample specific VAR models
IRF analysis
Post-estimation
   Comparing of subsample specific responses by using t-tests
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics of variables in SpPVAR model, 2000-2011 
Variable Mean  
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
bip 49341.59 12938.38 22936.38 116626.4 
emp 0.6141 0.0901 0.3902 0.9473 
hk 0.0566 0.0291 0.0155 0.2067 
invq 0.0254 0.0167 0.0027 0.2240 
pat 0.0067 0.0052 0 0.0356 
grw_ind 0.0012 0.0028 0 0.0576 
grw_infra 0.0004 0.0014 0 0.0337 
grw 0.0016 0.0037 0 0.0761 
          
w_bip 54087.27 12065.66 28247.57 93912.85 
w_emp 0.6456 0.0556 0.4803 0.8291 
w_hk 0.0700 0.0253 0.0224 0.1649 
w_invq 0.0235 0.0092 0.0057 0.0932 
w_pat 0.0069 0.0038 0.0004 0.0210 
w_grw_ind 0.0010 0.0019 0 0.0179 
w_grw_infra 0.0004 0.0008 0 0.0111 
w_grw 0.0014 0.0025 0 0.0216 
Notes: t = 12; i = 258; N = 3096. Variables are normalised according to Table 
A3.2. Summary statistics are presented before taking the ln and detrending varia-
bles. For estimation, zero values are replaced by a very small number before tak-
ing the ln. See Table A3.2 for variable descriptions and source information. 
Moreover, we calculate spatial lags for all variables included in the VAR model in order to control 
for spatial autocorrelation across variables. The employment and human capital rate together with 
their spatial lags have been detrended as they have shown signs for non-stationarity (see Im et al., 
2003 for the applied test procedure). Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the variables. 
A description of the underlying variables used to conduct the synthetic composite indicators for 
absorptive capacity and economic freedom is given in Table A3.3. In order to ensure the predeter-
minedness of absorptive capacity and economic freedom as conditioning factor for GRW effec-
tiveness, both composite indicators have been constructed for the initial (pre-)sample period in 
2000.49  
                                                 
49 Only the variable public employment is based on observations in 2006 due to a structural break in the public employment statistics 
and regional voter turnouts are taken from the federal parliament elections in 1998. See Table A3.3 for details.  
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The PCA-based factor loadings used to construct two composite indicators for absorptive capacity 
(ZAC) and economic freedom (ZEF)50 are shown below, where ~ indicates that the variables have 
been standardised:  
ZAC = 0.5108 (~ higher education rate) + 0.3893 (~ patent rate) + 0.4315 (~ population 
density) + 0.2953 (~ start-up rate high-tech sectors) + 0.5605 (~ start-up rate KIS) 
ZEF = 0.5549 (~ overall tax revenues) + 0.3772 (~ public debt) - 0.2726 (~ public employ-
ment) + 0.6896 (~ voter turnout) 
The reported factor loadings are based on the first principal component, which is typically used as 
the best synthetic indicator that combines or condenses the information originally dispersed over 
the input factors (e.g. Spruk and Kešeljević, 2018). As the PCA results show, the indicator for the 
absorptive capacity is positively correlated with all input factors in 2000, where the highest weights 
are given to the regions’ human capital endowment and KIS start-up rate. In line with Spruk and 
Kešeljević (2018), the PCA results for economic freedom show that the synthetic indicator posi-
tively correlates with tax revenues, public debt levels and voter turnout, while higher levels of 
public employment are associated with a lower degree of economic freedom. Moreover, if we cal-
culate a simple correlation coefficient ρ for both indicator scores, the result (ρ = 0.3901) shows that 
this correlation is positive but small and thus that both indicates capture different dimensions of 
regional context conditions.  
The regional absorptive capacity is primarily high in urban labour market regions – such as Berlin, 
Munich, Hamburg, Frankfurt (Main) or Düsseldorf – while rural labour markets bring out lower 
                                                 
50 Due to data issues (see Table A3.3), factor loadings are calculated without the labour market regions Hamburg, Bremen, Brem-
erhaven and Berlin.  
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levels of absorptive capacity. Conversely, the economic freedom indicator emphasises considera-
ble differences between Eastern and Western German labour markets, with a dominant concentra-
tion of higher levels of economic freedom in Western Germany (see Figure A3.1). 
3.6 Empirical results 
The presentation of empirical results is primarily based on a graphical IRF analysis. Statistical 
inference can be made on the basis of the plotted standard error belts. By partitioning our sample 
as outlined above, the main focus rests on a comparison of economic responses to a one-period 
GRW shock in regions with high (blue lines) and low (grey lines) indicator values. It is important 
to note that the initial GRW shock at time t = 0 is measured in terms of a positive, one-period 
increase in the GRW funding intensity by one standard deviation (henceforth: GRW shock).51 This 
implies that GRW shocks are subsample-specific. However, when we use t-test to detect systematic 
differences in the estimated responses across groups, we work with “comparable” GRW shock as 
a robustness check (that is, the initial shock for regions in the ‘high’ group is rescaled to equal the 
percentage shock for regions in the ‘low’ group). We report the empirical results for regional eco-
nomic responses to changes in the overall GRW funding intensity here; separate estimation results 
for disaggregated funding volumes of GRW industry and GRW infrastructure support can be found 
in the Appendix. The main findings of our IRF analysis, based on the estimated SpPVAR model, 
are summarised in Table 3.2 and will be discussed in the following. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Responses are measured relative to the standard deviation (in %). 
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Table 3.2 Summary of statistically significant findings from IRF analysis in SpPVAR model 
3.6.1 Absorptive capacity 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the regional economic responses to a one-period shock (increase) in the over-
all GRW funding intensity for regions with high and low levels of absorptive capacity (median 
classification). The reactions of the employment and human capital rate to a one-period increase in 
overall GRW funding are quite similar for type of regions (blue and grey lines in Figure 3.2): we 
observe a statistically significant increase in the employment rate and a positive response in the 
region’s human capital rate. Hence, higher intensities of overall GRW funding are associated with 
 
 
 lgdp lemp linvq lpat lhk 
A
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e 
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 GRW industry   funding 
Low AC - + +   
High AC + + - + - 
Diff. (see Table  
A3.4) H  L  L 
GRW infrastructure  
funding 
Low AC  +  - + 
High AC + +   + 
Diff. (see Table  
A3.4) H  L H  
Overall GRW  funding 
Low AC - + +  + 
High AC + +  + -       + 
Diff. (see Table  
A3.4) H L L  L 
Ec
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 GRW industry  funding 
Low EF -  + - + 
High EF + +  +  
Diff. (see Table  
A3.5) H H L H  
GRW infrastructure  
funding 
Low EF   + - + 
High EF + + -  + 
Diff. (see Table  
A3.5)  H L   
Overall GRW   funding 
Low EF -  + - + 
High EF + +  +  
Diff. (see Table  
A3.5) H H L H  
Notes: + indicates short-term (less than 4 years during the considered time period) and + long-term (at least 4 years) significant 
positive effects, - indicates short-term and - long-term significant negative effects. L denotes short-term (less than 4 years during 
the considered time period) and L long-term (at least 4 years) significant higher economic responses in regions with a low 
indicator score, H (short-term) and H (long-term) indicates significant higher economic responses in regions with a high indi-
cator score. 
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a higher employment and human capital rate – independent of the absorptive capacity in the re-
gions. When we test for significant differences in the response rate across regions with high and 
low absorptive capacity, the results from period-specific t-tests point at a higher response of the 
employment and human capital rate for regions with low absorptive capacity in the short run (Table 
A3.4). 
Figure 3.2 IRFs for one-period shock in overall GRW intensity, high/low levels of absorptive capacity (AC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the estimated IRF for each subsample and the corresponding dashed lines show the 95% confidence 
intervals that were calculated by performing Monte Carlo simulations with 200 repetitions. Subsamples are portioned by the median 
value of absorptive capacity. The associated regression results of the underlying SpPVAR models are available upon request. 
In regions with high absorptive capacity, an increase in the overall GRW funding is further asso-
ciated with a significant increase in the region’s GDP per workforce and the patent activity. Con-
versely, overall GRW funding appears to trigger private investments only in regions with low levels 
of absorptive capacity. This IRF heterogeneity hints at the fact that alternative transmission chan-
nels of funding operate in different regional contexts: While a traditional funding channel, mainly 
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running through an increase in the private sector investment rate, play a dominant role in regions 
with a low absorptive capacity, regions with a high absorptive capacity mainly benefit through a 
knowledge-based funding channel, which also appears to increase the region’s GDP. Finally, the 
results of the t-test analysis underline significant differences in the responses of the GDP per work-
force and the investment rate across regions with high and low levels of absorptive capacity (see 
Table A3.4 in the Appendix for details). 
In order to better identify potential non-linearities in the moderating role of absorptive capacity for 
regional GRW funding effects, we also classify regions in five subgroups according to the quintiles 
of the indicator’s distribution. This allows us to gain more insights into the effectiveness of GRW 
funding in different regional contexts. We focus on a graphical presentation of the results for a one-
period shock in the overall GRW intensity and reduce the information content in Figure 3.3 (i.e. 
solid lines denote statistically significant responses, while the non-solid lines indicate non-signifi-
cant responses). The quintile-based subsample estimation results confirm the main results from 
above and additionally provide some refined information. First, again all significant findings for 
effects on employment rate and human capital are positive. However, insignificant effects are ra-
ther found in the middle quintiles (the second and third quintile for human capital and second 
quintile for the employment rate). This suggests that GRW funding increases employment and 
human capital especially in regions with very low or very high absorptive capacity through differ-
ent transmission channels. The quintile-based findings for the response of private investment and 
patent activity also match with our above findings: Private investment is triggered by GRW funding 
only in the regions with the lowest absorptive capacity, while it has a negative impact on regions 
of the fourth quintile (high absorptive capacity). The regional patent activity appears to benefit 
from GRW funding in regions with high absorptive capacity (fourth and fifth quintile) and is neg-
atively correlated with GRW funding in regions with very low absorptive capacity. 
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Figure 3.3 Quintile-based IRFs for one-period shock in overall GRW intensity, absorptive capacity (AC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines illustrate statistically significant IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate statistically non-significant IRFs. The 
associated regression results of the underlying SpPVAR models are available upon request. 
The results for the response of GDP are mixed. At least, we find significant positive effects (third 
and fourth quintile) or no significant effects, so that GRW funding is, with exception of quintile 2, 
in sum positively correlated with regional GDP development.52 There is no clear tendency in the 
differences between the subsamples so that we avoid over-interpreting these results. However, 
carefully speaking, the findings indicate that traditional funding channels which mainly target the 
firms’ physical investment rate as intermediate output variable are rather less effective compared 
to knowledge-based funding channels.  
                                                 
52 Please note that the response is significant negative in the year of the funding increase for the first quintile. 
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Our findings for the two GRW policy fields in focus (GRW industry and infrastructure support) 
reveal only little differences in the underlying transmission channels: That is, GRW industry fund-
ing has a larger impact on private investment and the region’s patent activity, while GRW infra-
structure funding is mainly associated with a rise in the region’s human capital intensity. Both 
components of GRW funding influence GDP and employment in a similar way (see Figure A3.2 
in the Appendix for details). 
3.6.2 Economic freedom 
If we separate regions according to high and low levels of economic freedom (median classifica-
tion), the IRF results in Figure 3.4 show that we only observe a moderate level of group heteroge-
neity in the effects of a GRW shock on employment and human capital. Specifically, we observe 
that the estimated IRFs are positive for both groups, although the effects on the employment rate 
are statistically insignificant for regions with low economic freedom and also significantly lower 
compared to regions with a high level of economic freedom (see t-tests in Table A3.5 for details). 
Moreover, the effects on GDP, patent activity and private investment differ significantly across 
groups: overall GRW funding has a significant positive effect on GDP and the patent activity in 
regions with high economic freedom, while it has a positive effect on private investment and neg-
ative effect on patent activity in regions with low economic freedom (Figure 3.4). These differences 
are also emphasised by the t-test analysis, which reveals that the magnitudes of the estimated re-
sponses differ significantly across the subgroups (Table A3.5). In terms of the direction of effects, 
the IRF results are quite similar to the finding for absorptive capacity, although the regions in the 
subsamples are quite different. This is an interesting outcome of our estimations and will be further 
discussed below.  
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Figure 3.4 IRFs for one-period shock in overall GRW intensity, high/low levels of economic freedom (EF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the estimated IRF for each subsample and the corresponding dashed lines show the 95% confidence 
intervals that were calculated by performing Monte Carlo simulations with 200 repetitions. Subsamples are portioned by the median 
value of economic freedom. The associated regression results of the underlying SpPVAR models are available upon request. 
Figure 3.5 reports quintile-specific IRFs for a shock in the overall GRW intensity when the degree 
of economic freedom varies across quintiles. Similar to the findings for subgroups according to 
absorptive capacity, the employment rate benefits from GRW funding especially in regions with 
very high and very low economic freedom. Regions with high values in both indicators – absorptive 
capacity and economic freedom – are West German regions, while the regions with low values in 
both indicators are mainly the economically weak regions in East Germany together with East 
Bavaria. These regions seem to benefit most from GRW funding in terms of a rising employment 
rate. 
In contrast to the subsample results for absorptive capacity, however, only regions with a low level 
of economic freedom show a statistically significant positive correlation between GRW funding 
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and the human capital rate. The IRFs for regions with higher economic freedom are similar in size 
but statistically insignificant. Statistically significant positive effects on the patent activity arise 
only in the fifth quintile (highest economic freedom), while the effects are negative in the lowest 
three quintiles (significant for the lowest quintile). Thus, in East Bavaria and in regions in East 
Germany with low values in both indicators, GRW funding has negative effects on the patent ac-
tivity, while the patent activity is increased especially in supported West German regions. 
GRW funding and GDP per workforce are positively associated mainly in regions with high eco-
nomic freedom.53 In combination with the observed patterns for the absorptive capacity classifica-
tion, GRW funding is positively associated with GDP development in regions in West Germany; 
however, positive effects may also arise in East German regions with low economic freedom when 
the level of absorptive capacity is sufficiently high. 
An opposite empirical picture emerges for the response of private investment to GRW funding 
conditional on the observed level of economic freedom: Here, only regions with lower economic 
freedom seem to benefit, significant positive effects are only found for the two lowest quintiles. 
Combining this with the result that GRW funding increases private investments most in regions 
with very low absorptive capacity, the economically weak regions in West Germany (North-East 
of Bavaria) and regions with low absorptive capacity and economic freedom in East Germany seem 
to benefit most in this way. 
Regarding disaggregated results for GRW industry and infrastructure funding, we again find only 
little differences in the working of the two main pillars of German regional policy: the effects on 
GDP per workforce, the employment rate and, different to the analysis using the classification 
                                                 
53 Please note that the response is significant negative in the year of the funding increase for the fifth quintile. 
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according to the absorptive capacity, the investment rate are very similar for both policy instru-
ments. However, only GRW industry funding has a significant positive effect on the region’s patent 
activity, while GRW infrastructure funding affects the human capital rate in both subsamples (see 
Figure A3.3).54 
Figure 3.5 Quintile-based IRFs for one-period shock in overall GRW intensity, economic freedom (EF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines illustrate statistically significant IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate statistically non-significant IRFs. The 
associated regression results of the underlying SpPVAR models are available upon request. 
                                                 
54 We have also used a classification of regions according to their settlement structure as an additional robust check (Figure A3.4 in 
the Appendix). For the most part, the empirical results support a significant regional heterogeneity as indicated by differences in 
absorptive capacity and economic freedom. The findings show that the private sector investment rate is positively affected only for 
rural regions (all GRW funding measures) and negative in urban regions for GRW infrastructure funding, while human capital is 
positively affected especially in intermediate regions (applies for all GRW funding measures). The employment rate is positively 
affected by all kinds of GRW funding in urban and rural regions (GRW infrastructure funding). Finally, the patent activity is posi-
tively correlated with GRW funding in urban or intermediate regions. GRW funding only has a significant positive effect on the 
regional GDP per workforce in urban regions. 
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3.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has analysed the role of regional absorptive capacity and economic freedom for the 
ability of regions to use regional policy funding effectively for economic development. We have 
used data for Germany’s most important regional policy instrument, the “Joint Task for the Im-
provement of Regional Economic Structures” in the period 2000-2011 for our empirical investiga-
tion. In the empirical analysis, we have applied a structural SpPVAR approach and have used as-
sociated IRF analysis to track the effects of regional policy on the functioning of a regional eco-
nomic system for various subsamples of region types. These subsamples have been created on the 
basis of moments (median, quintiles) of the distribution for two synthetic composite indicators 
proxying regional absorptive capacity and economic freedom. Moreover, we have used ex-post t-
tests to determine significant differences between the estimated average responses across subsam-
ples.  
Our empirical results shed new light on the multifaceted dimension of the GRW policy and under-
line the importance of regional context conditions for policy effectiveness. While we find evidence 
for the working of a traditional funding channel for regions with low levels of absorptive capacity 
and economic freedom, mainly working through an increased investment rate, no evidence is found 
for growth enhancing effects of this transmission channel in these regions (e.g. measured in terms 
of GDP per workforce). In contrast, GRW funding is found to boost GDP per workforce through a 
knowledge-based funding channel in regions with a high absorptive capacity and economic free-
dom. Furthermore, both kinds of regions show a higher employment rate as a reaction to GRW 
funding, but this effect is strongest in the regions with high and very low indicator values for ab-
sorptive capacity and economic freedom. In general, our findings hint at the complementary role 
of both composite indicators as fertile soil for policy effectiveness.  
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Based on the empirical findings, we see two main policy implications. First, GRW is a multifaceted 
policy that i) affects several economic variables simultaneously and ii) has heterogeneous effects 
in different regional contexts. Accordingly, an assessment of the effective use of public funding 
chiefly depends on the specific policy objective in focus. However, the results of our structural 
SpPVAR suggest that traditional policy impact channels of German regional policy (e.g. via in-
creased private sector investment rates) are less effective to stimulate regional economic growth 
compared to knowledge-based transmission channels. The latter funding channel is particularly 
significant for regions with a high level of absorptive capacity and economic freedom. 
Secondly, in times of decreasing GRW funding volumes, regional context factors, including the 
absorptive capacity and economic freedom, should come to the fore of policy makers as a fertile 
ground for the implementation of policy objectives. As such, proper institutional designs and initi-
atives that are able to positively affect these context conditions may yield a higher return to public 
spending than compensating for lack of these regional ‘assets’ through large-scale funding 
schemes. While good-functioning regional institutions, educational opportunities, low bureaucratic 
hurdles, a dynamic entrepreneurship community and a local civil society can surely contribute to 
such positive regional context conditions, more research is needed to fully understand the funda-
mental mechanisms that drive their interplay with policy instruments to support the socio-economic 
development of regions in the long run. 
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A3. Appendix 
Table A3.1 Recent empirical studies on the conditional effects of investment and transfer programmes 
Authors Policy Geographical scale Conditional effects are measured by Conditional effects 
Röhl and von Speicher 
(2009) 
GRW Regional (Germany) Four different types of agglomeration (settlement 
structure) 
Highest effects in agglomerations, followed by rural areas.  
Rhoden (2016) GRW Regional (Germany) Four different types of agglomeration (settlement 
structure) 
No different effects in different types of agglomeration. 
Cappelen et al. (2003) EU Structural 
Funds 
Regional (Europe) Economic environment: less developed regions 
from Spain, Greece and Portugal are excluded in a 
reduced sample estimation 
Higher effects in economic more advanced regions. 
Beugelsdijk and 
Eijffinger (2005) 
EU Structural 
Funds 
National (Europe) Corruption index No higher effects in less corrupt countries.  
Ederveen et al. (2006) EU Structural 
Funds 
National (Europe) Institutional quality index, inflation, trust, open-
ness and corruption 
Higher effects in countries with adequate institutions. 
Becker et al. (2013) EU Structural 
Funds 
Regional (Europe) Absorptive capacity, quality of government Higher effects in regions with an adequate absorptive capacity (human 
capital endowment, quality of government) 
Fratesi and Perucca 
(2014) 
EU Structural 
Funds 
Regional (Central and 
Eastern Europe) 
Territorial capital A higher regional territorial capital increases the effectiveness of struc-
tural funds regarding GDP growth.  
Rodríguez-Pose and 
Garcilazo (2015) 
EU Structural 
Funds 
Regional (Europe) Quality of government Beyond a certain threshold, quality of government increases the efficacy 
of regional structural funds.  
Gagliardi and Percoco 
(2017) 
EU Structural 
Funds 
Regional (Europe) Settlement structures The effects of EU Objective 1 investments on GDP per capita is higher 
in intermediate as well as rural regions that are located close to a city. 
Breidenbach et al. 
(2019) 
EU Structural 
Funds 
Regional (Europe) Institutional (government) quality Positive correlation between the funding effects and government qual-
ity. 
Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) 
Foreign aid  National (Latin 
America. Asia and 
Africa)  
Index of Openness, budget surplus and inflation 
rate 
Higher effects in countries with a good policy environment. 
Suárez Serrato and 
Wingender (2016) 
Federal spending 
United States 
Counties (Unites 
States) 
Faster- and slower-growing counties Higher returns to federal spending on income and employment in poorer 
counties. 
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Table A3.2 Variables description and data sources variables used in SpPVAR analysis 
Variable Description Data source 
lgdp Nominal GDP per economically active working population 
defined as: 
[GDP in € / (Population aged 15 to 64 years × Participation 
rate)] 
Note: Population data is based on the census 1987. Till 
2011, the participation rate is based on the same population 
data. From 2011, the participation rate is calculated based 
on population data of the census 2011. 
GDP: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder” (Status: 
August 2015) 
Population aged 15 to 64 years: Re-
gionaldatenbank Deutschland (Based on 
the population census 1987) 
Participation rate: Statistik der Bunde-
sagentur für Arbeit / Indikatoren und Kar-
ten zur Raum und Stadtentwicklung (IN-
KAR) 
linvq Private sector physical capital investment rate (industry in-
vestments in the manufacturing, mining and quarrying sec-
tor) defined as: 
[Industry Investments in € / GDP in €]  
Note: Missing values are interpolated on the basis of an au-
toregressive process with 3 lags. 
Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt-, und Raum-
forschung (BBSR), laufende Raumbe-
obachtungen, various issues 
lhk Higher education rate defined as: 
[Employees with university degree / (Population aged 15 to 
64 years × Participation rate)] 
Note: We assume that possible data imperfections regarding 
the qualification of employees are random. 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), 
Nuremberg 
lemp Employment rate defined as: 
[Employees total / (Population aged 15 to 64 years × Partic-
ipation rate)] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), 
Nuremberg 
lpat Patent rate defined as:  
[Patents / GDP in Mio. €] 
Own calculation from the PATSTAT data-
base (Version October 2014, European Pa-
tent Office) 
lgrw 
(lgrw_ind, 
lgrw_infra) 
GRW investment intensity (and sub‐components for indus-
try and infrastructure investment support) defined as: 
[GRW funding volumes in € / GDP in €] 
Federal Office for Economic Affairs and 
Export Control (BAFA) 
 
w_X (controls) Spatial lags are calculated using the STATA command 
splagvar (in absolute values for each variable). After that, 
the constructed spatial lag variables are normalised and ln‐
transformed identical to the non‐spatial variables. 
 
Notes: All variables are used in logarithmic transformation. 
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Table A3.3 Variables description and data sources used for PCA analysis 
Variable Description Data source 
Absorptive Capacity 
Higher education rate Employees with university degree / (Population 
aged 15 to 64 years × Participation rate) 
see Table A3.2 
Patent rate Patents / GDP in Mio. € see Table A3.2 
Population density (Population aged 15 to 64 years × Participation 
rate) / area (in km2) 
Area in km2: Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt-, und 
Raumforschung (BBSR) 
Start-up rate high-
technology and me-
dium-high-technology 
sectors 
Start-ups high-technology and medium-high-
technology sectors / (Population aged 15 to 64 
years × Participation rate) 
Mannheimer Unternehmenspanel (2015), Centre 
for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
Start-up rate total 
knowledge intensive 
activities sectors 
Start-ups total knowledge intensive activities 
sectors / (Population aged 15 to 64 years × Par-
ticipation rate) 
Mannheimer Unternehmenspanel (2015), Centre 
for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
Economic Freedom 
Overall tax revenues Overall tax revenue in € / population Realsteuervergleich des Bundes und der Länder / 
Indikatoren und Karten zur Raum und Stadtent-
wicklung (INKAR) 
Public debts* 
 
Reserve bank credit in € / population 
 
Statistik über Schulden des Bundes und der Länder 
/ Indikatoren und Karten zur Raum und Stadtent-
wicklung (INKAR) 
Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 
Public employment* Employees of the municipality / population 
(10.000) 
 
Personalstandsstatistik der Länder, Gemeinden und 
Gemeindeverbände / Indikatoren und Karten zur 
Raum und Stadtentwicklung (INKAR) 
Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 
Voter turnout Second votes / people eligible to vote (in %) Allgemeine Bundestagswahlstatistik des Bundes 
und der Länder / Indikatoren und Karten zur Raum 
und Stadtentwicklung (INKAR) 
Notes: * No data is available for the districts of the city states Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin. The labour market regions Hamburg, 
Bremen and Bremerhaven comprise more administrative districts than the particular city district itself, for which reason inter-
pretable values exist for these labour market regions (underestimation is possible). To approximate values for Berlin, public 
employment includes employees of municipalities and of the federal state, while the public debts are measured for the federal 
state Berlin. Please note that the labour markets regions comprising city states are excluded for the calculation of the factor 
loadings. 
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Figure A3.1 Distribution of absorptive capacity and economic freedom across German labour market regions (quintiles) 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations. See main text and Table A3.3 for details on composite indicator calculation. Quintiles of distribution are shown for 258 local labour markets in Germany. 
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Table A3.4 t-tests for differences in the estimated average response to a GRW shock between regions with high and 
low levels of absorptive capacity 
Initial GRW shock in subsamples: one sample-specific standard deviation 
    GRW industry funding GRW infrastructure funding Overall GRW funding 
Time 
Re-
sponse 
var. 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha:  
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha:  
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha: 
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha: 
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha:  
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha:  
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
0 lhk 1.8602 0.0318 0.9682 0.0636 1.5036 0.0667 0.9333 0.1335 1.9375 0.0267 0.9733 0.0534 
1 lhk 1.0205 0.1540 0.8460 0.3081 1.0968 0.1367 0.8633 0.2734 1.0657 0.1436 0.8564 0.2872 
2 lhk 0.5364 0.2960 0.7040 0.5920 0.8274 0.2042 0.7958 0.4085 0.4903 0.3121 0.6879 0.6242 
3 lhk 0.3586 0.3601 0.6399 0.7201 0.6702 0.2516 0.7484 0.5031 0.2036 0.4194 0.5806 0.8387 
4 lhk 0.2587 0.3980 0.6020 0.7960 0.5427 0.2938 0.7062 0.5877 0.0328 0.4869 0.5131 0.9739 
5 lhk 0.1985 0.4214 0.5786 0.8428 0.4267 0.3349 0.6651 0.6699 -0.0844 0.5336 0.4664 0.9328 
6 lhk 0.1552 0.4384 0.5616 0.8767 0.3317 0.3701 0.6299 0.7403 -0.1755 0.5696 0.4304 0.8608 
7 lhk 0.1228 0.4512 0.5488 0.9024 0.2352 0.4071 0.5929 0.8142 -0.2498 0.5986 0.4014 0.8028 
8 lhk 0.0958 0.4619 0.5381 0.9238 0.1486 0.4410 0.5590 0.8820 -0.3081 0.6209 0.3791 0.7581 
9 lhk 0.0762 0.4697 0.5303 0.9393 0.0716 0.4715 0.5285 0.9430 -0.3506 0.6369 0.3631 0.7261 
10 lhk 0.0605 0.4759 0.5241 0.9518 0.0027 0.4989 0.5011 0.9979 -0.3926 0.6526 0.3474 0.6949 
11 lhk 0.0488 0.4805 0.5195 0.9611 -0.0570 0.5227 0.4773 0.9546 -0.4229 0.6637 0.3363 0.6726 
12 lhk 0.0409 0.4837 0.5163 0.9674 -0.1065 0.5424 0.4576 0.9152 -0.4357 0.6683 0.3317 0.6633 
0 lpat 0.1891 0.4251 0.5749 0.8501 -1.6751 0.9526 0.0474 0.0947 -0.3923 0.6525 0.3475 0.6950 
1 lpat -0.6377 0.7380 0.2620 0.5240 -1.2411 0.8924 0.1076 0.2153 -0.8929 0.8138 0.1862 0.3725 
2 lpat -0.8812 0.8106 0.1894 0.3788 -2.4348 0.9923 0.0077 0.0153 -1.1873 0.8821 0.1179 0.2358 
3 lpat -1.0421 0.8510 0.1490 0.2980 -2.0881 0.9813 0.0187 0.0374 -1.3346 0.9086 0.0914 0.1828 
4 lpat -1.1342 0.8713 0.1287 0.2574 -1.6115 0.9461 0.0539 0.1079 -1.3745 0.9150 0.0850 0.1701 
5 lpat -1.1731 0.8793 0.1207 0.2415 -1.2925 0.9015 0.0985 0.1969 -1.2563 0.8951 0.1049 0.2097 
6 lpat -1.1640 0.8774 0.1226 0.2451 -1.0759 0.8587 0.1413 0.2826 -1.2338 0.8910 0.1090 0.2180 
7 lpat -1.1324 0.8709 0.1291 0.2581 -0.9229 0.8217 0.1783 0.3566 -1.2355 0.8913 0.1087 0.2174 
8 lpat -1.0536 0.8537 0.1463 0.2927 -0.8150 0.7922 0.2078 0.4155 -1.1426 0.8731 0.1269 0.2539 
9 lpat -1.0145 0.8445 0.1555 0.3110 -0.6935 0.7558 0.2442 0.4884 -1.0793 0.8594 0.1406 0.2811 
10 lpat -0.9847 0.8373 0.1627 0.3254 -0.6017 0.7261 0.2739 0.5477 -0.9741 0.8347 0.1653 0.3306 
11 lpat -0.9429 0.8268 0.1732 0.3463 -0.5400 0.7052 0.2948 0.5895 -0.8788 0.8100 0.1900 0.3800 
12 lpat -0.8474 0.8013 0.1987 0.3973 -0.5132 0.6959 0.3041 0.6081 -0.7874 0.7843 0.2157 0.4315 
0 linvq 1.5773 0.0578 0.9422 0.1155 0.4656 0.3209 0.6791 0.6417 1.7512 0.0403 0.9597 0.0807 
1 linvq 3.2298 0.0007 0.9993 0.0013 1.7014 0.0448 0.9552 0.0897 2.7944 0.0027 0.9973 0.0055 
2 linvq 2.9540 0.0017 0.9983 0.0033 1.5803 0.0574 0.9426 0.1148 2.5168 0.0061 0.9939 0.0122 
3 linvq 2.7199 0.0034 0.9966 0.0068 1.2691 0.1026 0.8974 0.2052 2.1385 0.0165 0.9835 0.0331 
4 linvq 2.3913 0.0086 0.9914 0.0173 0.8002 0.2120 0.7880 0.4241 1.8203 0.0347 0.9653 0.0695 
5 linvq 2.0586 0.0201 0.9799 0.0402 0.3376 0.3679 0.6321 0.7358 1.4800 0.0698 0.9302 0.1397 
6 linvq 1.7099 0.0440 0.9560 0.0881 -0.0005 0.5002 0.4998 0.9996 1.2155 0.1124 0.8876 0.2249 
7 linvq 1.4258 0.0773 0.9227 0.1547 -0.2213 0.5875 0.4125 0.8250 1.0082 0.1570 0.8430 0.3140 
8 linvq 1.1859 0.1182 0.8818 0.2364 -0.3332 0.6304 0.3696 0.7391 0.7954 0.2134 0.7866 0.4269 
9 linvq 0.9677 0.1669 0.8331 0.3338 -0.4110 0.6593 0.3407 0.6813 0.6210 0.2675 0.7325 0.5350 
10 linvq 0.7716 0.2204 0.7796 0.4408 -0.4520 0.6743 0.3257 0.6515 0.4719 0.3186 0.6814 0.6372 
11 linvq 0.6126 0.2702 0.7298 0.5405 -0.4561 0.6757 0.3243 0.6486 0.3337 0.3694 0.6306 0.7388 
12 linvq 0.4712 0.3189 0.6811 0.6377 -0.4598 0.6770 0.3230 0.6459 0.2197 0.4131 0.5869 0.8262 
0 lemp 1.1472 0.1260 0.8740 0.2520 0.3171 0.3757 0.6243 0.7513 2.0216 0.0219 0.9781 0.0439 
1 lemp 0.1536 0.4390 0.5610 0.8780 -0.8436 0.8003 0.1997 0.3994 0.3738 0.3544 0.6456 0.7088 
2 lemp 0.0245 0.4902 0.5098 0.9805 -0.7820 0.7827 0.2173 0.4347 -0.1696 0.5673 0.4327 0.8654 
3 lemp 0.0905 0.4640 0.5360 0.9280 -0.5175 0.6974 0.3026 0.6051 -0.3220 0.6262 0.3738 0.7476 
4 lemp 0.1895 0.4249 0.5751 0.8498 -0.1940 0.5769 0.4231 0.8462 -0.3700 0.6442 0.3558 0.7116 
5 lemp 0.2965 0.3835 0.6165 0.7670 0.0560 0.4777 0.5223 0.9554 -0.3952 0.6535 0.3465 0.6929 
6 lemp 0.3780 0.3528 0.6472 0.7056 0.1837 0.4272 0.5728 0.8544 -0.4107 0.6592 0.3408 0.6815 
7 lemp 0.4335 0.3325 0.6675 0.6649 0.1949 0.4228 0.5772 0.8456 -0.4232 0.6638 0.3362 0.6724 
8 lemp 0.4681 0.3200 0.6800 0.6400 0.1343 0.4466 0.5534 0.8932 -0.4387 0.6694 0.3306 0.6611 
9 lemp 0.4718 0.3186 0.6814 0.6373 0.0511 0.4797 0.5203 0.9593 -0.4413 0.6704 0.3296 0.6593 
10 lemp 0.4906 0.3120 0.6880 0.6239 -0.0388 0.5154 0.4846 0.9691 -0.4418 0.6706 0.3294 0.6589 
11 lemp 0.4966 0.3099 0.6901 0.6197 -0.1204 0.5479 0.4521 0.9042 -0.4371 0.6689 0.3311 0.6623 
12 lemp 0.4915 0.3117 0.6883 0.6234 -0.1874 0.5743 0.4257 0.8515 -0.4401 0.6700 0.3300 0.6601 
0 lgdp -2.7546 0.9969 0.0031 0.0061 -1.3947 0.9181 0.0819 0.1639 -2.8183 0.9975 0.0025 0.0051 
1 lgdp -3.2450 0.9994 0.0006 0.0013 -1.7433 0.9590 0.0410 0.0821 -3.4058 0.9996 0.0004 0.0007 
2 lgdp -2.5925 0.9951 0.0049 0.0099 -1.4597 0.9274 0.0726 0.1452 -2.8523 0.9977 0.0023 0.0046 
3 lgdp -2.1269 0.9830 0.0170 0.0340 -1.1979 0.8842 0.1158 0.2317 -2.4665 0.9930 0.0070 0.0141 
4 lgdp -1.8336 0.9663 0.0337 0.0675 -1.0299 0.8482 0.1518 0.3037 -2.1763 0.9849 0.0151 0.0301 
5 lgdp -1.5990 0.9447 0.0553 0.1106 -0.8923 0.8136 0.1864 0.3728 -2.0342 0.9787 0.0213 0.0426 
6 lgdp -1.4007 0.9190 0.0810 0.1621 -0.8381 0.7988 0.2012 0.4025 -1.8803 0.9696 0.0304 0.0608 
7 lgdp -1.2542 0.8947 0.1053 0.2105 -0.7791 0.7818 0.2182 0.4364 -1.7907 0.9630 0.0370 0.0741 
8 lgdp -1.1434 0.8732 0.1268 0.2536 -0.7486 0.7727 0.2273 0.4546 -1.6951 0.9546 0.0454 0.0908 
9 lgdp -1.0513 0.8531 0.1469 0.2938 -0.7187 0.7636 0.2364 0.4727 -1.5931 0.9440 0.0560 0.1119 
10 lgdp -0.9846 0.8373 0.1627 0.3254 -0.6833 0.7526 0.2474 0.4948 -1.5008 0.9329 0.0671 0.1342 
11 lgdp -0.9074 0.8176 0.1824 0.3648 -0.6515 0.7424 0.2576 0.5151 -1.4299 0.9232 0.0768 0.1535 
12 lgdp -0.8266 0.7955 0.2045 0.4090 -0.6320 0.7361 0.2639 0.5278 -1.3458 0.9104 0.0896 0.1791 
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Table A3.4 continued 
Initial GRW shock in subsamples: same percentage* 
    GRW industry funding GRW infrastructure funding Overall GRW funding 
Time 
Re-
sponse 
var. 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha:  
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha:  
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha: 
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha: 
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha:  
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha:  
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
0 lhk 2.0012 0.0230 0.9770 0.0461 1.3896 0.0827 0.9173 0.1654 2.1182 0.0174 0.9826 0.0348 
1 lhk 0.8598 0.1952 0.8048 0.3904 0.5164 0.3029 0.6971 0.6059 0.8759 0.1908 0.8092 0.3816 
2 lhk 0.3231 0.3734 0.6266 0.7468 0.2661 0.3952 0.6048 0.7903 0.2006 0.4205 0.5795 0.8411 
3 lhk 0.1315 0.4477 0.5523 0.8954 0.1831 0.4274 0.5726 0.8549 -0.0977 0.5389 0.4611 0.9222 
4 lhk 0.0377 0.4850 0.5150 0.9700 0.1355 0.4462 0.5538 0.8923 -0.2599 0.6025 0.3975 0.7951 
5 lhk -0.0155 0.5062 0.4938 0.9877 0.0876 0.4651 0.5349 0.9302 -0.3677 0.6434 0.3566 0.7133 
6 lhk -0.0498 0.5199 0.4801 0.9603 0.0344 0.4863 0.5137 0.9726 -0.4506 0.6738 0.3262 0.6525 
7 lhk -0.0735 0.5293 0.4707 0.9414 -0.0237 0.5095 0.4905 0.9811 -0.5145 0.6964 0.3036 0.6072 
8 lhk -0.0891 0.5355 0.4645 0.9290 -0.0816 0.5325 0.4675 0.9350 -0.5593 0.7118 0.2882 0.5763 
9 lhk -0.1011 0.5402 0.4598 0.9195 -0.1369 0.5544 0.4456 0.8912 -0.5849 0.7205 0.2795 0.5589 
10 lhk -0.1088 0.5433 0.4567 0.9134 -0.1906 0.5755 0.4245 0.8490 -0.6193 0.7320 0.2680 0.5360 
11 lhk -0.1133 0.5451 0.4549 0.9099 -0.2293 0.5906 0.4094 0.8188 -0.6400 0.7387 0.2613 0.5225 
12 lhk -0.1163 0.5463 0.4537 0.9075 -0.2600 0.6025 0.3975 0.7950 -0.6341 0.7368 0.2632 0.5264 
0 lpat 0.0563 0.4776 0.5224 0.9551 -1.6036 0.9452 0.0548 0.1096 -0.4915 0.6883 0.3117 0.6233 
1 lpat -0.6485 0.7415 0.2585 0.5170 -1.2878 0.9007 0.0993 0.1986 -0.9231 0.8217 0.1783 0.3565 
2 lpat -0.8677 0.8070 0.1930 0.3861 -2.3824 0.9912 0.0088 0.0177 -1.1850 0.8816 0.1184 0.2367 
3 lpat -1.0218 0.8463 0.1537 0.3075 -2.0700 0.9805 0.0195 0.0391 -1.3195 0.9061 0.0939 0.1877 
4 lpat -1.1134 0.8669 0.1331 0.2662 -1.6064 0.9455 0.0545 0.1090 -1.3576 0.9123 0.0877 0.1753 
5 lpat -1.1546 0.8755 0.1245 0.2490 -1.2850 0.9002 0.0998 0.1995 -1.2466 0.8934 0.1066 0.2133 
6 lpat -1.1484 0.8742 0.1258 0.2515 -1.0697 0.8573 0.1427 0.2854 -1.2260 0.8895 0.1105 0.2209 
7 lpat -1.1201 0.8683 0.1317 0.2633 -0.9207 0.8211 0.1789 0.3578 -1.2282 0.8899 0.1101 0.2201 
8 lpat -1.0452 0.8517 0.1483 0.2966 -0.8145 0.7921 0.2079 0.4159 -1.1379 0.8721 0.1279 0.2559 
9 lpat -1.0086 0.8431 0.1569 0.3138 -0.6949 0.7562 0.2438 0.4875 -1.0772 0.8590 0.1410 0.2820 
10 lpat -0.9805 0.8363 0.1637 0.3274 -0.6043 0.7270 0.2730 0.5460 -0.9742 0.8347 0.1653 0.3305 
11 lpat -0.9404 0.8262 0.1738 0.3476 -0.5437 0.7065 0.2935 0.5869 -0.8813 0.8107 0.1893 0.3787 
12 lpat -0.8465 0.8011 0.1989 0.3978 -0.5170 0.6973 0.3027 0.6055 -0.7909 0.7853 0.2147 0.4295 
0 linvq 1.5876 0.0566 0.9434 0.1132 0.4392 0.3304 0.6696 0.6608 1.7584 0.0397 0.9603 0.0794 
1 linvq 3.1017 0.0010 0.9990 0.0021 1.6431 0.0506 0.9494 0.1012 2.7328 0.0033 0.9967 0.0066 
2 linvq 2.8202 0.0025 0.9975 0.0050 1.5275 0.0637 0.9363 0.1274 2.4189 0.0080 0.9920 0.0160 
3 linvq 2.5439 0.0057 0.9943 0.0113 1.2007 0.1153 0.8847 0.2306 2.0208 0.0220 0.9780 0.0440 
4 linvq 2.2164 0.0136 0.9864 0.0272 0.7484 0.2273 0.7727 0.4546 1.6978 0.0452 0.9548 0.0903 
5 linvq 1.8853 0.0301 0.9699 0.0601 0.3007 0.3819 0.6181 0.7638 1.3543 0.0882 0.9118 0.1764 
6 linvq 1.5390 0.0623 0.9377 0.1246 -0.0295 0.5118 0.4882 0.9765 1.0959 0.1369 0.8631 0.2738 
7 linvq 1.2610 0.1040 0.8960 0.2080 -0.2450 0.5967 0.4033 0.8066 0.8869 0.1878 0.8122 0.3757 
8 linvq 1.0328 0.1512 0.8488 0.3023 -0.3541 0.6383 0.3617 0.7234 0.6776 0.2492 0.7508 0.4984 
9 linvq 0.8193 0.2066 0.7934 0.4131 -0.4281 0.6656 0.3344 0.6688 0.5104 0.3050 0.6950 0.6100 
10 linvq 0.6280 0.2652 0.7348 0.5303 -0.4727 0.6817 0.3183 0.6367 0.3669 0.3570 0.6430 0.7139 
11 linvq 0.4684 0.3199 0.6801 0.6397 -0.4799 0.6842 0.3158 0.6316 0.2361 0.4067 0.5933 0.8135 
12 linvq 0.3281 0.3715 0.6285 0.7430 -0.4836 0.6855 0.3145 0.6290 0.1277 0.4492 0.5508 0.8985 
0 lemp 1.1141 0.1330 0.8670 0.2659 0.1228 0.4512 0.5488 0.9023 1.9645 0.0251 0.9749 0.0502 
1 lemp -0.1058 0.5421 0.4579 0.9158 -1.4342 0.9239 0.0761 0.1523 0.0418 0.4833 0.5167 0.9667 
2 lemp -0.2689 0.6059 0.3941 0.7881 -1.4210 0.9220 0.0780 0.1561 -0.5407 0.7055 0.2945 0.5890 
3 lemp -0.2261 0.5894 0.4106 0.8213 -1.1665 0.8779 0.1221 0.2441 -0.7097 0.7609 0.2391 0.4783 
4 lemp -0.1304 0.5518 0.4482 0.8963 -0.7868 0.7841 0.2159 0.4319 -0.7550 0.7746 0.2254 0.4507 
5 lemp -0.0348 0.5139 0.4861 0.9723 -0.4581 0.6764 0.3236 0.6471 -0.7820 0.7827 0.2173 0.4347 
6 lemp 0.0550 0.4781 0.5219 0.9562 -0.2477 0.5977 0.4023 0.8045 -0.7855 0.7837 0.2163 0.4326 
7 lemp 0.1270 0.4495 0.5505 0.8990 -0.1436 0.5570 0.4430 0.8859 -0.7898 0.7849 0.2151 0.4301 
8 lemp 0.1809 0.4283 0.5717 0.8566 -0.1250 0.5497 0.4503 0.9006 -0.7884 0.7845 0.2155 0.4309 
9 lemp 0.2129 0.4157 0.5843 0.8315 -0.1549 0.5615 0.4385 0.8770 -0.7701 0.7792 0.2208 0.4417 
10 lemp 0.2443 0.4036 0.5964 0.8071 -0.2028 0.5803 0.4197 0.8394 -0.7556 0.7748 0.2252 0.4503 
11 lemp 0.2634 0.3962 0.6038 0.7924 -0.2530 0.5998 0.4002 0.8004 -0.7286 0.7667 0.2333 0.4666 
12 lemp 0.2744 0.3920 0.6080 0.7839 -0.2952 0.6160 0.3840 0.7680 -0.7194 0.7638 0.2362 0.4723 
0 lgdp -2.5242 0.9940 0.0060 0.0120 -1.5646 0.9408 0.0592 0.1185 -2.4891 0.9934 0.0066 0.0132 
1 lgdp -3.3716 0.9996 0.0004 0.0008 -2.1075 0.9822 0.0178 0.0357 -3.5813 0.9998 0.0002 0.0004 
2 lgdp -2.7807 0.9972 0.0028 0.0057 -1.7465 0.9593 0.0407 0.0815 -3.1135 0.9990 0.0010 0.0020 
3 lgdp -2.3357 0.9900 0.0100 0.0200 -1.4026 0.9192 0.0808 0.1615 -2.7466 0.9969 0.0031 0.0063 
4 lgdp -2.0519 0.9796 0.0204 0.0408 -1.1855 0.8817 0.1183 0.2365 -2.4607 0.9929 0.0071 0.0143 
5 lgdp -1.8140 0.9648 0.0352 0.0704 -1.0176 0.8452 0.1548 0.3095 -2.3131 0.9894 0.0106 0.0212 
6 lgdp -1.6074 0.9456 0.0544 0.1088 -0.9392 0.8259 0.1741 0.3482 -2.1468 0.9838 0.0162 0.0324 
7 lgdp -1.4463 0.9256 0.0744 0.1489 -0.8605 0.8050 0.1950 0.3900 -2.0402 0.9790 0.0210 0.0420 
8 lgdp -1.3265 0.9073 0.0927 0.1854 -0.8215 0.7941 0.2059 0.4119 -1.9223 0.9724 0.0276 0.0553 
9 lgdp -1.2207 0.8885 0.1115 0.2229 -0.7792 0.7818 0.2182 0.4363 -1.8086 0.9644 0.0356 0.0713 
10 lgdp -1.1471 0.8740 0.1260 0.2520 -0.7352 0.7687 0.2313 0.4626 -1.7057 0.9556 0.0444 0.0888 
11 lgdp -1.0604 0.8552 0.1448 0.2896 -0.6953 0.7564 0.2436 0.4873 -1.6201 0.9470 0.0530 0.1060 
12 lgdp -0.9634 0.8320 0.1680 0.3360 -0.6676 0.7476 0.2524 0.5048 -1.5232 0.9357 0.0643 0.1285 
Notes: diff = mean(low_regions) - mean(high_regions); H0: diff = 0; degrees of freedom = 398. *Initial shock in high value re-
gions is rescaled to the amount of the initial shock in low value regions. 
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Figure A3.2 IRFs for one-period shock in GRW components, high/low levels of absorptive capacity (AC) 
a. GRW industry funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. GRW infrastructure funding 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the estimated IRF for each subsample and the corresponding dashed lines show the 95% confidence 
intervals that were calculated by performing Monte Carlo simulations with 200 repetitions. Subsamples are portioned by the median 
value of absorptive capacity. The associated regression results of the underlying SpPVAR models are available upon request. 
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Table A3.5 t-tests for differences in the estimated average responses to a GRW shock between regions with high and 
low levels of economic freedom 
Initial GRW shock in subsamples: one sample-specific standard deviation 
    GRW industry funding GRW infrastructure funding Overall GRW funding 
Time 
Re-
sponse 
var. 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha:  
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha:  
diff != 
0, (|T| > 
|t|) 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha: 
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha: 
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha:  
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha:  
diff != 
0, (|T| > 
|t|) 
0 lhk 1.4491 0.0741 0.9259 0.1481 0.3100 0.3784 0.6216 0.7568 1.1384 0.1278 0.8722 0.2557 
1 lhk 1.1563 0.1241 0.8759 0.2483 -0.1866 0.5740 0.4260 0.8520 0.8462 0.1990 0.8010 0.3979 
2 lhk 0.6633 0.2537 0.7463 0.5075 -0.1169 0.5465 0.4535 0.9070 0.4088 0.3414 0.6586 0.6829 
3 lhk 0.4110 0.3407 0.6593 0.6813 0.1496 0.4406 0.5594 0.8812 0.1627 0.4354 0.5646 0.8709 
4 lhk 0.2369 0.4064 0.5936 0.8128 0.4055 0.3427 0.6573 0.6853 -0.0112 0.5045 0.4955 0.9910 
5 lhk 0.1184 0.4529 0.5471 0.9058 0.6103 0.2710 0.7290 0.5420 -0.1429 0.5568 0.4432 0.8864 
6 lhk 0.0257 0.4898 0.5102 0.9795 0.7418 0.2293 0.7707 0.4586 -0.2432 0.5960 0.4040 0.8079 
7 lhk -0.0464 0.5185 0.4815 0.9630 0.7906 0.2148 0.7852 0.4296 -0.3173 0.6244 0.3756 0.7512 
8 lhk -0.0984 0.5392 0.4608 0.9216 0.8242 0.2052 0.7948 0.4103 -0.3686 0.6437 0.3563 0.7126 
9 lhk -0.1385 0.5550 0.4450 0.8899 0.8044 0.2108 0.7892 0.4216 -0.4019 0.6560 0.3440 0.6879 
10 lhk -0.1680 0.5667 0.4333 0.8667 0.7864 0.2161 0.7839 0.4321 -0.4270 0.6652 0.3348 0.6696 
11 lhk -0.1907 0.5756 0.4244 0.8488 0.7575 0.2246 0.7754 0.4492 -0.4485 0.6730 0.3270 0.6541 
12 lhk -0.1974 0.5782 0.4218 0.8436 0.7036 0.2410 0.7590 0.4821 -0.4504 0.6737 0.3263 0.6527 
0 lpat -0.4359 0.6684 0.3316 0.6632 -1.2024 0.8850 0.1150 0.2299 -1.1807 0.8808 0.1192 0.2384 
1 lpat -1.6456 0.9497 0.0503 0.1006 -0.6952 0.7563 0.2437 0.4873 -1.5667 0.9410 0.0590 0.1180 
2 lpat -2.0114 0.9775 0.0225 0.0450 -1.6169 0.9467 0.0533 0.1067 -1.8856 0.9700 0.0300 0.0601 
3 lpat -2.2876 0.9887 0.0113 0.0227 -1.5026 0.9331 0.0669 0.1337 -2.1503 0.9839 0.0161 0.0321 
4 lpat -2.1922 0.9855 0.0145 0.0289 -1.2905 0.9012 0.0988 0.1976 -2.0780 0.9808 0.0192 0.0383 
5 lpat -2.1443 0.9837 0.0163 0.0326 -1.1795 0.8806 0.1194 0.2389 -2.0250 0.9782 0.0218 0.0435 
6 lpat -1.9072 0.9714 0.0286 0.0572 -1.0213 0.8461 0.1539 0.3078 -1.8307 0.9661 0.0339 0.0679 
7 lpat -1.6672 0.9519 0.0481 0.0963 -0.9224 0.8216 0.1784 0.3569 -1.6279 0.9478 0.0522 0.1043 
8 lpat -1.4896 0.9314 0.0686 0.1371 -0.8624 0.8055 0.1945 0.3890 -1.4466 0.9256 0.0744 0.1488 
9 lpat -1.3382 0.9092 0.0908 0.1816 -0.7881 0.7845 0.2155 0.4311 -1.3008 0.9030 0.0970 0.1941 
10 lpat -1.1995 0.8845 0.1155 0.2311 -0.7568 0.7752 0.2248 0.4496 -1.1563 0.8759 0.1241 0.2482 
11 lpat -1.0224 0.8464 0.1536 0.3072 -0.7459 0.7719 0.2281 0.4562 -1.0161 0.8449 0.1551 0.3102 
12 lpat -0.8972 0.8149 0.1851 0.3702 -0.7128 0.7618 0.2382 0.4764 -0.8874 0.8123 0.1877 0.3754 
0 linvq 3.2228 0.0007 0.9993 0.0014 1.9503 0.0259 0.9741 0.0518 3.3220 0.0005 0.9995 0.0010 
1 linvq 2.9957 0.0015 0.9985 0.0029 2.5416 0.0057 0.9943 0.0114 2.9425 0.0017 0.9983 0.0034 
2 linvq 2.2660 0.0120 0.9880 0.0240 2.5710 0.0053 0.9947 0.0105 2.1610 0.0156 0.9844 0.0313 
3 linvq 1.9624 0.0252 0.9748 0.0504 2.5661 0.0053 0.9947 0.0107 1.7971 0.0365 0.9635 0.0731 
4 linvq 1.6860 0.0463 0.9537 0.0926 2.4302 0.0078 0.9922 0.0155 1.5555 0.0603 0.9397 0.1206 
5 linvq 1.4382 0.0756 0.9244 0.1512 2.0521 0.0204 0.9796 0.0408 1.3239 0.0931 0.9069 0.1863 
6 linvq 1.2314 0.1094 0.8906 0.2189 1.7562 0.0399 0.9601 0.0798 1.1123 0.1334 0.8666 0.2667 
7 linvq 1.0719 0.1422 0.8578 0.2844 1.3614 0.0871 0.9129 0.1741 0.9665 0.1672 0.8328 0.3344 
8 linvq 0.9002 0.1843 0.8157 0.3685 1.0810 0.1402 0.8598 0.2803 0.8053 0.2106 0.7894 0.4212 
9 linvq 0.7116 0.2386 0.7614 0.4771 0.8892 0.1872 0.8128 0.3744 0.6628 0.2539 0.7461 0.5079 
10 linvq 0.6124 0.2703 0.7297 0.5407 0.7201 0.2360 0.7640 0.4719 0.5659 0.2859 0.7141 0.5718 
11 linvq 0.5290 0.2986 0.7014 0.5971 0.6204 0.2677 0.7323 0.5354 0.4886 0.3127 0.6873 0.6254 
12 linvq 0.4703 0.3192 0.6808 0.6384 0.5452 0.2930 0.7070 0.5859 0.4278 0.3345 0.6655 0.6690 
0 lemp -0.2441 0.5964 0.4036 0.8073 -0.4964 0.6900 0.3100 0.6199 -0.3427 0.6340 0.3660 0.7320 
1 lemp -0.5107 0.6951 0.3049 0.6098 -1.8825 0.9698 0.0302 0.0605 -0.7264 0.7660 0.2340 0.4680 
2 lemp -0.7056 0.7596 0.2404 0.4808 -2.0381 0.9789 0.0211 0.0422 -0.9564 0.8303 0.1697 0.3395 
3 lemp -0.9619 0.8317 0.1683 0.3367 -1.8479 0.9673 0.0327 0.0654 -1.2537 0.8947 0.1053 0.2107 
4 lemp -1.2015 0.8849 0.1151 0.2303 -1.4852 0.9309 0.0691 0.1383 -1.5191 0.9352 0.0648 0.1295 
5 lemp -1.4569 0.9270 0.0730 0.1459 -1.0689 0.8571 0.1429 0.2858 -1.8017 0.9638 0.0362 0.0724 
6 lemp -1.7187 0.9568 0.0432 0.0864 -0.7056 0.7596 0.2404 0.4809 -2.0208 0.9780 0.0220 0.0440 
7 lemp -1.8828 0.9698 0.0302 0.0605 -0.4569 0.6760 0.3240 0.6480 -2.1240 0.9829 0.0171 0.0343 
8 lemp -1.9622 0.9748 0.0252 0.0504 -0.2917 0.6147 0.3853 0.7706 -2.1918 0.9855 0.0145 0.0290 
9 lemp -1.9655 0.9750 0.0250 0.0500 -0.2087 0.5826 0.4174 0.8348 -2.1631 0.9844 0.0156 0.0311 
10 lemp -1.9184 0.9721 0.0279 0.0558 -0.1625 0.5645 0.4355 0.8710 -2.0114 0.9775 0.0225 0.0450 
11 lemp -1.8797 0.9696 0.0304 0.0609 -0.1417 0.5563 0.4437 0.8874 -1.9275 0.9727 0.0273 0.0546 
12 lemp -1.8252 0.9656 0.0344 0.0687 -0.1307 0.5520 0.4480 0.8961 -1.7616 0.9605 0.0395 0.0789 
0 lgdp -1.2563 0.8951 0.1049 0.2097 -1.5796 0.9425 0.0575 0.1150 -1.4986 0.9326 0.0674 0.1348 
1 lgdp -2.2395 0.9872 0.0128 0.0257 -1.2518 0.8943 0.1057 0.2114 -2.5168 0.9939 0.0061 0.0122 
2 lgdp -2.1797 0.9851 0.0149 0.0299 -1.0104 0.8435 0.1565 0.3129 -2.4384 0.9924 0.0076 0.0152 
3 lgdp -2.1992 0.9858 0.0142 0.0284 -0.8001 0.7879 0.2121 0.4242 -2.4944 0.9935 0.0065 0.0130 
4 lgdp -2.1689 0.9847 0.0153 0.0307 -0.6160 0.7309 0.2691 0.5382 -2.4416 0.9925 0.0075 0.0151 
5 lgdp -2.1472 0.9838 0.0162 0.0324 -0.5127 0.6958 0.3042 0.6085 -2.4672 0.9930 0.0070 0.0140 
6 lgdp -2.1079 0.9822 0.0178 0.0357 -0.4385 0.6694 0.3306 0.6613 -2.4319 0.9923 0.0077 0.0155 
7 lgdp -2.0333 0.9787 0.0213 0.0427 -0.3770 0.6468 0.3532 0.7064 -2.2711 0.9882 0.0118 0.0237 
8 lgdp -1.9291 0.9728 0.0272 0.0544 -0.3358 0.6314 0.3686 0.7372 -2.2474 0.9874 0.0126 0.0252 
9 lgdp -1.8513 0.9676 0.0324 0.0649 -0.2954 0.6161 0.3839 0.7679 -2.1775 0.9850 0.0150 0.0300 
10 lgdp -1.7747 0.9616 0.0384 0.0767 -0.2690 0.6060 0.3940 0.7881 -2.0388 0.9789 0.0211 0.0421 
11 lgdp -1.7103 0.9560 0.0440 0.0880 -0.2472 0.5976 0.4024 0.8049 -1.8432 0.9670 0.0330 0.0660 
12 lgdp -1.5826 0.9428 0.0572 0.1143 -0.2315 0.5915 0.4085 0.8170 -1.7489 0.9595 0.0405 0.0811 
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Table A3.5 continued 
Initial GRW shock in subsamples: same percentage* 
    GRW industry funding GRW infrastructure funding Overall GRW funding 
Time 
Re-
sponse 
var. 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha:  
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha:  
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha: 
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha: 
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
t-value 
Ha:  
diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha:  
diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha:  
diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
0 lhk 1.3847 0.0835 0.9165 0.1669 0.3377 0.3679 0.6321 0.7358 1.0392 0.1497 0.8503 0.2994 
1 lhk 1.4325 0.0764 0.9236 0.1528 -0.0590 0.5235 0.4765 0.9530 1.1645 0.1225 0.8775 0.2449 
2 lhk 0.9860 0.1624 0.8376 0.3247 0.0037 0.4985 0.5015 0.9970 0.7918 0.2145 0.7855 0.4290 
3 lhk 0.7297 0.2330 0.7670 0.4660 0.2539 0.3999 0.6001 0.7997 0.5510 0.2910 0.7090 0.5819 
4 lhk 0.5315 0.2977 0.7023 0.5954 0.4894 0.3124 0.6876 0.6248 0.3583 0.3601 0.6399 0.7203 
5 lhk 0.3952 0.3464 0.6536 0.6929 0.6760 0.2497 0.7503 0.4994 0.2038 0.4193 0.5807 0.8386 
6 lhk 0.2803 0.3897 0.6103 0.7794 0.7926 0.2142 0.7858 0.4285 0.0715 0.4715 0.5285 0.9431 
7 lhk 0.1785 0.4292 0.5708 0.8584 0.8256 0.2048 0.7952 0.4095 -0.0374 0.5149 0.4851 0.9702 
8 lhk 0.0969 0.4614 0.5386 0.9229 0.8490 0.1982 0.8018 0.3964 -0.1239 0.5493 0.4507 0.9015 
9 lhk 0.0352 0.4859 0.5141 0.9719 0.8215 0.2059 0.7941 0.4119 -0.1904 0.5754 0.4246 0.8491 
10 lhk -0.0133 0.5053 0.4947 0.9894 0.7975 0.2128 0.7872 0.4257 -0.2424 0.5957 0.4043 0.8086 
11 lhk -0.0518 0.5206 0.4794 0.9587 0.7642 0.2226 0.7774 0.4452 -0.2854 0.6123 0.3877 0.7755 
12 lhk -0.0783 0.5312 0.4688 0.9376 0.7071 0.2400 0.7600 0.4799 -0.3115 0.6222 0.3778 0.7555 
0 lpat -0.2730 0.6075 0.3925 0.7850 -1.2312 0.8905 0.1095 0.2190 -1.0345 0.8492 0.1508 0.3015 
1 lpat -1.5982 0.9446 0.0554 0.1108 -0.7036 0.7590 0.2410 0.4821 -1.5075 0.9338 0.0662 0.1325 
2 lpat -1.9964 0.9767 0.0233 0.0466 -1.6386 0.9490 0.0510 0.1021 -1.8563 0.9679 0.0321 0.0642 
3 lpat -2.3131 0.9894 0.0106 0.0212 -1.5100 0.9341 0.0659 0.1318 -2.1597 0.9843 0.0157 0.0314 
4 lpat -2.2413 0.9872 0.0128 0.0256 -1.2941 0.9018 0.0982 0.1964 -2.1196 0.9827 0.0173 0.0347 
5 lpat -2.2271 0.9867 0.0133 0.0265 -1.1835 0.8813 0.1187 0.2373 -2.1030 0.9820 0.0180 0.0361 
6 lpat -1.9745 0.9755 0.0245 0.0490 -1.0251 0.8470 0.1530 0.3060 -1.9183 0.9721 0.0279 0.0558 
7 lpat -1.7242 0.9573 0.0427 0.0854 -0.9268 0.8227 0.1773 0.3546 -1.7124 0.9562 0.0438 0.0876 
8 lpat -1.5486 0.9389 0.0611 0.1223 -0.8673 0.8069 0.1931 0.3863 -1.5292 0.9365 0.0635 0.1270 
9 lpat -1.4086 0.9201 0.0799 0.1597 -0.7933 0.7860 0.2140 0.4281 -1.3945 0.9180 0.0820 0.1639 
10 lpat -1.2702 0.8976 0.1024 0.2048 -0.7624 0.7769 0.2231 0.4463 -1.2585 0.8955 0.1045 0.2090 
11 lpat -1.0869 0.8611 0.1389 0.2778 -0.7519 0.7737 0.2263 0.4526 -1.1197 0.8682 0.1318 0.2635 
12 lpat -0.9578 0.8306 0.1694 0.3388 -0.7187 0.7636 0.2364 0.4727 -0.9835 0.8370 0.1630 0.3260 
0 linvq 3.3278 0.0005 0.9995 0.0010 1.9404 0.0265 0.9735 0.0530 3.4894 0.0003 0.9997 0.0005 
1 linvq 3.2160 0.0007 0.9993 0.0014 2.5492 0.0056 0.9944 0.0112 3.1882 0.0008 0.9992 0.0015 
2 linvq 2.4938 0.0065 0.9935 0.0130 2.5810 0.0051 0.9949 0.0102 2.4028 0.0084 0.9916 0.0167 
3 linvq 2.2048 0.0140 0.9860 0.0280 2.5713 0.0052 0.9948 0.0105 2.0586 0.0201 0.9799 0.0402 
4 linvq 1.9080 0.0286 0.9714 0.0571 2.4439 0.0075 0.9925 0.0150 1.7982 0.0365 0.9635 0.0729 
5 linvq 1.6354 0.0514 0.9486 0.1028 2.0473 0.0206 0.9794 0.0413 1.5428 0.0618 0.9382 0.1237 
6 linvq 1.4077 0.0800 0.9200 0.1600 1.7481 0.0406 0.9594 0.0812 1.3097 0.0955 0.9045 0.1911 
7 linvq 1.2198 0.1116 0.8884 0.2233 1.3527 0.0885 0.9115 0.1769 1.1369 0.1281 0.8719 0.2563 
8 linvq 1.0219 0.1537 0.8463 0.3074 1.0756 0.1414 0.8586 0.2828 0.9449 0.1726 0.8274 0.3453 
9 linvq 0.8028 0.2113 0.7887 0.4226 0.8881 0.1875 0.8125 0.3750 0.7708 0.2207 0.7793 0.4413 
10 linvq 0.6839 0.2472 0.7528 0.4944 0.7215 0.2355 0.7645 0.4710 0.6522 0.2573 0.7427 0.5147 
11 linvq 0.5844 0.2796 0.7204 0.5593 0.6243 0.2664 0.7336 0.5328 0.5599 0.2879 0.7121 0.5759 
12 linvq 0.5112 0.3048 0.6952 0.6095 0.5514 0.2908 0.7092 0.5816 0.4840 0.3143 0.6857 0.6286 
0 lemp -0.1116 0.5444 0.4556 0.9112 -0.4200 0.6626 0.3374 0.6747 -0.1277 0.5508 0.4492 0.8985 
1 lemp -0.0975 0.5388 0.4612 0.9224 -1.7204 0.9569 0.0431 0.0861 -0.2495 0.5984 0.4016 0.8031 
2 lemp -0.2590 0.6021 0.3979 0.7958 -1.8664 0.9686 0.0314 0.0627 -0.4458 0.6720 0.3280 0.6560 
3 lemp -0.4885 0.6872 0.3128 0.6255 -1.6820 0.9533 0.0467 0.0934 -0.7190 0.7637 0.2363 0.4726 
4 lemp -0.7390 0.7698 0.2302 0.4604 -1.3318 0.9082 0.0918 0.1837 -1.0055 0.8424 0.1576 0.3153 
5 lemp -1.0134 0.8442 0.1558 0.3115 -0.9340 0.8246 0.1754 0.3509 -1.3208 0.9063 0.0937 0.1873 
6 lemp -1.3256 0.9071 0.0929 0.1857 -0.5971 0.7246 0.2754 0.5508 -1.6156 0.9465 0.0535 0.1070 
7 lemp -1.5540 0.9395 0.0605 0.1210 -0.3722 0.6450 0.3550 0.7099 -1.8299 0.9660 0.0340 0.0680 
8 lemp -1.7134 0.9563 0.0437 0.0874 -0.2288 0.5904 0.4096 0.8191 -1.9645 0.9749 0.0251 0.0502 
9 lemp -1.7842 0.9624 0.0376 0.0752 -0.1592 0.5632 0.4368 0.8736 -2.0061 0.9772 0.0228 0.0455 
10 lemp -1.7864 0.9626 0.0374 0.0748 -0.1225 0.5487 0.4513 0.9026 -1.9091 0.9715 0.0285 0.0570 
11 lemp -1.7799 0.9621 0.0379 0.0759 -0.1073 0.5427 0.4573 0.9146 -1.8580 0.9680 0.0320 0.0639 
12 lemp -1.7471 0.9593 0.0407 0.0814 -0.1005 0.5400 0.4600 0.9200 -1.7178 0.9567 0.0433 0.0866 
0 lgdp -1.6248 0.9475 0.0525 0.1050 -1.5057 0.9335 0.0665 0.1329 -1.8937 0.9705 0.0295 0.0590 
1 lgdp -2.1841 0.9852 0.0148 0.0295 -1.1483 0.8742 0.1258 0.2515 -2.4080 0.9918 0.0082 0.0165 
2 lgdp -2.0600 0.9800 0.0200 0.0400 -0.9294 0.8234 0.1766 0.3533 -2.2438 0.9873 0.0127 0.0254 
3 lgdp -2.0745 0.9807 0.0193 0.0387 -0.7336 0.7682 0.2318 0.4636 -2.2866 0.9886 0.0114 0.0227 
4 lgdp -2.0506 0.9795 0.0205 0.0410 -0.5610 0.7124 0.2876 0.5751 -2.2473 0.9874 0.0126 0.0252 
5 lgdp -2.0261 0.9783 0.0217 0.0434 -0.4640 0.6785 0.3215 0.6429 -2.2742 0.9883 0.0117 0.0235 
6 lgdp -2.0007 0.9770 0.0230 0.0461 -0.3959 0.6538 0.3462 0.6924 -2.2627 0.9879 0.0121 0.0242 
7 lgdp -1.9473 0.9739 0.0261 0.0522 -0.3402 0.6330 0.3670 0.7339 -2.1567 0.9842 0.0158 0.0316 
8 lgdp -1.8677 0.9687 0.0313 0.0625 -0.3026 0.6188 0.3812 0.7624 -2.1528 0.9840 0.0160 0.0319 
9 lgdp -1.8103 0.9645 0.0355 0.0710 -0.2657 0.6047 0.3953 0.7906 -2.0966 0.9817 0.0183 0.0367 
10 lgdp -1.7378 0.9585 0.0415 0.0830 -0.2418 0.5955 0.4045 0.8090 -1.9806 0.9758 0.0242 0.0483 
11 lgdp -1.6804 0.9532 0.0468 0.0937 -0.2221 0.5878 0.4122 0.8243 -1.8135 0.9647 0.0353 0.0705 
12 lgdp -1.5613 0.9404 0.0596 0.1193 -0.2081 0.5824 0.4176 0.8352 -1.7258 0.9574 0.0426 0.0852 
Notes: diff = mean(low_regions) - mean(high_regions); H0: diff = 0; degrees of freedom = 398. *Initial shock in high value regions is 
rescaled to the amount of the initial shock in low value regions. 
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Figure A3.3 IRFs for one-period shock in GRW components, high/low levels of economic freedom (EF) 
a. GRW industry funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. GRW infrastructure funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the estimated IRF for each subsample and the corresponding dashed lines show the 95% confidence 
intervals that were calculated by performing Monte Carlo simulations with 200 repetitions. Subsamples are portioned by the median 
value of economic freedom. The associated regression results of the underlying SpPVAR models are available upon request. 
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Figure A3.4 IRFs for one-period shocks in GRW intensity, BBSR classification for regions with different settlement 
structure 
a. GRW industry funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. GRW infrastructure funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 
 
 
c. Overall GRW funding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines illustrate the estimated IRF for each subsample and the corresponding dashed lines show the 95% confidence 
intervals that were calculated by performing Monte Carlo simulations with 200 repetitions. Subsamples are portioned by the clas-
sification of the BBSR (Status: 31.12.2014) with Rural = Population density < 100 Pop./km2, Intermediate = Population density < 
150 Pop./km2  ≥ 100, Urban = Population density ≥ 150 Pop./ km2. The associated regression results of the underlying SpPVAR 
models are available upon request. 
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4. Economic effects of regional fiscal equalisation – Empirical evidence from German labour 
market regions 
 
Notes: The paper was submitted to Journal of Economics and Statistics (20 April 2019). A related version of the paper 
was published as Working Papers on Innovation and Space (Vol. 01.19).  
 
Abstract: Regional fiscal equalisation in Germany aims to reduce fiscal disparities by allocating financial resources 
to less promising regions. This paper aims to analyse potential economic secondary effects of regional fiscal equalisa-
tion on several economic in- and output variables. Additionally, the paper examines the potential regional characteris-
tics to influence the transformation of fiscal inputs into economic outcomes. Lastly, I compare the effects of fiscal 
equalisation to these of the major German structural funding programme. The findings generally reveal a significant 
positive effect of fiscal equalisation on the regional employment rate. Moreover, the findings suggest different trans-
mission channels of fiscal equalisation in East and West Germany. Particularly, I find higher effects in right-wing 
CDU/CSU preferring regions on the employment, human capital and private sector investment rate. Finally, while 
structural funding affects more economic variables significantly, the magnitude of the estimated economic responses 
of fiscal equalisation compared to these of German structural funding are not statistically different. 
Keywords: Evaluation, fiscal equalisation, regional economic growth, political ideology, SpPVAR, impulse response 
functions 
JEL Classification: C33, E62, R11, R58, O47 
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4.1 Introduction 
Many regional policy measures explicitly aim to foster the economic progress of rather less affluent 
regions to warrant equal living conditions and economic balance. To this end, a large amount of 
public money is spent in terms of structural investment programmes to trigger economic develop-
ment in less promising regions – examples are the cohesion policy of the EU (e.g. European Com-
mission, 2017) or, in Germany, the Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional Economic Struc-
tures (GRW) (e.g. Brachert et al., 2018; Deutscher Bundestag, 2014).  
However, besides structural funding, further important regional policy measures are fiscal equali-
sation schemes. In Germany, fiscal equalisation is provided across federal states (Länderfinanzaus-
gleich) as well as across municipalities within a federal state. This paper sheds light on the latter 
equalisation scheme, which is of particular political interest as it provides a high funding volume 
each year and is thus a crucial income source for German regional authorities. Between 2000 and 
2011, on average, 23.51 billion Euro in unconditional formula-based grants (Schlü-
sselzuweisungen) – the key funding mechanism for regional financial compensation – was pro-
vided annually to German municipalities.55 The basic purpose of regional equalisation is to provide 
financial resources to needier municipalities to perpetuate the supply of public goods by explicitly 
considering the financial capacity and needs for fund allocation (e.g. Albouy, 2012; Lenk et al., 
2013). Thus, regional equalisation bridges financial gaps and features a distinct redistributive func-
tion of public financial resources (see Lenk et al., 2013, for German regional fiscal equalisation). 
Despite the economic relevance as important income source and the high annual financial volume, 
empirical evaluations of the economic effects of German regional fiscal equalisation are sparse 
                                                 
55 Please note that this figures are based on own calculations using data from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban 
Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) (see Table A4.1). 
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(e.g. Henkel et al., 2018; Kalb, 2010; Lehmann and Wrede, 2019). That said, economic implica-
tions are hardly known, especially regarding potential economic secondary effects, which are in-
terpreted in this paper as additional (inadvertent) effects of an increase in formula-based grants on 
other economic variables in the regional production system – such as the per capita income, patent, 
investment, human capital and employment rate.  
The purpose of the paper at hand is to contribute to the scientific and political discussion by trans-
ferring a simultaneous equation approach suggested by Eberle et al. (2019) to an evaluation exer-
cise of the regional fiscal equalisation scheme. The applied econometric approach provides multi-
faceted insights in the working and the transmission channels of German fiscal equalisation and 
explicitly detects direct and indirect effects among the variables in the regional production system. 
This is, to the author’s knowledge, the first study regarding regional fiscal equalisation that applies 
this methodological approach. In doing so, the first question of interest is: Do fiscal equalisation 
grants trigger economic development via secondary effects? 
Second, studies evaluating structural and cohesion funds increasingly emphasise the relevance of 
conditioning factors (e.g. quality of government) as driver for an efficient use of public spending 
(Fratesi and Wishlade, 2017). Building upon this burgeoning string of literature, the second re-
search question asks whether potential secondary effects are uniform across regions or rather de-
pend on political-economic conditions. To this end, German regions are subdivided according to a 
rather general (Eastern and Western German regions) as well as to a more specific (government 
ideologies) measure of political structures. Finally, in contrast to regional fiscal equalisation, the 
GRW programme can be considered as more industry-oriented policy measure (Deutscher Bun-
destag, 2014). In order to provide a profound comparison of the two regional policies, the last 
research question raises the discussion as to whether or not the economic effects differ between 
regional fiscal equalisation and the GRW programme. 
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The findings show significant positive (unconditional) effects on regional employment, while fur-
ther economic variables are unaffected by an increase in the formula-based grant intensity in the 
basic model. Furthermore, I find evidence for slightly different transmission channels of regional 
fiscal equalisation in Eastern and Western German regions. In addition, an increase in the formula-
based grant intensity leads to statistically significantly higher effects on the employment, human 
capital and private sector investment rate in regions that mainly support the rather pro-business and 
right-wing conservative parties Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and Christian Social Party 
(CSU). Lastly, while the differences in the estimated economic effects of fiscal equalisation and 
the GRW are not significant, the GRW triggers not only significant positive effects on the employ-
ment rate but also on the GDP and human capital.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I provide information on 
the basic setup of regional fiscal equalisation in Germany and discuss the state of academic debate 
(Section 4.2). In Section 4.3, theoretical considerations and research hypotheses are presented, 
while Section 4.4 shortly describes the econometric strategy and data. Section 4.5 analyses the 
economic effects of German regional fiscal equalisation and Section 4.6 summarises and con-
cludes.  
4.2 The German regional fiscal equalisation scheme 
4.2.1 Institutional setup  
German fiscal equalisation is implemented at the federal level (Länderfinanzausgleich) as well as 
on the regional level, where equalisation is provided across municipalities within a federal state. 
The paper on hand is focused on the regional fiscal equalisation scheme, where the responsibility 
of detailed design and implementation is incumbent upon the particular federal state. The scheme 
aims to improve the financial resources of municipalities within a specific federal state to guarantee 
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a sufficient endowment of public goods, especially by allocating funds predominantly to economic 
weaker municipalities with the highest need – indicating a highly redistributive character (Lenk et 
al., 2013). 
Municipalities are the lowest level of regional government in Germany, notwithstanding they gen-
erally have notable autonomy (e.g. Kalb, 2010). Buettner and Holm-Hadulla (2008) name three 
general income sources of German municipalities: First, municipalities receive a share of income 
taxes and valued-added tax (VAT). Second, they raise local business and land taxes. Finally, they 
gain from fiscal transfers allocated by the federal state government. The distribution of these funds 
is, on the one hand, based on the fiscal capacity and, on the other hand, on the fiscal need of mu-
nicipalities. If fiscal capacity exceeds fiscal need, no equalisation funds are provided (abundant 
municipality) and they are net contributors. Conversely, if fiscal need is in excess of financial ca-
pacity, equalisation funds are provided to balance a flexible part of this difference (Buettner and 
Holm-Hadulla, 2008). As explained by Lenk et al. (2013), the detailed setup and conceptualization 
differs across German federal states. However, the approximation of the financial conditions in the 
municipalities generally follows the above presented structure, i.e. counting the financial capacity 
against the financial need. To this end, the unconditional formula-based grants are the key funds 
for financial compensation of economically weaker municipalities and their use is most widely 
unconstrained. This implies that municipalities are free to make use of the formula-based grants 
according to their preferences (Lenk et al., 2013). As regional fiscal equalisation is also provided 
in many other countries according to a similar basis of calculation, the results of this study are, to 
some extent, also transferable to countries with similar equalisation schemes. 
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4.2.2 State of debate 
Based on the seminal work by Buchanan (1950), empirical studies predominantly focus on the 
effects of fiscal equalisation on migration patterns and an efficient fund allocation.56 Albouy (2012) 
applies data from Canadian provinces in 2001 to analyse the efficiency and equity purposes of the 
Canadian federal grant system. The author concludes that the grants increase public expenditures 
only moderately and thus miss the efficiency criterion. Moreover, federal grants are allocated to 
provinces with higher earnings and realised incomes, which is also contrary to the implied equity 
purpose (Albouy, 2012). Lehmann and Wrede (2019) adapt the empirical approach of Albouy 
(2012) to analyse the efficiency and equity aim of fiscal equalisation in the German state Bavaria. 
Their findings suggest that fiscal equalisation hampers efficiency, but satisfies equity conditions as 
the grants are allocated to regions with rather low income levels (productivity) and low realised 
incomes (Lehmann and Wrede, 2019). 
Using data from the state of Baden-Württemberg from 1990 to 2004, Kalb (2010) analyses the 
effects of equalisation grants on regional technical efficiency. The author argues that an increase 
in equalisation grants raises technical inefficiency and results in a waste of public resources in 
supported regions (Kalb, 2010). 
Henkel et al. (2018) apply a general equilibrium model and compare the present political reality 
with fiscal transfers to the counterfactual scenario without transfers across federal states and mu-
nicipalities by using data from 411 German administrative districts (Landkreise). The results point 
to vast migration waves in the counterfactual situation without fiscal equalisation. Approximately 
3.2 million people would move from present recipient regions to more productive regions, resulting 
in a considerable increase of national labour productivity (5.8 %) and GDP per capita (3.7 %). The 
                                                 
56 I refer to the study by Albouy (2012) for a comprehensive listing of these studies.  
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implied net migration is 32 times higher than the net migration in Germany observed between 2000 
and 2010. Moreover, public goods quality would diverge across regions. Conversely, national wel-
fare would only increase moderately, because more productive regions already suffer from an over-
congestion that would worsen. Therefore, fiscal equalisation may hamper national GDP per capita 
and labour productivity gains, but not welfare gains (Henkel et al., 2018).  
In the context of these heterogeneous results, the next section presents the conceptual background 
of the study, the ensuing variable selection and discusses the expected economic effects of fiscal 
equalisation. 
4.3. The effects of fiscal equalisation: theoretical background 
To this end, various theories of economic growth (Mankiw et al., 1992; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 
1991; Romer, 1990) are used to select variables for the empirical analysis and to derive hypotheses 
regarding the anticipated outcomes of an increase in the formula-based grant intensity. I presume 
the following regional production function for each German region i 
        Yi = Kiα Hiβ Ziγ (Ai (λiPi))1-α-β-γ,57        (4.1) 
which can be rewritten in terms of the economically active population (henceforth: workforce) as 
                 yi = kiα hiβ ziγ (Aiλi)1-α-β-γ.         (4.2) 
Based on Equation (4.2), private ki and public physical capital zi, human capital hi, technology Ai 
as well as the employment rate λi are the economic input factors to produce regional output per 
                                                 
57 Yi is the regional output, Ki denotes private physical and Hi human capital, Zi is the public physical capital, Ai denotes the regional 
level of technology, while λi is the constant gross employment rate (λi = Li/Pi), where Li denotes labour and Pi describes the eco-
nomically active population (15 to 64 years), which grows exogenously with ni (see Eberle et al., 2019, for additional details). 
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workforce yi and determine the theory-based variable selection for the applied vector-autoregres-
sive (VAR) model in this paper.58  
4.3.1 Unconditional effects 
In this section, the theory-based hypothesis regarding the first research question is derived: Do 
fiscal equalisation grants trigger economic development via secondary effects? The general dy-
namics of the public capital stock zi in region i can be expressed as (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019) 
      
z. i
zi
 = sz,i(kiα hiβ ziγ-1 (Aiλi)1-α-β-γ) – (ni+δ),         (4.3) 
where sz,i denotes the investment rate in the public capital stock and δ is the depreciation rate of 
public capital. Consequentially, an exogenous change in the formula-based grants directly affects 
the investment rate sz,i in Equation (4.3), which enables a region to provide a higher amount of 
public capital to the resident industry. The increase of the public investment rate may be higher if 
fiscal transfers induce additional public expenditures (efficiency purpose according to Albouy, 
2012). Furthermore, changes of public investments may have additional secondary effects on fur-
ther economic variables in Equation (4.2). 
At first, I consider potential (short-run) effects on the gross employment rate λi.59 Fiscal equalisa-
tion may have short-run effects on the labour input in regions as it affects (public-sector) labour 
demand and migration patterns. As outlined by Henkel et al. (2018), fiscal transfers make initially 
poorer regions more attractive and either induce immigration or reduce emigration, respectively. 
This assumption is strongly underlined by the implied 32 times higher net migration rate in the 
                                                 
58 Due to the unavailability of adequate regional data, I use the private sk,i and public physical capital investment rate sz,i instead of 
the respective capital stocks ki and zi. For the same reason, instead of the regional technological level Ai, the technological growth 
rate gi is used for empirical analysis (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019). 
59 Major growth models do not regard the labour dynamics in detail and, instead, assume that labour Li grows exogenously (e.g. 
Mankiw et al., 1992) or is constant (e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Romer, 1990) in the long run.  
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hypothetical case without any fiscal equalisation payments (Henkel et al., 2018). Thus, an increase 
in the formula-based grant intensity is expected to positively affect regional migration behaviour, 
which leads to a higher labour supply and regional employment rate in the short run. 
Second, the dynamics of physical capital ki and human capital hi are similar to the dynamics of 
public capital in Equation (4.3) (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). For this reason, an increase in the public 
investment rate is expected to have no effects on the fixed private sector physical capital investment 
rate sk,i. However, due to efficiency gains, a positive change in the public investment rate may have 
positive secondary effects on the accumulation of human capital hi. However, in regard to the an-
ticipated influence of formula-based grants on migration patterns, the effects on the human capital 
also depend on the influence on the migration behaviour of high-skilled workers. 
Third, following the endogenous growth approaches by Romer (1990) or Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
(1991), regional technological growth gi depends on the input factors (e.g. human capital, physical 
capital, labour) that are assigned to the research sector. Consequently, the effects on technological 
growth are ex-ante rather unclear and depend on the contingent development of other input factors. 
Finally, changes in the regional GDP per workforce can be written as a function of changes in 
regional input variables (see Equation 4.2) 
     
y. i
yi
 = (1-α-β-γ) 
A
.
i
Ai
+ (1-α-β-γ) 
λ
.
i
λi
+ α
k
.
i
ki
+ β
h
.
i
hi
+ γ z. izi .        (4.4) 
Merging the presented arguments in this section, the first research hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4.1: An increase of the formula-based grant intensity directly affects public 
investments sz,i and subsequently triggers positive secondary effects on the regional em-
ployment rate λi , human capital hi and GDP per workforce yi, while the effects on the patent 
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intensity gi are expected to be rather moderate. Moreover, no effects on the private sector 
physical capital investment rate sk,i are presumed. 
4.3.2 Conditional effects: the influence of political-economic structures 
With regard to the second research question, I question if economic outcomes of regional fiscal 
equalisation depend on the political-economic structure. To this end, I expand Equation (4.3) to 
(e.g. Eberle et al., 2018) 
      
z. i
zi
 = ψi [sz,i(kiα hiβ ziγ-1 (Aiλi)1-α-β-γ)] – (ni+δ),         (4.5) 
where ψi indicates a parameter with a fixed value between 0 and 1 that influences the efficiency of 
public investments and, consequently, the degree of subsequent secondary effects emanated by 
public capital investments. Simply speaking, a higher value of ψi implies a higher share of effi-
ciently used public investments (e.g. Eberle et al., 2018). 
One conditional factor that may influence the value of ψi is the political-economic structure (ide-
ology).60 The theory of partisan politics argues that effects of macroeconomic policies are influ-
enced by politicians and party ideologies (Hibbs, 1977). Based on this argumentation, I apply two 
measures for political-economic structures and ideologies in Germany.  
At first, I compare the effects of fiscal equalisation between Eastern and Western German regions.61 
Due to the German division till the year 1990, both parts of former divided Germany developed 
                                                 
60 In the context of EU structural and cohesion funds, Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) conclude that the quality of government 
positively affects returns on (public) investments and regional growth. 
61 Please note that a comparison between Eastern and Western German regions does not only consider political differences, it rather 
includes a wide range of differing (political-)economic conditions. For example, after the German reunification, GDP per capita 
and labour productivity differed considerably between Eastern and Western regions (e.g. Barrell and te Velde, 2000). Moreover, by 
analysing new business performances in East and West Germany, Fritsch (2004) argues that the political-economic system in East-
ern Germany left marks that still affects economic activities. 
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contrarious political-economic systems, with democracy and a market economy in Western and 
communism and a centrally planned economy in Eastern Germany (e.g. Fritsch, 2004). This is 
reflected by a different party system and fragmentation in East and West Germany after reunifica-
tion – for example due to the popularity of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS, today ‘Die 
Linke’) in Eastern Germany (Kitschelt, 2003). Kitschelt (2003) shows that in Eastern Germany the 
share of votes for social parties in the federal elections 1998 and 2002 are higher than for rather 
conservative and pro-business parties. I relate the differing political-economic structures in former 
divided Germany to the regional fiscal equalisation scheme and hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 4.2: The anticipated effects in hypothesis 4.1 are assumed to primarily apply 
for Western German regions as these regions support rather pro-business parties and are 
more effective to transform public investments into economic growth (higher ψi). 
Second, I analyse the influence of political ideologies in German regions more specified. In line 
with partisan theories, Potrafke (2011) states that left-wing parties are more focused on the labour 
base, while, in contrast, right-wing parties rather act in accordance with capital owners. Using data 
from Western German federal states, Potrafke (2011) examines the effects of political ideologies 
on public expenditures. The results hint at no significant effects on overall public expenditures on 
education and cultural affairs. However, by decomposing public expenditures, left-wing parties 
positively influence public expenditures on schooling, while negatively affect expenditures on cul-
tural affairs. Conversely, rather right-wing parties increase public expenditures on universities. 
Thus, the findings show evidence that political ideologies and priorities influence budget compo-
sition of German federal states (Potrafke, 2011). Pinto and Pinto (2008) find evidence that left-
wing governments positively influence the effects of foreign direct investments on wages in Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Taking these findings 
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into account, I compare the effects in regions that support the rather left-wing Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) with the effects in right-wing and more pro-business CDU/CSU supporting regions:  
Hypothesis 4.3: With exception of the regional employment rate, the economic effects are 
expected to be higher in regions supporting the pro-business CDU/CSU party (higher ψi). 
4.3.3 Effects of structural funding 
The GRW structural funding programme explicitly aims to promote the economic development of 
the least prosperous German regions, therefore funding is restricted exclusively to these regions. 
In contrast to the described targets of regional fiscal equalisation, the GRW mainly works via two 
funding channels: first, by providing grants to firms in order to set incentives for a higher private 
sector investment rate and, second, by strengthening the local economic infrastructure (Brachert et 
al., 2018; Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). Consequently, GRW funding is much more industry-ori-
ented compared to regional fiscal equalisation schemes, leading to the fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4.4: The implied economic effects of regional fiscal equalisation in hypothesis 
4.1 are significantly lower compared to economic effects of the more industry-orientated 
GRW funding programme. 
4.4. Data and empirical strategy 
4.4.1 Data and variables 
I use data for six economic in- and output factors covering the observation period 2000 to 2011. At 
the municipality level, data is available only inadequately. Therefore, data is collected on the basis 
of the 402 German districts (Landkreise). Thereupon, I aggregate the districts to 258 labour market 
regions (Arbeitsmarktregionen) that are defined by the BBSR. Labour market regions explicitly 
account for economic ties across the small-scale German Kreise (e.g. by regarding commuting 
traffic) and reduces the risk of measurement errors when constructing normalised variables as, for 
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example, places of work and residence may differ using a classification according to the German 
Kreise.62 The applied variables are normalised and converted in logarithmic form as specified in 
more detail in Table A4.1 in the Appendix.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the annual amount of total formula-based grants as well as the ratio of for-
mula-based grants to GDP (formula-based grant intensity) in Germany. Funding volume and ratio 
are fairly constant over the covered time period, with a peak in the funding volume of 26.46 billion 
Euro in 2009 and a ratio of 1.12 % of annual GDP in the year 2000. 
Figure 4.1 Annual formula-based grants and formula-based grant intensity, 2000-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own figure (based on data from BBSR). 
                                                 
62 One potential shortcoming regarding the data for the formula-based grants is related to changed labels of allocated funds within 
the fiscal equalisation scheme. Regional authorities may receive the same overall amount of allocated funds but under a different 
label. I assume that these changes are random and add time dummies to the regression models to account for potential effects of 
these changes in public funding labeling.  
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Figure 4.2 shows the spatial patterns of the formula-based grant intensity across German labour 
market regions. The figure illustrates the importance of formula-based grants especially for East 
Germany, where the ratio of formula-based grants to GDP is considerably higher compared to 
Western regions.63 
Figure 4.2 Formula-based grant intensities in German labour market regions, 2000-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own figure (based on data from BBSR). 
                                                 
63 In Figure 4.2, the respective ratio for each labour market region is calculated for the entire time period according to the following 
formula: Intensityi = ∑ Formula-based grants2011n=2000 i) / ∑ GDP2011n=2000 i). Moreover, when subdividing the sample in Eastern and Western 
regions, I compare the economic responses to a funding increase that is equal to one respective standard deviation in each subsample 
and, additionally, to the same percentage rise in order to account for different formula-based grant intensities in Eastern and Western 
Germany. The same applies for the comparison of regions with different political ideologies (see Section 4.4). 
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The five labour market regions with the lowest ratio of formula-based grants to GDP include the 
economically prosperous regions of Munich and Düsseldorf as well as Berlin, Hamburg and Bre-
men. Conversely, the five highest ratios appear to be in East Germany, with the highest ratio of 
0.0454 in Mansfeld-Südharz (Table 4.1).64 
Table 4.1 German labour market regions with the highest and the lowest ratio of formula-based grants, 2000-2011 
 
Labour market region Ratio of formula-based grants to GDP  
Lo
w
 r
at
io
 
Berlin 0 
Munich 0.0008 
Düsseldorf 0.0012 
Hamburg 0.0015 
Bremen 0.0023 
H
ig
h 
ra
tio
 
Altenburg 0.0366 
Salzlandkreis 0.0379 
Wittenberg 0.0384 
Stendal 0.0418 
Mansfeld-Südharz 0.0454 
Notes: Own calculation (based on data from BBSR). 
Moreover, I include the spatial lag of each variable to the VAR model and refer to this setup as 
basic model.65 Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to be an empirical issue that may result from a 
divergence between the applied regional scale (labour market regions) and the actual degree of 
spatial autocorrelation. For this reason, spatial dependencies are not discussed in Section 4.3 but 
spatial lags are included as control variables to the regressions models. 
                                                 
64 The lowest ratio is observed for Berlin, which is the only labour market not receiving any formula-based grants in the covered 
time period. By definition, city states do not have fiscal equalisation. In contrast to the other city states Hamburg and Bremen 
(Bremerhaven), the small-scale district Berlin is not aligned with other districts to a common labour market. Thus, as shown in 
Table 4.1, the respective grant intensity is higher than zero in Hamburg and Bremen, but they are also counted among the labour 
markets with the lowest grant intensities. 
65 A binary first‐order neighbourhood matrix is used for the calculation of the spatial relationships (e.g. Eckey and Kosfeld, 2005). 
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Panel unit root tests according to the approach by Im et al. (2003) show that not all time series are 
stationary. The non-stationarity applies for the regional gross employment and human capital rate 
as well as for the spatial lags of these variables (see Table A4.2). Consequently, detrended values 
are used for estimation. Moreover, the panel unit root test for the formula-based grant intensity 
indicates stationarity, but impulse response function (IRF) analysis does not work without detrend-
ing. Thus, I also use the detrended variable for the formula-based grant intensity in all settings. 
Figure 4.3 Spatial patterns highest share of second votes Bundestag elections 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own figure (based on data from Allgemeine Bundestagswahlstatistik des Bundes und der Länder/ INKAR). 
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In order to detect potential effects of differences in political-economic structures and ideologies, I 
initially subdivide the labour market regions in former East and West German regions, while Berlin 
is excluded from this subdivision. Moreover, the share of second votes for the Bundestag elections 
in the year 1998 is used as a more specific approximation for the regional political ideology. In 
doing so, the Bundestag election in the year 1998 is chosen to guarantee predeterminedness of the 
indicator.66 Figure 4.3 shows that the SPD reached the highest share of votes in 153 German labour 
market regions, while the right-wing party CDU/CSU gained the highest share of votes in the re-
maining 105 regions. This figure also indicates that either the SPD or the CDU/CSU gained the 
highest share of votes in the 258 German labour market regions in Bundestag elections 1998 and 
thus allows researchers to analyse the presented left-right ideology (e.g. Potrafke, 2011).67 
The applied indicator for political ideology may have some drawbacks that are briefly discussed in 
the following: First, the election behaviour may differ between Bundestag and local elections. 
Thus, Bundestag elections may not always represent regional government composition perfectly, 
for which reason the results should be interpreted carefully. However, I assume that the share of 
second votes for the Bundestag elections is, for the most part, a proper approximation of regional 
political ideology. Second, one political party is rarely able to govern without coalition partners. 
However, the regions are subdivided according to the party with the highest share of votes because 
the major party largely enforce the political agenda and significantly influence the regional gov-
ernment agenda. Third, the respective party with the highest share in 1998 may be replaced by 
another party in subsequent elections, leading to a misinterpretation of the results. To tackle this 
                                                 
66 The subdivision and identification is likely to be exogenous, because parties on this administrative level do not influence the 
allocation regulations that are made on federal state level.  
67 Correlation coefficient ρSPD-East = 0.2476 indicates that the correlation between Eastern regions and SPD preferring regions is 
small, although SPD is slightly more favored in East German regions (Berlin is excluded for calculation). The correlation coefficient 
indicates an adequate level of independence between the two subsamples. 
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issue, a robustness check is performed that includes only these regions, where the major party in 
1998 also gains the highest shares of votes in the subsequent Bundestag elections 2002 and 2005. 
Fourth, labour market regions often comprise multiple small-scale administrative districts (Kreise) 
and the popularity of the SPD and CDU/CSU within one labour market region may differ in the 
associated districts. Thus, a further robustness test applies only these labour markets regions for 
analysis, where the leading party has the highest share of votes in all associated administrative 
districts. 
4.4.2 Econometric identification strategy 
A simultaneous equation approach allows to analyse the total effects of formula-based grants on 
all variables in the described economic system by considering diverse transmission channels. Thus, 
besides direct effects that are usually measured by the estimated coefficient in a single equation 
approach, the applied VAR setup also accounts for indirect effects among the six variables in the 
regional system (structural VAR approach, see Rickman, 2010). For example, formula-based 
grants may affect regional GDP per workforce not directly via the particular coefficient in the GDP 
equation, but indirectly via an increased human capital or employment rate that, in turn, affect the 
GDP per workforce.  
Based on the theory-based variable selection in Section 4.3, I apply a structural spatial panel VAR 
model with six equations, comprising the following six endogenous variables: 1) public physical 
capital investment rate sz, 2) human capital h, 3) patent intensity g, 4) private physical capital in-
vestment rate sk, gross employment rate λ, 6) output per workforce y. Based on this, the applied 
structural spatial panel VAR model can be formulated in matrix notation as (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019) 
        Ayt	=	Byt-1+	CWyt-1+	µ	+	τt	+	Det,        (4.6) 
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where yt is a vector that contains the six endogenous variables, A is a matrix of contemporaneous 
parameters, B and C, respectively, represent matrices of polynomials that connect time lagged as 
well as time-space lagged variables to contemporaneous variables, µ and τt are vectors covering 
region- and time fixed effects, D represents a diagonal matrix connecting the endogenous variables 
to exogenous shocks and et is a vector of orthogonal errors (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019; Keating, 1992; 
Mitze et al., 2018; Rickman, 2010).68 Using the moving average (MA) presentation of the VAR 
model, total effects of an orthogonal increase in the formula-based grant intensity (sz) on the re-
maining economic in- and output factors are calculated and graphically presented. Based on Monte 
Carlo simulations with 1000 repetitions, confidence intervals are constructed in order to make 
statements about the significance of the estimated responses (Love and Zicchino, 2006). 
Finally, the IRF analysis can be conducted separately for the isolated total spatially direct effects 
(changes in yt-1 on y) and the isolated total spatially indirect effects (changes in Wyt-1 on y) (e.g. 
Eberle et al., 2019). While the focus of the empirical analysis in Section 4.5 is on the computation 
of the isolated total spatially direct effects, response functions of isolated total spatially indirect 
effects are computed in order to test how fiscal equalisation schemes affect the spatial vicinity. 
Finally, the presented VAR model is conducted separately for each subsample according to the 
East-West and SPD-CDU/CSU classification and, ex-post, a t-test analysis is applied to test the 
null hypothesis of no statistical significant differences between the estimated responses (Eberle et 
al., 2018) 
                                                 
68 In order to prevent redundancy, the applied spatial panel VAR is explained only briefly here. A bias-corrected fixed-effects 
estimator, based on Everaert and Pozzi (2007), is used for estimation of the six equations that are estimated in the reduced-form 
VAR specification. Detailed information regarding the causal ordering at time t to identify the structural parameters A and errors et 
(Choleski decomposition) and further estimation issues are given in the study by Eberle et al. (2019). The formula-based grant 
intensity is assumed to be the most exogenous variable in the described economic system (assumed ordering: sz - h - g - sk - λ - y), 
implying contemporaneous effects on all other variables at time t. 
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      tt = 
IRFregion1 	-	IRFregion2
sd2region1
Nregion1
 +	sd2region2Nregion2
.          (4.7) 
In Equation (4.7), IRFregion1 and IRFregion2, respectively, denote the estimated responses in the two 
subsamples at year t, while sdregion1 and sdregion2 are the standard deviations, which are approximated 
using the constructed confidence intervals. Finally, Nregion1 and Nregion2 express the amount of rep-
etitions in the conducted Monte Carlo simulation (here: N = 1000) (Eberle et al., 2018). I perform 
a t-test analysis using the respective original shock in each subsample that is equal to one respective 
standard deviation (may differ between the subsamples). In order to control for large differences 
of these initial shocks, I also conduct a t-test analysis comparing the economic responses to an 
equal shock in terms of the same percentage rise in both subsamples. 
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Unconditional effects  
I start by analysing the economic effects of a formula-based grant intensity increase (“shock”) for 
the defined set of variables with yt = [sz, h, g, sk, λ, yt]. The continuous lines in Figure 4.4 show the 
particular response of an economic variable to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity, 
while the associated dotted lines indicate the constructed error bands. Each response is multiplied 
by 100 in order to express the estimated effects as a percentage [%].  
The estimated response of the regional gross employment rate (λ) implies significant positive ef-
fects, which is in line with hypothesis 4.1. The intuition is that formula-based grants may internalise 
public externalities and have positive effects on the migration behaviour, both leading to a higher 
labour supply and gross employment rate. Moreover, more financial resources may lead to higher 
levels of employment especially due to an increasing demand in the public sector. In line with the 
ex-ante expectations, the estimated magnitude of the private sector physical capital investment rate 
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(sk) is small and non-significant. In addition, the plotted IRFs suggest that mainly low-skilled work-
ers are impacted by an increase in the formula-based grant intensity, while the stock of high-skilled 
workers remains unaffected by a change – expressed by a statistically insignificant response of the 
human capital (h). That said, the patent intensity (g) displays an insignificant response as well. 
Finally, an increase in the formula-based funding intensity is not associated with a higher regional 
GDP per workforce (y). Thus, the positive response of the employment rate appears to be driven 
predominantly by an increase of low-skilled workers with a rather low average productivity in 
industrial production.  
Figure 4.4 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants (spatially direct effects), basic model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity, the dotted lines show the confidence 
intervals (CI) constructed by using Monte Carlo simulations (1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR 
approach explained in Section 4.4.2 and the variables described in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon 
request. 
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Subsequently two robustness checks are provided. First, the spatial lag Wyt-1 of the particular de-
pendent variable is excluded in each of the six equations because this variable is supposed to be 
weakly exogenous and may suffer from a bias in the applied fixed-effects estimator approach (see 
Figure A4.1 in the Appendix for the results).69 Second, additive public investments are added as 
control variable to the regression models (see Figure A4.2 for the results and Table A4.1 for de-
tails). The results of the two robustness checks emphasise that neither the exclusion of the particular 
spatial lag variable nor the inclusion of the public funding intensity of additive public policies leads 
to serious changes of the plotted IRF results. 
Figure A4.3 in the Appendix shows the isolated total spatially indirect effects of an increase in the 
formula-based funding intensity. I use the same initial increase (“shock”) in the grant intensity as 
in Figure 4.4 (basic model) and I assume the same contemporaneous relationship across the six 
spatial lag variables compared to the non-spatial model (same A matrix).70 The results hint at sig-
nificant negative effects of an increase in the formula-based grant intensity in neighbouring regions 
on the grant-intensity in region i. This finding suggests that regions are competing for formula-
based grants as an increase in the neighbourhood may be indirectly financed by region i (by receiv-
ing less formula-based grants, respectively). In addition, a shock in neighbouring regions abates 
much faster than the spatially direct effects and the error belts suggest non-significant effects for 
all economic variables. 
                                                 
69 The applied bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator is supposed to correct only for the bias in the time lag of the particular depend-
ent variable yt-1 in each regression model. However, this bias is more severe than the potential bias of Wyt-1 for the respective 
dependent variable, which is only included as control variable in the basic model. 
70 The definition of the spatial model (see Equation (4.5)) precludes contemporaneous effects from neighbouring regions on yt, for 
which reason they are 0 at time t. 
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4.5.2 Conditional effects 
In this section, I split the basic sample into subsamples, starting with comparing the plotted IRFs 
in Eastern and Western German regions. Due to its special status in divided Germany, Berlin is 
excluded from analysis. In both setups, the two continuous lines (blue and grey) display the eco-
nomic responses, while the dotted lines in grey and blue report the associated confidence intervals.  
Figure 4.5 shows the responses of Eastern and Western German regions to a shock in the formula-
based funding intensity. With regard to the significance and the magnitude of the estimated re-
sponses, the results hint at only minor differences for the human capital and the patent intensity 
between the subsamples. However, the response of the employment rate to an increase in the for-
mula-based grant intensity is significant positive only for Western German regions. Moreover, in 
the year of the funding increase, the magnitude of the response is also significantly higher in West 
Germany (if the respective one standard deviation increase is used for the computation, see Table 
A4.3).  
Additionally, the plotted IRFs suggest short-run significant negative effects on the GDP per work-
force in East Germany. This finding is also supported by a statistically significantly lower response 
in the year of the funding increase in Eastern German regions. Conversely, the findings hint at 
short-run significant positive effects on the private sector physical capital investment rate in East-
ern German regions, also reflected by a significant higher magnitude in the year of the funding 
change. However, this finding is limited to the year of a grant increase. 
The described moderate differences may be explained by an unequal conceptualization and imple-
mentation of fiscal equalisation as well as by different political ideologies in East and West Ger-
many (hypothesis 4.2). However, one should keep in mind that the economic conditions in both 
parts of former divided Germany are still different. The marginal productivity of capital may be 
smaller in West compared to East Germany as regions are closer to their individual steady state 
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level. Thus, Western regions may be more focused on the employment target, while Eastern Ger-
man regions use the grants primarily to create incentives for firms to raise the private sector invest-
ment rate. In addition, average wages are still lower in Eastern German regions, for which reason 
it may be more complex to influence the migration patterns of employees. The short-run negative 
response of the GDP per workforce becomes positive in subsequent years, which is why I do not 
overvalue this finding. 
Figure 4.5 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants, East – West German labour market regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity in East (grey) and West German 
regions (blue), the dotted lines show the corresponding confidence intervals (CI) constructed by using Monte Carlo simulations 
(1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR approach explained in Section 4.4.2 and the variables described 
in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon request. 
In a second investigation, I deepen the analysis on the influence of political ideologies on the eco-
nomic responses to an increase in the grant intensity by using the share of votes for German parties. 
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Figure 4.6 displays the differences in the use of fiscal grants between left-wing SPD and pro-busi-
ness CDU/CSU preferring regions. The effects in SPD supporting regions are non-significant for 
all economic in- and output variables, while fiscal equalisation triggers statistically significant pos-
itive effects on the employment, human capital and private sector investment rate in CDU/CSU 
preferring regions. Carefully speaking, regions with a high share of votes for the right-wing and 
pro-business CDU/CSU transform an increase in the grant intensity not solely to more employment, 
but also to an increase of high-skilled employment (human capital). Conversely, the findings also 
suggest short-term negative effects on the GDP per workforce in these regions but the response 
turns into non-significant positive effects in subsequent years. 
Figure 4.6 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants, Share of votes SPD – CDU/CSU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity in regions with a major share of 
voters for the SPD (grey) and the CDU/CSU (blue), the dotted lines show the corresponding confidence intervals (CI) constructed 
by using Monte Carlo simulations (1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR approach explained in Section 
4.4.2 and the variables described in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon request. 
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I run several robustness checks for the applied SPD-CDU/CSU classification. At first, I use only 
these regions, where SPD or CDU/CSU receive the highest shares of votes in the Bundestag elec-
tions 1998, 2002 and 2005. Second, I consider only these labour market regions, where either SPD 
or CDU/CSU receive the highest share of votes 1998 in all inherent small-scale Kreise. The find-
ings for both robustness checks remain robust and almost unchanged (see Figures A4.4 and A4.5). 
Finally, I use only these regions for analysis, where the SPD or CDU/CSU receive the highest share 
of votes in all inherent Kreise in the respective Bundestag elections of 1998, 2002 and 2005. The 
IRF analysis confirms that economic responses in CDU/CSU supporting regions are robust, while 
the economic responses and associated confidence intervals in SPD supporting regions change to 
a greater extend in this setting (see Figure A4.6). The findings hint at significant positive effects of 
an increase in the grant intensity on the employment rate as well as on the regional GDP per work-
force in SPD preferring regions. However, the latter finding is only significant in the year of the 
shock. In subsequent years, the response becomes insignificant and negative. The estimated eco-
nomic responses in Figure A4.6 are considered as the most robust classification and thus these 
responses are used to perform a t-test analysis. The estimated response of the GDP per workforce 
is significantly higher in SPD preferring regions in the year of the funding increase, while the 
results hint at significantly higher (short-term) effects on the regional employment, human capital 
and investment rate in CDU/CSU supporting regions (see Table A4.4). The conducted analysis 
emphasises that the findings are partially in line with the formulated expectations in hypothesis 4.3 
but statistically significant differences are restricted to single years. 
4.5.3 Economic effects of fiscal equalisation compared to structural funding 
Finally, this section determines potential differences between fiscal equalisation and the structural 
funding programme GRW. To this end, I initially estimate the economic effects of an increase in 
overall GRW funding intensity. In doing so, the funding intensity of remaining public investments 
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is included as control variable.71 The plotted IRFs in Figure A4.7 illustrate the responses to an 
increase in the overall GRW and formula-based grant intensity, respectively. The findings support 
the robustness of the results by Eberle et al. (2019), suggesting statistically significant positive 
effects of overall GRW investments on the employment and human capital rate as well as on re-
gional GDP per workforce. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of t-test analysis comparing the estimated economic responses to an 
increase in the formula-based grant and GRW funding intensity. Using the estimated responses to 
an initial shock that amounts each to one respective standard deviation (may differ between both 
subsamples), an increase in the GRW is associated with statistically significantly higher responses 
of the regional GDP per workforce, employment and human capital rate. The responses of the 
patent activity and private sector investment rate are not significantly different. However, calculat-
ing the economic responses based on a rescaled initial shock (same initial percent rise), the statis-
tically significant differences in the magnitudes of the economic responses diminish. Thus, the 
findings suggest that GRW funding triggers significant positive effects on more economic variables 
compared to regional fiscal equalisation but the magnitudes are not higher compared to these of 
regional fiscal equalisation (hypothesis 4.4 is not confirmed). 
                                                 
71 This approach is the same as the robustness check regarding formula-based grants illustrated in Figure A4.2. 
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Table 4.2 t-test analysis comparing economic responses to an increase in the formula-based grant and overall GRW intensity (based on Figure A4.7) 
Funding increases are one sample-specific standard deviation in each subsample Funding increases are equal to the same % in each subsample* 
Time Response variable t-value 
Ha: diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha: diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha: diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) Time 
Response 
variable t-value 
Ha: diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha: diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha: diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
0 lhk 0.5125 0.3042 0.6958 0.6084 0 lhk 0.0471 0.4812 0.5188 0.9625 
1 lhk -1.0500 0.8531 0.1469 0.2938 1 lhk -0.0151 0.5060 0.4940 0.9880 
2 lhk -1.4876 0.9315 0.0685 0.1370 2 lhk -0.2139 0.5847 0.4153 0.8306 
3 lhk -1.6812 0.9536 0.0464 0.0929 3 lhk -0.3912 0.6521 0.3479 0.6957 
4 lhk -1.7880 0.9630 0.0370 0.0739 4 lhk -0.5496 0.7087 0.2913 0.5826 
5 lhk -1.8380 0.9669 0.0331 0.0662 5 lhk -0.6819 0.7523 0.2477 0.4954 
6 lhk -1.8658 0.9689 0.0311 0.0622 6 lhk -0.8048 0.7895 0.2105 0.4210 
7 lhk -1.8398 0.9670 0.0330 0.0659 7 lhk -0.9028 0.8166 0.1834 0.3667 
8 lhk -1.8157 0.9652 0.0348 0.0696 8 lhk -0.9847 0.8375 0.1625 0.3249 
9 lhk -1.7815 0.9625 0.0375 0.0750 9 lhk -1.0430 0.8515 0.1485 0.2971 
10 lhk -1.7084 0.9561 0.0439 0.0877 10 lhk -1.0921 0.8625 0.1375 0.2749 
11 lhk -1.6454 0.9500 0.0500 0.1000 11 lhk -1.1325 0.8712 0.1288 0.2575 
12 lhk -1.5892 0.9439 0.0561 0.1122 12 lhk -1.1483 0.8745 0.1255 0.2510 
0 lemp -0.8514 0.8027 0.1973 0.3946 0 lemp -0.3378 0.6322 0.3678 0.7355 
1 lemp -0.6330 0.7366 0.2634 0.5268 1 lemp 1.4616 0.0720 0.9280 0.1440 
2 lemp -0.7694 0.7791 0.2209 0.4418 2 lemp 1.6182 0.0529 0.9471 0.1058 
3 lemp -1.0750 0.8587 0.1413 0.2825 3 lemp 1.5774 0.0574 0.9426 0.1149 
4 lemp -1.4231 0.9226 0.0774 0.1549 4 lemp 1.4331 0.0760 0.9240 0.1520 
5 lemp -1.7658 0.9612 0.0388 0.0776 5 lemp 1.1771 0.1197 0.8803 0.2393 
6 lemp -2.1008 0.9821 0.0179 0.0358 6 lemp 0.8506 0.1975 0.8025 0.3951 
7 lemp -2.3005 0.9892 0.0108 0.0215 7 lemp 0.4598 0.3228 0.6772 0.6457 
8 lemp -2.4513 0.9928 0.0072 0.0143 8 lemp 0.0678 0.4730 0.5270 0.9459 
9 lemp -2.4982 0.9937 0.0063 0.0126 9 lemp -0.2787 0.6097 0.3903 0.7805 
10 lemp -2.4751 0.9933 0.0067 0.0134 10 lemp -0.5420 0.7060 0.2940 0.5879 
11 lemp -2.3801 0.9913 0.0087 0.0174 11 lemp -0.7426 0.7711 0.2289 0.4578 
12 lemp -2.3044 0.9893 0.0107 0.0213 12 lemp -0.8950 0.8146 0.1854 0.3709 
0 lgdp 1.5472 0.0610 0.9390 0.1220 0 lgdp 0.1582 0.4372 0.5628 0.8743 
1 lgdp -0.5099 0.6949 0.3051 0.6102 1 lgdp -0.0829 0.5330 0.4670 0.9339 
2 lgdp -1.1824 0.8814 0.1186 0.2372 2 lgdp -0.2752 0.6084 0.3916 0.7832 
3 lgdp -1.4906 0.9319 0.0681 0.1362 3 lgdp -0.4344 0.6680 0.3320 0.6640 
4 lgdp -1.6220 0.9475 0.0525 0.1050 4 lgdp -0.5679 0.7149 0.2851 0.5702 
5 lgdp -1.6913 0.9545 0.0455 0.0909 5 lgdp -0.6716 0.7491 0.2509 0.5019 
6 lgdp -1.7124 0.9565 0.0435 0.0870 6 lgdp -0.7605 0.7765 0.2235 0.4471 
7 lgdp -1.7060 0.9559 0.0441 0.0882 7 lgdp -0.8389 0.7992 0.2008 0.4017 
8 lgdp -1.7078 0.9561 0.0439 0.0878 8 lgdp -0.8986 0.8155 0.1845 0.3690 
9 lgdp -1.6779 0.9532 0.0468 0.0935 9 lgdp -0.9509 0.8291 0.1709 0.3418 
10 lgdp -1.6392 0.9493 0.0507 0.1013 10 lgdp -1.0000 0.8413 0.1587 0.3174 
11 lgdp -1.5949 0.9445 0.0555 0.1109 11 lgdp -1.0302 0.8485 0.1515 0.3031 
12 lgdp -1.5538 0.9398 0.0602 0.1204 12 lgdp -1.0535 0.8539 0.1461 0.2922 
Notes: diff = mean(formula-based grant intensity) - mean(overall GRW intensity); H0: diff = 0; degrees of freedom = 1198. Only variables with significant differences are presented. *Ini-
tial shock in the GRW intensity is rescaled to the amount of the initial shock in the formula-based grant intensity. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
This paper adds to recent literature by analysing the economic effects of regional fiscal equalisation 
in Germany. While the primary aim of regional fiscal equalisation is to endow regions with a suf-
ficient level of financial resources to provide public goods, potential economic secondary effects 
are widely disregarded so far. I explicitly consider three features of German regional fiscal equal-
isation: First, I account for a potential multifaceted impact character by applying a VAR approach 
and IRF analysis. Second, I examine conditional effects by subdividing the basic sample according 
to political-economic structures. Third, I compare the effects to the economic outcomes of rather 
industry-oriented structural funding in Germany. 
Using a sample comprising the full set of 258 German labour market regions as basic model, the 
plotted IRFs suggest statistically significant positive effects on the regional employment rate. This 
finding may express the influence on migration patterns of rather low-skilled workers and on em-
ployees in the public sector. However, the overall economic secondary effects are moderate be-
cause further economic variables are not affected statistically significant. Carefully speaking, re-
gional fiscal equalisation cannot be considered as ideal policy instrument to spur regional develop-
ment in a multifaceted way. 
In addition, I find only small heterogeneous treatment responses across the defined subsamples: 
the results suggest statistically significantly higher responses on the employment rate and GDP per 
workforce in Western regions, while the effects are higher on the private sector investment rate in 
Eastern regions. However, the differences appear only for single years and shortly after an increase 
in the funding intensity. Moreover, the results hint at significantly higher effects on the employ-
ment, human capital and investment rate in CDU/CSU preferring regions, while an increase is 
associated with higher effects on the GDP per workforce in SPD supporting regions (in the short-
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run perspective). Thus, political-economic structures influence the working of formula-based 
grants especially in the short run but their influence should not be overrated by policy makers. 
Finally, an initial increase amounting to one respective standard deviation leads to significant 
higher effects of the GRW programme on the GDP per workforce, the employment and human 
capital rate, while the significant differences diminish when using an initial increase amounting to 
the same percentage of both policies. However, fiscal equalisation affects only the employment 
rate statistically significant positive. Structural funding has additional significant positive effects 
on the human capital rate and regional GDP per workforce. Based on this finding, the last policy 
implication can be drawn: If the policy objective is to increase the regional GDP and human capital 
endowment, policymakers should allocate structural funds rather than fiscal equalisation payments.  
The analysis conducted in this paper is one contribution towards a comprehensive debate regarding 
the working of fiscal equalisation in Germany. For future research, I point to the following aspects: 
First, additional research should gain detailed information about the quality of jobs that are created 
by an increase of formula-based grants. The quality and wage level of the created jobs as well as 
the sector may have important implications for regional economies. Second, I analyse fiscal equal-
isation between German regions. It is also worth to determine the effects of fiscal equalisation on 
the distribution within the (gaining) regions in future evaluation studies. Third, future research 
should focus on detailed analyses for particular federal states to identify differences and best prac-
tice characteristics. 
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A4. Appendix 
Table A4.1 Variable description and construction 
Description Shortcut Construction Data source 
Nominal GDP per 
economically ac-
tive working pop-
ulation (work-
force) 
y ln[GDP in Euro / (Population aged 15 to 64 years × Par-
ticipation rate)] 
Note: Population data is based on the extrapolation of the 
census 1987. The participation rate is based on the same 
population data until the year 2011. From 2011, the par-
ticipation rate is calculated based on the population data 
of the census 2011. 
GDP: Arbeitskreis “Volkswirtschaftliche Ge-
samtrechnungen der Länder” (Status: August 
2015) 
Population aged 15 to 64 years: Regionaldaten-
bank Deutschland (Based on the population 
census 1987) 
Partizipation rate: Statistik der Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit / Indikatoren und Karten zur Raum 
und Stadtentwicklung (INKAR) 
Private sector 
physical capital 
intensity (manu-
facturing, mining 
and quarrying sec-
tor) 
sk ln[Industry investments in Euro / GDP in Euro]  
Note: Missing values for the industry investments are in-
terpolated on the basis of an autoregressive process with 3 
lags. 
Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt-, und Raumfor-
schung (BBSR), laufende Raumbeobachtun-
gen, various issues 
Higher education 
rate 
h ln[Employees with university degree / (Population aged 
15 to 64 years × Participation rate)] 
Note: Potential data imperfections related to the registra-
tion of the qualification of employees are assumed to be 
random. 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nu-
remberg 
Gross employ-
ment rate 
λ ln[Employees total / (Population aged 15 to 64 years × 
Participation rate)] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nu-
remberg 
Patent intensity (in 
ln) 
g ln[Patents / GDP in Mio. Euro] Own calculation from the PATSTAT database 
(Version October 2014, European Patent Of-
fice) 
Formula-based 
grant intensity (in 
ln) 
sz ln[Formula-based grants in Euro / GDP in Euro] Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt-, und Raumfor-
schung (BBSR) 
Spatial lag varia-
bles 
Wx Spatial lags for each variable are constructed in absolute 
values using the STATA command splagvar and a binary 
first‐order neighbourhood matrix. Thereupon, all spatial 
lag variables are normalised and ln‐transformed similar to 
the non‐spatial variables above. 
 
Further public 
funding intensity 
(control variable 
for formula-based 
grant intensity) 
 ln[Sum of further public funding programmes in Euro / 
GDP in Euro] 
Note: This variable covers regional investment data for the 
GRW programme, urban development promotion pro-
grammes, project funding programmes of the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and further 
German Ministries as well as programmes of the Recon-
struction Credit Institute (KfW) (Start-up, Infrastructure, 
Innovation, Environment and Living investments) 
GRW: Federal Office for Economic Affairs 
and Export Control (BAFA) 
Further public funding  programmes: Bundes-
institut für Bau-, Stadt-, und Raumforschung 
(BBSR) 
Votes SPD and 
CDU/CSU Bun-
destag election 
1998 
 Second votes SPD (CDU/CSU)/total second votes Allgemeine Bundestagswahlstatistik des Bun-
des und der Länder/ INKAR 
Overall GRW in-
tensity (industry 
and infrastructure 
investments) 
grw ln[GRW funding volumes in Euro / GDP in Euro]. BAFA 
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Table A4.2 Panel unit root test 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Number 
of years 
Test-
statistic p-value 
y 12 -4.122 0.000 
λ 12 -0.345 0.365 
λ_detrended 12 -16.080 0.000 
h 12 0.130 0.552 
h_detrended 12 -17.616 0.000 
sk 12 -17.582 0.000 
g 12 -17.446 0.000 
sz 12 -6.591 0.000 
sz_detrended 12 -22.989 0.000 
w_y 12 -3.376 0.000 
w_λ 12 -1.410 0.079 
w_λ_detrended 12 -17.756 0.000 
w_h 12 0.011 0.504 
w_h_detrended 12 -18.114 0.000 
w_sk 12 -15.190 0.000 
w_g 12 -13.691 0.000 
w_sz 12 -4.567 0.000 
Additive public funding intensity  12 -17.276 0.000 
w_additive public funding intensity  12 -10.387 0.000 
Notes: Panel unit root test based on Im et al. (2003). H0: All panels contain unit 
roots. HA: Some panels are stationary. The suffix “_detrended” indicates a 
detrended variable. 
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Figure A4.1 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants, spatial lag from the particular dependent vari-
able is excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity, the dotted lines show the confidence 
intervals (CI) constructed by using Monte Carlo simulations (1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR 
approach explained in Section 4.4.2 and the variables described in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon 
request. 
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Figure A4.2 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants, control variables added  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity, the dotted lines show the confidence 
intervals (CI) constructed by using Monte Carlo simulations (1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR 
approach explained in Section 4.4.2 and the variables described in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon 
request. 
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Figure A4.3 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants (spatially indirect effects), basic model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity, the dotted lines show the confidence 
intervals (CI) constructed by using Monte Carlo simulations (1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR 
approach explained in Section 4.4.2 and the variables described in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon 
request. 
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Table A4.3 t-test analysis comparing economic responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity, East-West classification (based on Figure 4.5) 
Funding increases are one sample-specific standard deviation in each subsample Funding increases are equal to the same % in each subsample* 
Time Response variable t-value 
Ha: diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha: diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha: diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) Time 
Response 
variable t-value 
Ha: diff > 0, 
Pr(T > t) 
Ha: diff < 0, 
Pr(T < t) 
Ha: diff != 0, 
(|T| > |t|) 
0 linvq 2.1456 0.0160 0.9840 0.0320 0 linvq 2.0591 0.0198 0.9802 0.0396 
1 linvq -0.3938 0.6531 0.3469 0.6938 1 linvq -0.3283 0.6286 0.3714 0.7427 
2 linvq -0.9320 0.8243 0.1757 0.3514 2 linvq -0.8176 0.7932 0.2068 0.4137 
3 linvq -1.1860 0.8821 0.1179 0.2358 3 linvq -1.0674 0.8570 0.1430 0.2859 
4 linvq -1.2781 0.8993 0.1007 0.2014 4 linvq -1.1759 0.8801 0.1199 0.2398 
5 linvq -1.1969 0.8843 0.1157 0.2315 5 linvq -1.1073 0.8659 0.1341 0.2683 
6 linvq -1.0456 0.8521 0.1479 0.2959 6 linvq -0.9651 0.8327 0.1673 0.3346 
7 linvq -0.9056 0.8174 0.1826 0.3653 7 linvq -0.8415 0.7999 0.2001 0.4001 
8 linvq -0.7713 0.7797 0.2203 0.4406 8 linvq -0.7259 0.7660 0.2340 0.4680 
9 linvq -0.6839 0.7529 0.2471 0.4941 9 linvq -0.6542 0.7435 0.2565 0.5130 
10 linvq -0.5935 0.7236 0.2764 0.5529 10 linvq -0.5762 0.7177 0.2823 0.5646 
11 linvq -0.5170 0.6974 0.3026 0.6052 11 linvq -0.5078 0.6942 0.3058 0.6117 
12 linvq -0.4588 0.6768 0.3232 0.6464 12 linvq -0.4547 0.6753 0.3247 0.6494 
0 lemp -1.6957 0.9549 0.0451 0.0901 0 lemp -1.6285 0.9482 0.0518 0.1036 
1 lemp -0.4666 0.6796 0.3204 0.6408 1 lemp -0.0701 0.5280 0.4720 0.9441 
2 lemp -0.4884 0.6873 0.3127 0.6253 2 lemp -0.0023 0.5009 0.4991 0.9982 
3 lemp -0.6266 0.7345 0.2655 0.5310 3 lemp -0.0913 0.5364 0.4636 0.9273 
4 lemp -0.7541 0.7746 0.2254 0.4509 4 lemp -0.2113 0.5837 0.4163 0.8327 
5 lemp -0.8172 0.7931 0.2069 0.4139 5 lemp -0.3139 0.6232 0.3768 0.7536 
6 lemp -0.7532 0.7743 0.2257 0.4514 6 lemp -0.3465 0.6355 0.3645 0.7290 
7 lemp -0.6137 0.7303 0.2697 0.5395 7 lemp -0.3233 0.6267 0.3733 0.7465 
8 lemp -0.4984 0.6909 0.3091 0.6183 8 lemp -0.3022 0.6187 0.3813 0.7625 
9 lemp -0.4108 0.6594 0.3406 0.6812 9 lemp -0.2856 0.6124 0.3876 0.7752 
10 lemp -0.3372 0.6320 0.3680 0.7360 10 lemp -0.2658 0.6048 0.3952 0.7904 
11 lemp -0.2891 0.6137 0.3863 0.7725 11 lemp -0.2528 0.5998 0.4002 0.8004 
12 lemp -0.2570 0.6014 0.3986 0.7972 12 lemp -0.2426 0.5958 0.4042 0.8083 
0 lgdp -3.6109 0.9998 0.0002 0.0003 0 lgdp -3.7036 0.9999 0.0001 0.0002 
1 lgdp -0.0043 0.5017 0.4983 0.9966 1 lgdp 0.0424 0.4831 0.5169 0.9662 
2 lgdp 0.5188 0.3020 0.6980 0.6040 2 lgdp 0.5274 0.2990 0.7010 0.5980 
3 lgdp 0.5428 0.2937 0.7063 0.5874 3 lgdp 0.5159 0.3030 0.6970 0.6060 
4 lgdp 0.4659 0.3207 0.6793 0.6413 4 lgdp 0.4111 0.3405 0.6595 0.6811 
5 lgdp 0.3653 0.3575 0.6425 0.7149 5 lgdp 0.2959 0.3837 0.6163 0.7673 
6 lgdp 0.2676 0.3945 0.6055 0.7891 6 lgdp 0.1954 0.4226 0.5774 0.8451 
7 lgdp 0.1827 0.4275 0.5725 0.8550 7 lgdp 0.1142 0.4546 0.5454 0.9091 
8 lgdp 0.1100 0.4562 0.5438 0.9125 8 lgdp 0.0488 0.4806 0.5194 0.9611 
9 lgdp 0.0481 0.4808 0.5192 0.9616 9 lgdp -0.0042 0.5017 0.4983 0.9966 
10 lgdp -0.0033 0.5013 0.4987 0.9974 10 lgdp -0.0463 0.5185 0.4815 0.9631 
11 lgdp -0.0429 0.5171 0.4829 0.9658 11 lgdp -0.0762 0.5304 0.4696 0.9393 
12 lgdp -0.0722 0.5288 0.4712 0.9424 12 lgdp -0.0979 0.5390 0.4610 0.9220 
Notes: diff = mean(Eastern_regions) - mean(Western_regions); H0: diff = 0; degrees of freedom = 1198. Only variables with significant differences are presented. *Initial shock in Western 
regions is rescaled to the amount of the initial shock in Eastern regions. 
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Figure A4.4 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants, Share of votes SPD – CDU/CSU considering 
subsequent Bundestag elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity in regions with a major share of 
voters for the SPD (grey) and the CDU/CSU (blue), the dotted lines show the corresponding confidence intervals (CI) constructed 
by using Monte Carlo simulations (1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR approach explained in Section 
4.4.2 and the variables described in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon request. 
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Figure A4.5 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants, Share of votes SPD – CDU/CSU considering 
inherent districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity in regions with a major share of 
voters for the SPD (grey) and the CDU/CSU (blue), the dotted lines show the corresponding confidence intervals (CI) constructed 
by using Monte Carlo simulations (1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR approach explained in Section 
4.4.2 and the variables described in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon request. 
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Figure A4.6 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants, Share of votes SPD – CDU/CSU considering 
inherent districts and subsequent Bundestag elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity in regions with a major share of 
voters for the SPD (grey) and the CDU/CSU (blue), the dotted lines show the corresponding confidence intervals (CI) constructed 
by using Monte Carlo simulations (1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR approach explained in Section 
4.4.2 and the variables described in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon request. 
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Table A4.4 t-test analysis comparing economic responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity, SPD-CDU/CSU classification (based on Figure A4.6) 
Funding increases are one sample-specific standard deviation in each subsample Funding increases are equal to the same % in each subsample* 
Time Response variable t-value 
Ha: diff > 
0, Pr(T > t) 
Ha: diff < 
0, Pr(T < t) 
Ha: diff != 
0, (|T| > |t|) Time 
Response 
variable t-value 
Ha: diff > 
0, Pr(T > t) 
Ha: diff < 
0, Pr(T < t) 
Ha: diff != 
0, (|T| > |t|) 
0 lhk 0.2762 0.3912 0.6088 0.7824 0 lhk 0.1431 0.4431 0.5569 0.8862 
1 lhk -1.1505 0.8750 0.1250 0.2501 1 lhk -1.6682 0.9523 0.0477 0.0954 
2 lhk -0.9684 0.8335 0.1665 0.3330 2 lhk -1.6293 0.9483 0.0517 0.1034 
3 lhk -0.7350 0.7688 0.2312 0.4625 3 lhk -1.3906 0.9177 0.0823 0.1645 
4 lhk -0.5865 0.7212 0.2788 0.5576 4 lhk -1.1236 0.8693 0.1307 0.2613 
5 lhk -0.5043 0.6929 0.3071 0.6141 5 lhk -0.8784 0.8101 0.1899 0.3798 
6 lhk -0.4538 0.6750 0.3250 0.6500 6 lhk -0.6942 0.7562 0.2438 0.4876 
7 lhk -0.4044 0.6570 0.3430 0.6860 7 lhk -0.5392 0.7051 0.2949 0.5898 
8 lhk -0.3639 0.6420 0.3580 0.7160 8 lhk -0.4215 0.6633 0.3367 0.6735 
9 lhk -0.3278 0.6284 0.3716 0.7431 9 lhk -0.3324 0.6302 0.3698 0.7397 
10 lhk -0.2883 0.6134 0.3866 0.7731 10 lhk -0.2571 0.6014 0.3986 0.7971 
11 lhk -0.2511 0.5991 0.4009 0.8017 11 lhk -0.1961 0.5777 0.4223 0.8445 
12 lhk -0.2161 0.5855 0.4145 0.8289 12 lhk -0.1454 0.5578 0.4422 0.8844 
0 linvq -2.7916 0.9974 0.0026 0.0053 0 linvq -2.8523 0.9978 0.0022 0.0044 
1 linvq -1.0900 0.8621 0.1379 0.2758 1 linvq -1.5654 0.9412 0.0588 0.1177 
2 linvq -0.3800 0.6480 0.3520 0.7040 2 linvq -1.0702 0.8577 0.1423 0.2847 
3 linvq -0.0389 0.5155 0.4845 0.9690 3 linvq -0.6807 0.7519 0.2481 0.4962 
4 linvq 0.0927 0.4631 0.5369 0.9262 4 linvq -0.3848 0.6498 0.3502 0.7004 
5 linvq 0.1060 0.4578 0.5422 0.9156 5 linvq -0.1779 0.5706 0.4294 0.8588 
6 linvq 0.0552 0.4780 0.5220 0.9560 6 linvq -0.0687 0.5274 0.4726 0.9452 
7 linvq -0.0185 0.5074 0.4926 0.9852 7 linvq -0.0313 0.5125 0.4875 0.9750 
8 linvq -0.0947 0.5377 0.4623 0.9246 8 linvq -0.0378 0.5151 0.4849 0.9699 
9 linvq -0.1628 0.5647 0.4353 0.8707 9 linvq -0.0646 0.5258 0.4742 0.9485 
10 linvq -0.2184 0.5864 0.4136 0.8272 10 linvq -0.0989 0.5394 0.4606 0.9213 
11 linvq -0.2530 0.5999 0.4001 0.8003 11 linvq -0.1280 0.5509 0.4491 0.8981 
12 linvq -0.2749 0.6083 0.3917 0.7834 12 linvq -0.1520 0.5604 0.4396 0.8792 
0 lemp -0.3155 0.6238 0.3762 0.7524 0 lemp -0.8159 0.7927 0.2073 0.4147 
1 lemp -1.0265 0.8476 0.1524 0.3048 1 lemp -2.2737 0.9885 0.0115 0.0231 
2 lemp -0.3933 0.6529 0.3471 0.6941 2 lemp -2.0830 0.9813 0.0187 0.0374 
3 lemp 0.1458 0.4421 0.5579 0.8841 3 lemp -1.5530 0.9397 0.0603 0.1206 
4 lemp 0.4692 0.3195 0.6805 0.6390 4 lemp -0.9318 0.8242 0.1758 0.3516 
5 lemp 0.6187 0.2681 0.7319 0.5362 5 lemp -0.4369 0.6689 0.3311 0.6622 
6 lemp 0.6572 0.2556 0.7444 0.5111 6 lemp -0.0981 0.5391 0.4609 0.9218 
7 lemp 0.5600 0.2878 0.7122 0.5756 7 lemp 0.1018 0.4595 0.5405 0.9189 
8 lemp 0.4502 0.3263 0.6737 0.6526 8 lemp 0.2023 0.4199 0.5801 0.8397 
9 lemp 0.3211 0.3741 0.6259 0.7482 9 lemp 0.2418 0.4045 0.5955 0.8089 
10 lemp 0.1828 0.4275 0.5725 0.8550 10 lemp 0.2398 0.4052 0.5948 0.8105 
11 lemp 0.0613 0.4755 0.5245 0.9511 11 lemp 0.2170 0.4141 0.5859 0.8282 
12 lemp -0.0406 0.5162 0.4838 0.9676 12 lemp 0.1815 0.4280 0.5720 0.8560 
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Table A4.4 continued 
Funding increases are one sample-specific standard deviation in each subsample Funding increases are equal to the same % in each subsample* 
Time Response variable t-value 
Ha: diff > 
0, Pr(T > t) 
Ha: diff < 
0, Pr(T < t) 
Ha: diff != 
0, (|T| > |t|) Time 
Response 
variable t-value 
Ha: diff > 
0, Pr(T > t) 
Ha: diff < 
0, Pr(T < t) 
Ha: diff != 
0, (|T| > |t|) 
0 lgdp 2.7355 0.0031 0.9969 0.0063 0 lgdp 2.5569 0.0053 0.9947 0.0106 
1 lgdp -0.4088 0.6587 0.3413 0.6827 1 lgdp -0.6643 0.7467 0.2533 0.5066 
2 lgdp -0.5925 0.7232 0.2768 0.5536 2 lgdp -0.6473 0.7413 0.2587 0.5175 
3 lgdp -0.5539 0.7101 0.2899 0.5797 3 lgdp -0.4577 0.6764 0.3236 0.6472 
4 lgdp -0.5346 0.7035 0.2965 0.5930 4 lgdp -0.3084 0.6211 0.3789 0.7578 
5 lgdp -0.5272 0.7010 0.2990 0.5981 5 lgdp -0.2175 0.5861 0.4139 0.8279 
6 lgdp -0.5334 0.7031 0.2969 0.5938 6 lgdp -0.1699 0.5674 0.4326 0.8651 
7 lgdp -0.5398 0.7053 0.2947 0.5894 7 lgdp -0.1484 0.5590 0.4410 0.8820 
8 lgdp -0.5470 0.7078 0.2922 0.5844 8 lgdp -0.1473 0.5585 0.4415 0.8829 
9 lgdp -0.5562 0.7109 0.2891 0.5781 9 lgdp -0.1555 0.5618 0.4382 0.8765 
10 lgdp -0.5620 0.7129 0.2871 0.5741 10 lgdp -0.1679 0.5666 0.4334 0.8667 
11 lgdp -0.5609 0.7125 0.2875 0.5749 11 lgdp -0.1816 0.5720 0.4280 0.8559 
12 lgdp -0.5619 0.7129 0.2871 0.5743 12 lgdp -0.1957 0.5776 0.4224 0.8448 
Notes: diff = mean(SPD_regions) - mean(CDU/CSU_regions); H0: diff = 0; degrees of freedom = 1198. Only variables with significant differences are presented. *Initial 
shock in CDU/CSU regions is rescaled to the amount of the initial shock in SPD regions. 
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Figure A4.7 Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants and overall GRW investments, control variables 
added (Impulse response function analysis formula-based grants is similar to Figure A4.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines present the responses to an increase in the formula-based grant intensity (grey) and in the overall GRW 
intensity (blue), the dotted lines show the corresponding confidence intervals (CI) constructed by using Monte Carlo simulations 
(1000 repetitions). The estimated responses are based on the VAR approach explained in Section 4.4.2 and the variables described 
in Table A4.1. Associated regression results are available upon request. 
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Abstract: This paper estimates the regional economic effects of public research activities. In order to identify the 
underlying transmission channels from knowledge creation to the regional environment, the empirical identification 
strategy goes beyond traditional partial effects analyses and studies the complex linkages between public research, 
innovativeness and regional development on the basis of a structural VAR model. A particular focus is thereby set on 
assessing if the effects of local public research activity differ by the type of research actors (universities, technical 
colleges and public research institutes). The empirical results indicate that an increase in the volume of (public) third-
party funding to technical colleges is associated with a rise in the regional investment and employment rate as well as 
the human capital stock. Increasing public third-party funding to both, universities and technical colleges, positively 
affects the regional patent activity, the employment rate and per workforce output. In comparison, the empirical results 
provide limited evidence for regional economic effects stemming from an increase in local knowledge creation meas-
ured in terms of scientific publications. Here only variations in the publication rate of public research institutes can be 
linked to positive private sector investment and employment effects. 
Keywords: Public research, knowledge transfer, regional economic growth, factor inputs, VAR, impulse response 
functions 
JEL Classification: C33, I23, I25, R11, O38, O47 
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5.1. Introduction 
A central research question in regional economics and economic geography relates to the role of 
human capital and knowledge creation in driving regional economic growth and development. 
Building on seminal contributions in the field of new growth theory (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992; 
Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990), a common understanding of knowledge-driven growth process is that 
human capital and research and development (R&D) inputs leads to innovations, which  – in turn 
– trigger economic growth through both private and social returns to these knowledge inputs. Social 
returns are typically associated with positive knowledge spillovers. The literature on Regional In-
novation Systems (RIS) complements growth analyses by studying the main transmission channels 
of knowledge creation to the regional economy, e.g. related to the contribution of public research 
activities for regional knowledge transfer and development (e.g. Braczyk et al., 2004). The main 
conclusion is that public research actors play a crucial role for innovation processes and associated 
regional development (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999). Despite the progress made in the contempo-
raneous literature, however, it is less well understood which types of public research actors and 
activities contribute the most to regional development and if different actor-activity combinations 
affect the regional economy through alternative transmission channels. 
In this paper, we contribute to this open research agenda by analysing the mutual linkages between 
research activities carried out by different public research actors and regional economic develop-
ment in Germany. Germany can be seen as an interesting case study for this endeavour as the 
German public research landscape comprises different research actors within and outside the uni-
versity system, which interact with the regional economy to varying extents: Although universities 
operate in a specific region, seen from a knowledge transfer perspective, the university system has 
more interregional linkages. This is, for instance, emphasised by a rather spatially unbounded co-
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operation behaviour of universities (Beise and Stahl, 1999; Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999).72 Differ-
ently, technical colleges are more embedded in the local economic system, for example, due to 
their co-operation behaviour and a relatively higher share of graduates that remain in the region 
(Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999). Public research institutes (outside universities) are heterogeneous 
and do not always have a regional focus when transferring knowledge to firms (Beise and Stahl, 
1999; Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999). In the following, we focus here on these three groups of re-
search actors and their relevance for localised knowledge transfer to the regional development. 
The amount of public funds that are allocated to research and innovation activities in Germany is 
considerably large. In 2013, €23.198 billion of public funds were spent (BMBF, 2016b) as a means 
to compensate for private under-investments in research and innovation activities. Given the sig-
nificant financial input to public research activities, gaining insight into the explicit regional effects 
of this type of public investment is of strong interest, both scientifically and politically. In the 
conduct of our empirical analysis we thus seek to answer the following research questions: Do 
public research activities foster regional economic development? Which regional economic factors 
are mainly affected by different types of public research activities? And finally, do knowledge 
transfer effects differ between universities, technical colleges and public research institutes? 
Providing answers to these specific research questions shall contribute to a better understanding of 
the overriding question which type of public research activity gives the largest local return to the 
public investment. 
Based on seminal work on the knowledge production function (Jaffe, 1989), impact analyses of the 
effects of universities on regional innovativeness has a long tradition – especially the literature 
                                                 
72 Faggian and McCann (2009) emphasise the interregional flows of university graduates and their impact on regional innovation 
in Britain. 
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focusing on the United States (see Drucker and Goldstein, 2007, and Varga and Horváth 2015, for 
comprehensive reviews of international studies on this topic). However, most quantitative studies 
are primarily focused on exploring the immediate link between university research activities and 
regional innovativeness or output, while they ignore to shed light on the broader regional impacts 
of these public research activities related to employment, physical capital investments or human 
capital. 
For the case of Germany, the economic effects of public research activities have predominantly 
been analysed using single equation regression models and regional data (e.g. Fritsch and 
Slavtchev, 2007; Schubert and Kroll, 2013; Spehl et al., 2007). Existing studies examine the effects 
of public research on regional economic growth in one of two ways: Either they estimate the effect 
of public research on innovativeness in a knowledge production function approach (Fritsch and 
Slavtchev, 2007) or they examine the effects of public research on economic growth directly (Schu-
bert and Kroll, 2013). Both approaches thus restrict the study of knowledge transfers to a partial 
effects analysis. Many other mechanisms, however, can be thought of being relevant for assessing 
the overall effects of public research activities to the regional economy, such as that they attract 
high-skilled jobs to the regions or simply increase regional investments.73 
To deepen our knowledge on the direct and indirect effects of public research on regional economic 
growth, this paper extends the recent literature in two ways: First, with regard to the plurality of 
                                                 
73 Florax and Folmer (1992) provide an excellent summary on the research approaches to analyse the impact of regional university 
knowledge production (including the knowledge production and production function approach). The authors argue that effects on 
regional output do not taking place directly but rather indirectly via investments and thus demand a longer time period to be ob-
served. Instead, the authors propose to use investments as dependent variable since investments properly measure the economic 
relevance of university knowledge production and implicitly involve relocation decisions of firms (Florax and Folmer, 1992). The 
applied econometric approach in this paper explicitly considers such potential indirect effects (e.g. the link between public research 
on output via investments as well as via human capital, employment or patents) and calculates the particular total effect of an 
increase in the publicly funded research on each regional economic factor (including investments). 
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public research activities at the regional level, we take a disaggregated perspective by gathering 
information on alternative indicators for research activities (scientific publications, acquired third-
party funds) of different actors (universities, technical colleges and public research institutes). We 
then link this research actor-activity information to a set of further economic variables such as the 
regional investment rate, human capital, employment and innovation indicators as well as eco-
nomic growth. Second, to the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that uses a systems ap-
proach which allows for the identification of interdependencies among these variables in all kinds 
of directions, including the dependencies of growth-relevant aspects, such as investment and hu-
man capital, on public research as well as of public research activities on regional economic factors. 
Hence, we are able to deal with regional dynamics more adequately by treating all variables as 
endogenous in the regional economic system and by measuring all their mutual interdependencies 
and feedback effects.74 
To this end, a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model is estimated and combined with Im-
pulse Response Functions (IRFs) analyses to identify direct as well as indirect effects of public 
research activities on regional economic variables as well as resulting feedback effects. The VAR 
model covers several variables – namely per capita GDP, employment, investment, human capital, 
innovation output as well as the number of scientific publications and third-party funds as measures 
                                                 
74 Since the data are restricted to the time period 2000 to 2011, we are mainly able to identify short-run effects but cannot observe 
long-run knowledge transfer that may emanate especially from basic research activities conducted at universities (positive returns 
of universities investments may need more time to become measurable). Moreover, we are strongly focused on the research activities 
of universities. However, beyond that, they contribute to regional economy generally in different ways (e.g. Bleany et al., 1992; 
Florax, 1992; Garrido-Yserte and Gallo-Rivera, 2010; Goldstein et al., 1995). 
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for public research activities.75 With regard to the latter, activities from universities, technical col-
leges (Fachhochschulen) and public research institutes (especially Fraunhofer and Max Planck in-
stitutes) are studied separately with regard to their respective linkages to economic variables. 
The remainder of the paper starts by presenting the different types of public research actors in 
Germany and their particular characteristics (Section 5.2). Moreover, potential spillover effects 
from public research and their spatial dimension are discussed. Section 5.3 briefly reviews the 
underlying economic theory and develops research hypotheses. After a brief discussion of the data 
(Section 5.4), the econometric approach (Section 5.5) and the linkage between theoretical and em-
pirical issues is introduced (Section 5.6). Section 5.7 presents the empirical results of the VAR 
analysis. Finally, Section 5.8 summarises the findings and concludes this study.   
5.2 Conceptual background 
5.2.1 The German public research activities in an international context 
Auranen and Nieminen (2010) emphasise the decentralised character of Germany’s university sys-
tem, where federal states enjoy a high degree of political autonomy. Compared to the UK, Aus-
tralia, Finland or Sweden, the German university system is more input-oriented (smaller govern-
mental steering, focus on a sufficient endowment with resources instead of a focus on results and 
efficiency) and receives less external funding. The higher education R&D expenditures (HERD) 
per capita and the ratio from HERD to the German gross domestic expenditures on R&D (GERD) 
are lower compared to countries such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Aus-
tralia and the UK (Auranen and Nieminen, 2010). Moreover, next to universities, technical colleges 
                                                 
75 Per capita GDP is measured in terms of GDP per economically active population. A detailed description of the data used for 
estimation is given in Section 5.4. 
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and public research institutes (outside universities) are additional actors within the publicly funded 
research sector in Germany, whose role is explained in more detail below.   
5.2.2 Publicly funded research institutes and their regional embeddedness 
According to the research and innovation report 2016 of the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF), the German GERD in 2013 accounted for €79.730 billion with €23.198 billion 
being publicly financed (29.1 %). Fund recipients are universities, technical colleges, public re-
search institutes and also business organizations in the private sector. Especially universities and 
technical colleges as well as public research institutes are the major recipients of public support, 
though. Although the latter actors also receive private R&D funds (see BMBF, 2016b, Table 1, pp. 
55-56), for the purpose of this study we define universities, technical colleges and public research 
institutes as core public research actors (a similar definition can be found, for example, in the study 
of Beise and Stahl, 1999).76 
Goldstein et al. (1995) argue that universities contribute to regional development through multiple 
impact channels. Besides investments in the regional physical capital stock and the creation of 
human capital via graduates, universities generate outputs that influence the knowledge and tech-
nological stock. They create basic knowledge, transfer existing know-how to firms and organiza-
tions, provide a basic knowledge infrastructure and may establish an innovative spirit within a 
region (Goldstein et al., 1995). Regarding their research activities, universities conduct mainly 
basic research activities with only moderate immediate intentions of commercialization (Beise and 
Stahl, 1999). The reader should note that this study is solely focussed on research activities and 
                                                 
76 The Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Helmholtz-Gesellschaft, Leibniz-Gemeinschaft and the Akademien der 
Wissenschaften are the largest publicly (co-)funded research institutes. The particular research focus differs among these institutes 
considerably. Moreover, several federal research institutes belong to this group as well (BMBF, 2016a). 
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knowledge transmission of universities thereby ignoring other supply and demand side linkages 
with the regional economy. 
Compared to universities, technical colleges are more focused on teaching and education. They 
conduct, on average, less basic research, while their activities are more focused on applied and 
specialised research in similar technological sectors as regional firms (Beise and Stahl, 1999). This 
link is further stressed in Fritsch and Schwirten (1999) who show that technical colleges – in con-
trast to universities – co-operate more frequently with firms than with other research institutes. 
Finally, technical colleges can be seen as regionally rooted actors, as they predominantly co-oper-
ate with regional firms.77 
Finally, public research institutes have been mainly founded for the purpose of complementing 
university (basic) research and transferring knowledge to firms. While, for instance, Max-Planck 
(MP) institutes are especially focused on doing basic research, Fraunhofer institutes conduct 
mainly applied and contract-based research and foster industrial innovations (Beise and Stahl, 
1999). Hence, research activities conducted by technical colleges and public research institutes – 
especially Fraunhofer institutes – can be seen as more applied and less basic research-orientated 
compared to universities as well as they are more transfer-orientated to the industry. However, as 
shown by Beise and Stahl (1999) and Fritsch and Schwirten (1999), public research institutes do 
not always have an explicit regional focus of co-operating with firms in their geographical vicinity. 
5.2.3 Regional knowledge transmission channels 
Public research actors produce different forms of new knowledge – basic, applied or industry-re-
lated knowledge. Besides providing internal returns to this knowledge creation within the research 
                                                 
77 Fritsch and Schwirten (1999) argue that students from technical colleges are more frequently from the hosting region and they 
also remain more frequently within the region after graduation.  
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sector, their activities may also create knowledge spillovers to firms via several channels. For in-
stance, Beise and Stahl (1999) emphasise the distribution of new knowledge via scientific publica-
tions, joint R&D projects and co-operations, (informal) networks and contacts between public and 
private researchers as well as via hiring university researchers as important transfer channels. Varga 
(2000), among others, additionally emphasises the role of spin-offs, graduates and physical facili-
ties (e.g. libraries) as important knowledge diffusion mechanisms. 
Regarding the spatial dimension of these knowledge spillovers, neoclassical growth models em-
phasise the public good characteristics of knowledge (non-excludable and -rivalry), which implies 
that knowledge spills over frictionless across space (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). However, there are 
several arguments that scrutinise this strong implication of frictionless knowledge spillovers: 
Firstly, public research institutes function as a regional “aerial” (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999, p. 
81). They absorb foreign knowledge, create new knowledge and make it available within their own 
region (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999). Accordingly, it can be expected that knowledge spillovers 
have, at least to some extent, a local context. Secondly, Audretsch and Lehmann (2005) refer to 
geographical (localization) theory and argue that new knowledge does not spill across space readily 
and gratuitously.78  
In fact, the spatial range of knowledge spillovers running from public research inputs to private 
sector research outputs has been discussed controversially in recent years: Beise and Stahl (1999) 
provide an excellent summary of the well-known arguments for the importance of spatial proximity 
between firms and public knowledge sources: On the one hand, effective knowledge transfer is 
based on informal networks and contacts, face-to-face-communication or mutual trust to exchange 
                                                 
78 This may apply even if a certain share of graduates move to other regions (see Faggian and McCann, 2009 for the role of graduate 
migration in the UK). 
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tacit knowledge. On the other hand, the authors also provide arguments against the relevance of 
spatial proximity in this context, for instance, related to modern information and telecommunica-
tion techniques as well as specifically for the case of Germany as subject of this analysis, the rela-
tive low distances within the country compared to larger economies such as the United States as 
well as the dense infrastructure network in Germany (Beise and Stahl, 1999). To sum up, the eco-
nomic effects of public research activities can be expected to partly take place within the region 
and partly work in a distance-free manner across all locations in Germany or even beyond that. 
Due to the empirical approach chosen here, we will focus on identifying the strength of localised 
effects that are specific to the region. 
5.2.4 Effects of regional knowledge spillovers on regional economic development 
The impact of universities on regional knowledge production (new technologies) and development 
has been analysed intensely in different spatial contexts so far. The study by Drucker and Goldstein 
(2007) provides a comprehensive review of international investigations by sub-classifying the stud-
ies according to different methodological approaches.79 The authors argue that case studies provide 
heterogeneous results as they suffer from two major drawbacks: it is difficult to determine causal 
effects of universities’ activities and the results are hardly generalizable. Moreover, studies on the 
co-location behaviour of firms and universities provide ambiguous results (Drucker and Goldstein, 
2007). Finally, the literature reviews given in Drucker and Goldstein (2007) and Varga and Horváth 
(2015) show that a large fraction of empirical studies find positive effects of university activities – 
typically measured by R&D expenditures – on the regional knowledge production.  
                                                 
79 The review by Drucker and Goldstein (2007) also comprises firm-level studies, more recent firm-level studies are for example 
the studies by Barra et al. (2019), Maietta (2015) and Maietta et al. (2017).  
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Several studies have also analysed the role of public research actors (mainly universities and tech-
nical colleges) for regional economic development in Germany. In line with the above mentioned 
international studies, German studies can also be divided into three research strands (a detailed 
survey of the methods and results is provided in Table A5.1 in the Appendix). At first, there is a 
bulk of case studies analysing the demand-side effects of universities on regional income and em-
ployment (e.g. Glorius and Schultz, 2002; Glückler and König, 2011; Spehl et al., 2005, among 
others). The main conclusion from these studies is that universities and technical colleges have 
positive effects on both regional income and on employment.80 
Secondly, various firm-level studies focus on the (spatial) co-operation behaviour between public 
research institutes and firms (e.g. Beise and Stahl, 1999; Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999) and on the 
location decisions of firms to operate in spatial proximity to universities (e.g. Audretsch and Leh-
mann, 2005; Audretsch et al., 2005). Analysing survey data, Beise and Stahl (1999), for instance, 
find that firms see access to public research outputs as a vital element for private research success. 
However, spatial proximity – with the exception of technical colleges – is not as important as in 
the Unites States to gain from research spillovers (Beise and Stahl, 1999). This is in line with the 
results reported in Fritsch and Schwirten (1999), who also conclude that public research institutes 
are vital for private innovation activities. Spatial proximity is seen as an advantage for establishing 
co-operations, with the highest share of regional co-operations being found for technical colleges 
(Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999). Audretsch et al. (2005) highlight that spatial business decisions of 
firms to locate close to universities depends on scientific disciplines (social or natural science) as 
well as on the transfer mechanisms (via publications or the number of students). According to a 
further study by Audretsch and Lehmann (2005), regions with universities that educate a high 
                                                 
80 Table 25 in the study of Glorius and Schultz (2002, p. 32) as well as Table 1 in the study of Spehl et al. (2005, pp. 6-7) give an 
overview of further case studies. 
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amount of students in social and natural sciences and produce a high number of publications (par-
ticularly natural sciences) attract more knowledge-based start-ups. 
Thirdly, a further strand of literature uses data at the regional level to analyse the effects of public 
research institutes on various economic variables (see Table 5.1). Fritsch and Slavtchev (2007) 
analyse the effects of universities (regular and external research funds) on regional patent activity. 
While the intensity of regular funding volumes (base funding) do not have significant effects, ex-
ternal research funding is found to positively affect regional patent applications (Fritsch and 
Slavtchev, 2007).81 In a study for the German federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate, Spehl et al. 
(2007) emphasise that public knowledge and human capital increase gross value added signifi-
cantly. Moreover, the authors find significant effects of public research on the regional patent ac-
tivity (Spehl et al., 2007).82 Finally, using regional data for all German regions, Schubert and Kroll 
(2013) find positive effects of various measures for regional university and technical college activ-
ities, for example on regional GDP per capita, employment and patent applications. 
Summing up, the paper at hand aims at contributing to the analysis of the regional economic effects 
of public research activities by tackling some unresolved issues in the existing empirical literature 
using German regional data, which is mainly focused on the analysis of the direct effects of publicly 
funded research on particular output variables such as regional patents or output (see Table 5.1) 
while neglecting indirect effects between the variables in regional innovation and production sys-
tem. The paper sheds light on the total effects of various publicly funded research measures (pub-
lications, third-party funds) by different public research actors on several economic variables. In 
                                                 
81 Table 3 in the study of Fritsch and Slavtchev (2007, pp.214-215) also summarise the results of (international) studies focusing on 
the elasticities of private sector as well as of university R&D on innovation counts (patents).  
82 Table 2.1 in the study of Spehl et al. (2007. p.6) presents further studies. 
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order to define the functional relationships between public research and regional economic devel-
opment, the subsequent chapter discusses the theoretical framework, variable selection and the de-
rived hypotheses used for our empirical modelling approach. 
Table 5.1 German empirical studies on regional level – unresolved issues 
Authors Data Method Studied public actor(s) Unresolved Issues 
Fritsch and 
Slavtchev (2007) Panel 
data 
(all 
stud-
ies) 
Single 
equation 
models 
(all stud-
ies) 
Universities 1. Effects of public research institutes 
(for all German labour market regions) 
2. System approach: total effects (direct 
plus indirect effects) of public research 
actors on all economic variables in a re-
gional production system 
Spehl et al. 
(2007) 
Universities, technical colleges and Insti-
tutes within the Ministry of Science of 
Rhineland-Palatinate 
Schubert and 
Kroll (2013) Universities and technical colleges 
5.3 Theoretical considerations and research hypotheses 
Theories of economic growth are used to formulate research hypotheses and to impose a causal 
structure linking variables over time. Our main argument is that public research contributes to re-
gional innovativeness (knowledge production function) and that innovation and new products, re-
spectively, contributes to regional growth and development (e.g. Romer, 1990). We also account 
for the fact that this causal chain is not necessarily uni-directional. We therefore propose a modifi-
cation/extension of the standard knowledge production function, which allows incorporating mu-
tual linkages between public research activities and further economic variables in the underlying 
regional economy. The basic elements of the theoretical argumentation are the regional production 
function as well as exogenous and endogenous growth theory. 
5.3.1 Regional production function 
The production function for each region i is given by (Mankiw et al., 1992) 
     Yi = Kiα Hiβ (Ai Li)1-α-β.83          (5.1) 
                                                 
83 Yi is output, Ki physical and Hi human capital, Ai is technology/knowledge and Li denotes labour. 
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With regard to the input factors we define labour Li at time t as 
     Li(t) = λi(t) × Pi(0)enit,          (5.2) 
where λi(t) is the ratio of employed people at time t (constant in the long-run perspective), Pi(t) 
denotes the economically active population from 15 to 64 years and ni is the growth rate of the 
economically active population (Eberle et al., 2019).84 The production function per economically 
active population is then given by 
     yi = kiα hiβ (Aiλi)1-α-β.                      (5.3) 
As shown in Equation (5.3), per capita output is specified as a function of technology, physical and 
human capital as well as the employment rate. Details on the specification of these input factors 
will be given in the following.85 
5.3.2 Technology 
We relax the strict assumption of equal technological growth across regions (e.g. Mankiw et al., 
1992) and permit short-run differences in the technological growth rates gi.86 To derive explicit 
research hypotheses, we start with the endogenous growth approach defined by Romer (1990). The 
model is based on the public good argument of knowledge, but allows for different technological 
growth rates across regions due to its interdependences with human capital devoted to the R&D-
sector (HA) (Romer, 1990) 
                                                 
84 We highly acknowledge a comment from an anonymous reviewer who proposes to use solely unskilled employed persons to 
measure Li. We apply this definition as alternative operationalization in the robustness checks reported in Section 5.7 in order to 
employ a skilled-unskilled dichotomy. 
85 Output, employment and human capital can be measured empirically for German regions, while data on the level of technology 
and physical capital is complex to collect. Thus, we apply technological growth and capital investments instead (e.g. Eberle et al., 
2019). For the remainder of the paper, capital investments are denoted by sk, while technological growth is denoted by gi. 
86 In the long-run perspective, we assume that technology is a public good and technological growth may be approximately the same 
across regions (neoclassical, competitive assumption). 
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.
i = δHA,i Ai  and  
A
.
i
Ai
 = gi = δHA,i,         (5.4) 
where δ indicates a productivity parameter. The research sector in this model is assumed to be 
private, with firms earning income by licensing their research findings (Romer, 1990). In reality, 
however, research is typically conducted by firms and public research actors (see Section 5.2). 
Therefore, we distinguish between these two kinds of research actors. We denote Ai as the eco-
nomically useable research output (proxied through patents) and Ri as the public research activities 
(e.g. publications, third-party funds). We thereby assume that public research activities stimulate 
private research activities and output. In addition, we assume that further input factors in the pro-
duction sector in Equation (5.1) may – to some extent – also be inadvertently productive in the 
regional research sector (e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). 
Consequentially, we define the evolution of regional technological development Ai as  
    gi = δHA,i × ΦRi × w((1-Φ)R~ j) × ρXi.         (5.5) 
In Equation (5.5), the (exogenously given) Ri is a measure for the regional public research activities 
within region i, R~ j denotes the public knowledge created in other regions j, while the spatial 
weighting matrix w measures the spatial connectivity between the set of regions (see Section 5.4 
for further details). Furthermore, Xi controls for other economic variables from the production sec-
tor [e.g. Ki, HY,i, λiPi, Yi]. We follow Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) arguing that these factors may 
be productive in the research sector as well, but, conversely to these authors, we assume that they 
have only inadvertent effects on the research sector, which are measured by the parameter ρ.87 
                                                 
87 The argument is, for example, also in the spirit of Arrow (1962), who states that investments and production have – due to learning 
experiences – also positive (unintended) effects on the stock of knowledge. 
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Moreover, we add these variables as proxies for potential agglomeration effects and the productiv-
ity of region i (see Varga, 2000 for the effects of agglomerations on technology transfer). Conse-
quently, public research can be interpreted as a region-specific productivity parameter in the 
knowledge-production process of private firms, in doing so research institutes make new 
knowledge available to firms.  
To this end, we add the parameter Φ to Equation (5.5), because not all public knowledge created 
locally is transferred to regional firms. Consequently, Φ is fixed between 0 and 1 and measures the 
amount of public research activities that are transferred to firms in region i, while 1-Φ is the amount 
that is transferred to firms in other regions. We assume that Φ depends on the co-operation behav-
iour (the need for spatial proximity for knowledge exchange), the degree of embeddedness in re-
gional (informal) networks (e.g. via graduates) as well as on the form of the newly created 
knowledge (basic vs. applied knowledge).88 Due to their focus on basic research and a rather un-
bounded spatial co-operation behaviour (with primarily larger firms), we expect Φ to be generally 
lower for universities compared to the other public research actors located in the region as they co-
operate with firms farther away (see e.g. Beise and Stahl, 1999; Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999). With 
regard to public research institutes, we expect Φ to be higher for Fraunhofer institutes compared to 
Max Planck institutes since Fraunhofer institutes place a stronger focus on applied industry-related 
research (see Section 5.2). Finally, based on the previous arguments, Φ is expected to be highest 
for technical colleges.   
These considerations can be consolidated to a first hypothesis: 
                                                 
88 Applied research may be based on the technological sectors of regional firms and it may require a higher amount of personal 
interaction for exchange (more tacit). We refer to the seminal study by Boschma (2005) for an extensive discussion of the role of 
(spatial) proximity on knowledge exchange. 
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Hypothesis 5.1 (H5.1): An increase in regional public research activities (Ri) lead to 
higher innovativeness and technological development (gi) in the respective region. The size 
of the effect is expected to vary across the set of research actors (universities, technical 
colleges and public research institutes) with higher effects for public actors focusing on 
applied research and local co-operation activities. 
5.3.3 Physical and Human Capital 
The interaction between technical growth, physical and human capital is based on Mankiw et al. 
(1992) and the associated physical and human capital accumulation dynamics. Consequently, a 
positive change in the technological growth rate gi affects physical and human capital accumulation 
positively as it makes physical and human capital more effective, while investment rates are com-
monly expected to be unaffected (Mankiw et al., 1992).89 This leads to a second hypothesis: 
H5.2: An increase in regional technological development (gi) – triggered by higher public 
research activities (Ri) – leads to a significant positive effect on the stock of human capital 
(hi), while the investment rate of physical capital (sk,i) remains prima facie unaffected. Due 
to their research focus and co-operation behaviour, we assume that this link mainly holds 
for technical colleges and public research institutes (especially Fraunhofer). 
5.3.4 Employment rate 
A continuous effect on the employment rate can only occur if a change in the technological growth 
rate affects aggregate supply on regional labour markets.90 An increase in the labour-augmenting 
                                                 
89 Positive externalities of public research may lead to higher levels of regional output (yi) and physical capital (ki), while the ratio 
of saved and re-invested capital from the generated output (here: investment rate, sk) is assumed to be constant. An increase in the 
output implies an increase in total investments and thus a fixed investment ratio.  
90 In exogenous growth models labour supply grows constantly and technological change has no effect on the development of labour 
(e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992; Solow, 1956). Romer (1990) also assumes that the supply of labour Li is fixed. 
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technology (see Equation 5.3) makes labour more effective (higher marginal productivity), in-
creases demand for labour and, thus, wages and employment (if the supply curve of labour is not 
vertical).  
Implied higher wages may attract more labour from outside the region (inducing in-migration). 
Niebuhr et al. (2012) provide a detailed survey of theoretical approaches showing how mobility 
may influence labour supply and demand. Neoclassical labour market theory assumes that migra-
tion mainly affects labour supply and works towards spatial convergence, because migration to 
high-wage regions puts the wages in these regions under pressure or – if wages are rigid – generates 
unemployment (Niebuhr et al., 2012). Moreover, a higher labour supply may lead to over-conges-
tion and, thus, to negative effects on utilities (Varga, 2017). Hence, growth of labour supply would 
occur only temporarily. However, this does not seem in line with the recent development of em-
ployment rate in Germany. For instance, Suedekum (2005) adds unemployment to a new economic 
geography model to show that migration also affects regional labour demand. This would lead to 
a spatial polarization of wages and (un)employment rates (Suedekum, 2005). 
Merging these arguments, we can formulate the following hypothesis: 
H5.3: As argued in H5.1, an increase in regional public research activities Ri increases the 
private regional innovation output (gi). This increases the demand for labour and results 
in significant positive effects on the regional employment rate (λi). 
5.3.5 Output 
According to the production function in Equation (5.3), the growth of regional output can be for-
mulated as a function of the input factors as 
     
y. i
yi
 = (1-α-β) 
A
.
i
Ai
+ (1-α-β) 
λ
.
i
λi
+ α
k
.
i
ki
+ β
h
.
i
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,        (5.6) 
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which immediately translates into our fourth hypothesis: 
H5.4: An increase in regional public research activities (Ri) triggers a positive change in 
the private innovation output gi (H5.1), the stock of human capital hi (H5.2) and the em-
ployment rate λi (H5.3). These input-related effects are then expected to translate into pos-
itive overall effects on regional economic output (yi). As already stated above, these effects 
are expected to be particularly significant for certain public research actors such as tech-
nical colleges and public research institutes with a focus on applied research and local 
knowledge transfer. 
5.4 Data 
We build a panel data covering 258 labour market regions in Germany in the period 2000 to 2011. 
We use the classification of labour market regions provided by the Federal Institute for Research 
on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR), which aims at harmonising the place 
of residence and place of work of German population by explicitly considering the commuting 
traffic across small-scale regions (Landkreise). Our choice of using local labour markets as the 
underlying regional scale for the empirical analysis thus aims at reducing measurement errors that 
stem from the fact that local residents produce output in another regions as they are living. Alt-
hough the used labour market regions are defined functionally, they are obtained by merging ad-
ministrative districts (Landkreise), which causes them to be not the best choice in some places. 
However, due to data availability a better definition of functional regions is not available for the 
purpose of this study. 
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Table 5.2 Variables and data sources 
Shortcut Definition Data source 
 lgdp Nominal GDP per economically active population (ln): 
[GDP in € / (Population aged between 15 and 64 × years Participa-
tion rate)] 
Note: Population data is based on the extrapolation of the census 
1987. The participation rate is based on the same population data till 
the year 2011. From 2011, the participation rate is calculated based 
on the population data of the census 2011.  
GDP: Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Ge-
samtrechnungen der Länder" (Status: August 
2015) 
Population aged between 15 and 64 years: 
Regionaldatenbank Deutschland (Based on the 
population census 1987) 
Participation rate: Statistik der Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit / Indikatoren und Karten zur Raum- 
und Stadtentwicklung (INKAR) 
linvq Private sector physical capital investments (industry investments in 
the manufacturing, mining and quarrying sector) as share of the 
nominal GDP (ln): 
[Industry Investments in € / GDP in €] 
Note: Missing values of the industry investments have been inter-
polated on the basis of an autoregressive process with 3 lags. 
Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt-, und Raumfor-
schung (BBSR), laufende Raumbeobachtungen, 
various issues 
lhk Higher education rate (ln): 
[Employees with university degree / (Population aged between 15 
and 64 years × Participation rate)]. 
Note: All alleged data imperfections related to the qualification of 
employees (human capital) are assumed to be random and do not 
systematically bias the results. 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nu-
remberg 
lemp Employment rate (ln): 
[Employees total / (Population aged between 15 and 64 years × Par-
ticipation rate)] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nu-
remberg 
lemp_ns Non-skilled employment rate (ln): 
[(Employees total - Employees with university degree) / (Population 
aged between 15 and 64 years × Participation rate)] 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nu-
remberg 
lpat Patent rate* (ln): 
[Patents region i / ∑ Patents Germany] 
Own calculation from the PATSTAT database 
(Version October 2014, European Patent Of-
fice) 
lpubli_X Publication Rate* (ln):  
[Publications X region i / ∑ Total Publications X Germany] 
X = Higher education institutes (hei), universities (uni), technical 
colleges (fh), public research institutes (ri), Fraunhofer (fraun) and 
Max-Planck (mp) institutes.  
Note: Public research institutes include MP, Fraunhofer, Helmholtz 
and Leibniz institutes. Higher education institutes include universi-
ties and technical colleges. 
Own calculation from the Web Of Science data-
base 
ltpf_X Third-Party Fund Rate* (ln): 
[Third-Party Funds X region i / ∑ Third-Party Funds X Germany] 
X = Receiving institute (hei, uni, fh) and source of fund: total funds 
(no suffix), public funds (pub) and industry funds (ind) 
Note: Public third-party funds are the sum of funds from the Bund, 
Federal States, municipalities, German Federal Labour Market Au-
thority, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), EU and other 
public investors (the dataset contains one negative value of the pub-
lic third-party funds, which was replaced by 0.25). Total Funds are 
the sum of private and public funds as well as from funds from foun-
dations. 
Statistisches Bundesamt (Germany) 
 
w_varia-
bles 
Spatial lags for each variable are constructed in absolute values us-
ing the STATA command splagvar. All spatial lag variables are nor-
malised and ln-transformed similar to the non-spatial variables.  
 
* In order to take the ln, we added 0.25 to each observation of the variable before normalization because zero values are included. 
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Table 5.2 shows the construction of variables and corresponding data sources. All variables are 
specified as intensities and are transformed by the natural logarithm. Public research activities are 
proxied by the number of publications of universities, technical colleges and public research insti-
tutes as well as third-party funds received by universities and technical colleges. Unfortunately, no 
data on acquired third-party funds are available for public research institutes. As publications are 
taken from the Web of Science, the data place a relatively strong weight on scientific publications 
compared to other types of research outlets such as technical reports, etc. Summary statistics for 
variables are reported in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Summary statistics 
  Shortcut Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Economic variables           
GDP per economically active population  gdp 49341.59 12938.38 22936.38 116626.4 
Physical capital investment rate invq 0.0254 0.0167 0.0027 0.2240 
Higher education rate hk 0.0566 0.0291 0.0155 0.2067 
Employment rate  emp 0.6141 0.0901 0.3902 0.9473 
Non-skilled employment rate emp_ns 0.5575 0.0752 0.3581 0.8911 
Patent rate pat 0.0039 0.0085 1.29E-05 0.1007 
Publications           
Publication rate higher education institutes publi_hei 0.0039 0.0101 4.77E-06 0.0911 
Publication rate universities publi_uni 0.0039 0.0101 4.80E-06 0.0918 
Publication rate technical colleges publi_fh 0.0039 0.0067 0.0005 0.0523 
Publication rate public research institutes publi_ri 0.0039 0.0154 3.81E-05 0.1954 
Publication rate Fraunhofer institutes publi_fraun 0.0039 0.0145 0.0003 0.2118 
Publication rate Max-Planck institutes publi_mp 0.0039 0.0169 0.0001 0.2182 
Third-Party Funds           
          Received by Higher Education Institutes            
Third-party fund rate higher education institutes tpf_hei 0.0039 0.0099 4.85E-08 0.1122 
Industry third-party fund rate higher education institutes tpf_hei_ind 0.0039 0.0110 2.53E-07 0.1140 
Public third-party fund rate higher education institutes tpf_hei_pub 0.0039 0.0099 6.56E-08 0.1168 
          Received by Universities           
Third-party fund rate universities tpf_uni 0.0039 0.0102 5.27E-08 0.1166 
Industry third-party fund rate universities tpf_uni_ind 0.0039 0.0116 2.88E-07 0.1232 
Public third-party fund rate universities tpf_uni_pub 0.0039 0.0101 7.06E-08 0.1199 
          Received by Technical colleges           
Third-party fund rate technical colleges tpf_fh 0.0039 0.0092 6.07E-07 0.1215 
Industry third-party fund rate technical colleges tpf_fh_ind 0.0039 0.0092 2.12E-06 0.0925 
Public third-party fund rate technical colleges tpf_fh_pub 0.0039 0.0114 9.29E-07 0.1770 
Notes: Number of Regions = 258 and t = 12. Normalised values are presented (before taking the ln). We added 0.25 to each 
observation of variables containing zero values before normalization (applies for pat, all publi- and tpf-variables). Suffix "_pub" 
indicates third party funds from public authorities and "_ind" third party funds from the industry. See Table 5.2 for details on 
variable description. 
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With regard to the statistical properties of our data, we are concerned with non-stationarity of var-
iables over time as well as cross-sectional dependence, which may both affect the estimation re-
sults. In order to test for the degree of non-stationarity within our data, we apply a panel unit root 
test proposed by Im et al. (2003) (henceforth: IPS). Table A5.2 in the Appendix shows that this is 
a serious problem, especially for variables measuring public research activities. Thus, we detrend 
all variables that are non-stationary in their levels. The results of the IPS test highlights that 
detrended variables reject the null hypothesis of containing unit roots.  
Moreover, with the exception of public research activities (see Section 5.3), the role of spatial 
dependencies has not been discussed so far. Nevertheless, we generate spatial lags for all variables 
and include them in all regression specification in order to capture underlying spatial spillovers and 
thus avoid an omitted variable bias. We use a binary first-order neighbourhood matrix to build 
spatial lags (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019). Matrix elements wij have the following properties 
   w*ij = 0 if i = j and i and j ≠ common border         (5.7) 
w*ij = 1 if i ≠ j and i and j = common border 
wij = w*ij/ ∑j w*ij. 
In Equation (5.7) w*ij denotes a particular element of an unstandardised weighting matrix, while 
wij denotes a particular element of a normalised weighting matrix (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019). We 
follow the approach presented in the study by Eberle et al. (2019) and normalise the matrix ele-
ments by dividing them with the column sum. The theoretical arguments for spillovers from public 
research activities also imply potential effects beyond neighbouring regions. However, effects of 
public research activities that occur independent of spatial distance should partly be captured by 
the time-fixed effects in our regression specifications. 
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5.5 Econometric modelling: Spatial panel VAR and impulse response functions 
To analyse the economic effects of public research activities on a regional economic system, we 
estimate a spatial panel VAR (SpPVAR) model (see, for example, Beenstock and Felsenstein, 
2007; Di Giacinto, 2010; Eberle et al., 2019; Mitze et al., 2018; Monteiro, 2010; Ramajo et al., 
2017). 
As argued above, earlier studies of the relationship between public research and regional economic 
growth usually estimate a one or two regression equation model. In the case of two equations, 
economic growth is assumed to depend on innovation and innovation is assumed to depend on 
public research. Such an approach has two limitations. First, there is a strong endogeneity problem 
since the innovation activity also depends on economic development and, especially on the regional 
level, public research responds to the economic and innovative activity within the region. Second, 
public research has not only an effect on the innovation output but may also directly influence 
human capital, employment and investment in the region. The SpPVAR model captures potential 
two-way interdependencies between all variables, reducing both limitations. First, endogeneity is 
explicitly considered in the model. This allows for Granger causal statements, given that all rele-
vant variables are considered and the correct causal structure at time t is used (e.g. Hoover, 2012 
for a discussion of structural VAR models and causality). Second, effects on other economic vari-
ables are explicitly considered in the structural VAR approach. Thus, besides modelling the trans-
mission channels that are discussed in Section 5.3, the SpPVAR approach allows us to detect ad-
ditional transmission channels and, thus, deepen the insights on the transmission mechanisms of 
public research activities in the regional economic system. 
Our system contains six equations including the subsequent dependent variables: 1) higher educa-
tion rate (human capital), 2) rate of public research activities, 3) patent rate, 4) physical capital 
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investment rate 5) employment rate and 6) GDP per (economically active) population. The struc-
tural SpPVAR – a specification with orthogonalised errors and contemporaneous relations – can 
be expressed in terms of a spatially augmented model as (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019) 
     Byt= µ + τt + CLyt-1+ GLWyt-1+ Det.        (5.8) 
In Equation (5.8), the vector yt	comprises the described endogenous variables, 	denotes a vector 
of regional fixed effects, while t indicates a vector of time-fixed effects (which captures nation-
wide economic shocks and technological progress that is not restricted to specific regions), the 
matrix B comprises contemporaneous coefficients, while CL and GL are matrices of polyno-
mials associating contemporaneous to (space-)time lagged variables, D relates contemporaneous 
shocks to the endogenous variables and the vector et describes orthogonal errors (e.g. Eberle et al., 
2019, Keating, 1992; Mitze et al., 2018 or Rickman, 2010.91 
In terms of estimating the system (in a reduced-form specification), the standard fixed effects (FE) 
estimator is biased due to the inclusion of time lags of the particular dependent variable (e.g. Nick-
ell, 1981).92 Thus, we use a bootstrap-based corrected FE estimator that has been originally pro-
posed by Everaert and Pozzi (2007). To visualise the estimated mean effects together with 95% 
                                                 
91 The coefficient matrix CL	denotes spatially direct, while GL	denotes spatially indirect effects of shocks in yt-1 on yt (e.g. 
Eberle et al., 2019). The analysis here is focused on the IRFs that are based on the spatially direct effects C(L), while G(L) is 
primarily used to control for an omitted variables bias and to get unbiased coefficients in the regression models (see explanation in 
Section 5.4). We refer to the work of Elhorst (2012) for more information on dynamic spatial panel techniques for single equation 
models and to Mitze et al. (2018) for VAR approaches. 
92 In fact, the temporal spatial lag Wyt-1 is also biased using a FE estimator. Wooldridge (2012) emphasises that the inclusion of 
one biased coefficient may also bias all other coefficients. Thus, we run robust checks for every model excluding the temporal 
spatial lag from the particular regression in order to control for this issue. The results indicate that the bias is negligible as the IRFs 
are not significantly different from the basic approach. 
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confidence intervals, we compute IRFs measuring the response of a particular variable to an iso-
lated shock in the rate of public research activities (Lütkepohl, 2005). Confidence intervals for 
these IRFs are calculated from Monte Carlo (MC) simulations (Love and Zicchino, 2006). 
5.6 Linkage between theoretical and empirical considerations 
To ensure identification, we need to stipulate the underlying causal structure of contemporaneous 
effects (B matrix) between variables (Rickman, 2010). Based on the theoretical argumentation pre-
sented in Section 5.3, we determine the subsequent recursive causal order at time t: 
 
                 (5.9) 
 
 
The recursive order in Equation (5.9) can be interpreted in the following way: human capital on 
the outmost left side has contemporaneous effects on the remaining variables in the regional eco-
nomic system, while it is not subject to contemporaneous feedback effects from other variables 
(which only occurs with a time lag). The degree of endogeneity increases the more we move to the 
right side of Equation (5.9). Thus, in similar veins, public research activities have contemporaneous 
effects on all regional variables – except on the human capital variable – but are only affected by 
(potential) feedback effects from these variables with a time lag. Finally, the variable on the ulti-
mate right side of Equation (5.9) – GDP per economically active population (workforce) – is con-
temporaneously affected by all other variables in period t but has only time lagged (feedback) ef-
fects on these variables as it is uni-directionally determined by regional input factors at time t and, 
therefore, the most endogenous variable in our production system.  
  lhkt     lpubli(ltpf)t         lpatt linvqt               lempt  lgdpt. 
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Accordingly, the ordering of the first three variables follows the logic of a knowledge production 
function as shown in Equation (5.5), where human capital and publicly funded research are the 
main input factors, while the other factors have only (time-lagged) effects, whose magnitude are 
ex-ante unclear.93 Moreover, a policy-induced increase in the TFP may have effects on regional 
employment, physical capital investments and regional production (e.g. Varga, 2017; see H5.2 to 
H5.4 in this study). Regarding these variables, we follow Eberle et al. (2019) and expect that con-
temporaneous capital investment decisions are primarily done ex-ante, while, in turn, a change in 
the employment is rather done on an ex-post basis.  
5.7 Empirical results  
5.7.1 Regional economic effects of publication activities 
Since the SpPVAR approach covers direct and indirect effects within the endogenous regional 
economic system, the complete effect of changes in one variable on another variable cannot be 
grasped by simply looking at the estimated regression coefficients. As a consequence, IRFs (im-
pulse response functions) are used for illustrating the reaction of per workforce output and factor 
inputs to an increase in public research activities in terms of a standard deviation “shock” of the 
latter variables (in order to interpret the responses as percentage measures, we multiply the esti-
mated responses by 100).94  
 
 
                                                 
93 This is in line with the initial model by Romer (1990) or the argumentation by Varga (2017), who states that innovation policies 
and human capital, respectively, affect technological progress that can be expressed through the total factor productivity (TFP). 
Moreover, by using human capital, publicly funded research (publications, third-party funds) can be considered as next step in the 
sharing of knowledge that afterwards moves to a commercialization phase (innovations measured by patents). 
94 Regression results of each SpPVAR model and non-significant IRFs regarding public research activities are available upon re-
quest.  
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Figure 5.1 IRFs for response of variables to shock in publication activity of public research institutes 
a. Employment rate (lemp) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Non-skilled employment rate (lemp_ns) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions are based on the SpPVAR system incorporating the variables shown in Table 5.2 and the esti-
mated coefficients. Solid lines are IRFs and dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals (CI) generated from Monte Carlo simulations 
with 200 repetitions. 
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The IRF results indicate that the responses of regional economic variables to a temporary, i.e. one-
period, increase in the publication activity of universities in period t are statistically insignificant. 
Carefully speaking, this finding points to the fact that universities conduct mainly basic research 
and that knowledge disseminates across regional boundaries. Surprisingly, the effects of a positive 
“shock” in the publication activity of technical colleges are also non-significant. The same result 
also holds if we aggregate the publication rate of universities and technical colleges (henceforth: 
higher education institutes, HEIs). The latter aggregation would allow covering scale effects of 
different HEIs being located in one region. 
With regard to the results of a one-period change in the publication activity of public research 
institutes, the results of the IRFs in Panel a of Figure 5.1 indicate that an increase in the publication 
activity has significant positive effects on the regional investment and employment rate.95 Different 
from Panel a, the robustness-checks in Panel b show, however, that the positive effect on the non-
skilled employment rate is non-significant. This finding may point to positive effects of public 
research institutes on skilled persons, even if the response of the human capital is non-significant.96 
As stated in Section 5.2, Fraunhofer institutes conduct more applied and innovation-orientated 
R&D, while MP institutes complement mainly university research. However, we do not find any 
significant differences between MP and Fraunhofer institutes when we disaggregate their publica-
tion activities. There are two ways to interpret these disaggregate findings: First, there are no sig-
nificant difference in the knowledge transfer of public research actors; second, and potentially more 
                                                 
95 All of the IRFs in this paper are based on the SpPVAR system in Table 5.2 and the associated estimated coefficients. The time 
dimension – measured by years – is displayed on the x-axis, while the response to a one standard deviation shock is displayed on 
the y-axis [multiplied by 100, in %]. 
96 Using the non-skilled employment rate instead of the employment rate reveals no differences regarding the significance of the 
remaining results in this study. Thus, in the remainder of the paper, we solely present the results of the models that uses the em-
 197 
 
 
likely, publication data can only be seen as an imperfect indicator to measure public research ac-
tivities, particularly when the data are disaggregated by public research actors. This disaggregation 
problem becomes visible when we contrast the disaggregated results with aggregated effects 
summed over all types of actors, which show significant effects on the regional economy.97 At the 
same time, this finding may also indicate that the right mix of public research activities is decisive 
for observing positive output effects in the regional economy. 
5.7.2 Regional economic effects of third-party funded public research activities 
Next, we present the results of the SpPVAR models and the associated IRFs using the volume of 
acquired third-party funds of universities and technical colleges as indicator for the strength of their 
public research efforts activities (unfortunately no funding data are available for public research 
institutes). Different from the publication data, we are able to distinguish between overall funding 
volumes, on the one hand, and public as well as private third-party funding volumes, on the other 
hand.98 Hence, we are able to analyse public research activities more precisely by not only detan-
gling public actors (universities and technical colleges) but also the sources of funds. 
The selected IRFs of the SpPVAR model in Figure 5.2 highlight the growth effects of a positive 
one standard deviation-“shock” in public third-party funding received by universities and technical 
colleges combined (higher education institutes). An increase of public third-party funds leads – 
after a phasing-in process of roughly five years – to a significant positive increase in the regional 
patent rate. Moreover, the temporary rise in public third-party funds also leads to a significant 
increase in the employment rate and to a significant increase in the output per workforce. These 
                                                 
97 In addition to the MP and Fraunhofer institutes, public research institutes also contain the publications of Helmholtz and Leibniz 
institutes (see Table 5.2). 
98 Please note, total funds are the sum of private as well as of public funds and funds provided by foundations, which are not analysed 
separately in this paper. In the remainder of the paper, we mainly discuss total and public third-party funds, because the findings 
for private third-party funds are continuously non-significant. 
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findings provide support for the hypotheses H5.1, H5.3 and H5.4.99 Conversely, a positive shock 
to overall and private third-party funds received by HEIs does not go along with any significant 
changes in regional variables. 
Figure 5.2 IRFs for response of variables to shock in public third-party funds of higher education institutes (universi-
ties and technical colleges combined) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions are based on the SpPVAR system incorporating the variables shown in Table 5.2 and the esti-
mated coefficients. Solid lines are IRFs and dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals (CI) generated from Monte Carlo simulations 
with 200 repetitions. 
As stated in H5.1 to H5.4, we expect that the growth effects illustrated in Figure 5.2 are mainly 
driven by research efforts of technical colleges. The responses to a temporary increase in third-
                                                 
99 This findings support the results of Schubert and Kroll (2013), who find also significant net effects on the GDP per capita, the 
unemployment and the patent rate.  
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party funding (overall, public, private funds) received by universities do not show significant ef-
fects, thereby supporting our previous findings using the publication intensity of universities. This 
is in line with expectations based on the studies of Beise and Stahl (1999) and Fritsch and Schwirten 
(1999) regarding the conducted research, graduates and co-operation behaviour of universities. 
In turn, the IRFs presented in the upper part of Figure 5.3 indicate that a change (“shock”) in the 
overall third-party funds received by technical colleges increases the investment rate significantly 
in the short run. The effects on the employment rate and output are very small and insignificant, 
while the effects on the regional patent rate (after a phasing-in of roughly one year) and the human 
capital are positive (both are statistically insignificant, though, which might be caused by the 
smaller number for technical colleges).  
In line with the overall results for the higher education institutes, private funds allocated to tech-
nical colleges do not have any significant regional effects. In contrast, a temporary rise in public 
third-party funds to technical colleges increases, on average, the stock of human capital and the 
employment rate significantly (H5.2 and H5.3 confirmed). In contrast to the findings for public 
third-party funds received by higher education institutes (Figure 5.2), we find positive, but insig-
nificant effects on the regional patent rate and the output in this setting (H5.1 and H5.4 not con-
firmed). Carefully speaking, this result may point to the fact that positive effects on a region’s 
patent rate may depend on the right mix of public sector research activities. 
Table 5.4 summarises the results of the analysis conducted in this paper. We find at least some 
statistical support for regional effects of public research activities on all five economic variables, 
namely investment, employment rate, stock of human capital, patent activity and economic output 
studied in the paper. Hence, our hypotheses are, at least, partly confirmed. 
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Figure 5.3 IRFs for response of variables to shock in third-party funds of technical colleges 
a. Overall third-party funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Public third-party funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions are based on the SpPVAR system incorporating the variables shown in Table 5.2 and the esti-
mated coefficients. Solid lines are IRFs and dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals (CI) generated from Monte Carlo simulations 
with 200 repetitions. 
 201 
 
 
Moreover, several details are worth discussing: First, we find little effects of publication activities. 
Publications seem not to reflect the interaction with the regional economy well. Publications are a 
more adequate measure for basic research, which is less regional bounded and less connected to 
the economic activity. In the case of public research institutes, publications have been the only 
available measure and have shown some significant effects. 
Second, the results for third-party funding show that technical colleges have a stronger positive 
effect on the regional economy than universities. All settings incorporating universities do not in-
dicate any significant regional effects. For technical colleges a number of positive effects are de-
tected, which may be explained by the higher regional embeddedness, the higher share of graduates 
remaining in the region and the co-operation behaviour. Hence, the higher relevance of technical 
colleges for the regional economy is clearly confirmed.100 
Third, distinguishing between public and private third-party funds leads to an interesting result: 
We do not find any positive effect of private third-party funds. One could have expected that private 
third-party funds come to a large extent from firms and therefore signal applied research. However, 
public third-party funds clearly translate into positive effects for the regional economy. Our inter-
pretation is as follows: Many public research funds target joint innovation projects between firms 
and public research institutes (including universities and technical colleges). It might well be that 
these joint research projects build a channel for knowledge transfer between public institutes and 
private actors, often within a region, that finally leads to economic effects. As a consequence, we 
are able to also find positive effects of such publicly funded research on the regional patent activity 
                                                 
100 As explained in the introduction, returns on university investments may be expected to take longer to be realised. This exercise 
remains open for future research. 
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and economic output. Similarly, we find some evidence that the right mix of public research activ-
ities in the region may influence the strength of the observed effects.  
Table 5.4 Findings of the conducted SpPVAR models and their associated IRFs                                        
Regional effects of changes in the publication rate 
 
lpat lhk linvq lemp lgdp 
Higher education institutes (lpubli_hei) (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) 
Universities (lpubli_uni) (-) (o) (o) (+) (o) 
Technical colleges (lpubli_fh) (-) (o) (+) (o) (-) 
Public Research Institutes (lpubli_ri) (+) (+) + 
+ 
((+) for 
lemp_ns) 
(-) 
Regional effects of changes in third-party fund rate  
 
lpat lhk linvq lemp lgdp 
Third-party fund rate higher education insti-
tutes (ltpf_hei) (o) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Public third-party fund rate higher educa-
tion institutes (ltpf_hei_pub) 
 
+ 
 
(+) (+) + + 
Third-party fund rate universities 
(ltpf_uni) (o) (+) (o) (+) (+) 
Public third-party fund rate universities 
(ltpf_uni_pub) (-) (+) (o) (+) (+) 
Third-party fund rate technical colleges  
(ltpf_fh) (+) (+) + (o) (o) 
Public third-party fund rate technical col-
leges (ltpf_fh_pub) (+) + (+) + (+) 
Notes: + positive, o neutral, - negative, ( ) non-significant effect, + significant effect. 
5.8 Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the regional economic effects of public research activities in Germany 
with a focus on their short-run dynamics. We have extended the recent literature on the transmis-
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sion channels of knowledge transfer by distinguishing between different actor-activity combina-
tions when analysing the linkages between public research and regional economic variables. By 
estimating a SpPVAR approach and applying IRF analysis, we have explicitly considered the sim-
ultaneous relationship between the regional variables. 
We find that especially the volume of public third-party funds received by local public research 
actors has positive effects on the regional economic activity. This might be caused by the fact that 
often public funds are given to collaborations between private actors and public institutes. Hence, 
we conclude that such funds might be especially helpful to make public research activities an ef-
fective means of development within their region. We find that regional economic effects are larger 
for technical colleges compared to universities. This can be interpreted such that technical colleges 
use the collaboration potential within the region more extensively compared to universities (e.g. 
due to the focus on applied research and the job market behaviour of graduates that remain more 
often in the region). We also get some evidence that the strength of regional economic responses 
to an increase in public research activities depends on the right mix of public research activities, 
i.e. the joint presence of different research actors in a region. 
The empirical results do not provide evidence that research conducted at universities has a signifi-
cant immediate effect on the local economic activity. This is in line with theoretical expectations 
and may reflect their focus on basic research and mainly inter-regional co-operations. However, 
the effects of universities on the regional economy may become significant in the long run. We 
also find significant positive effects of the research activity of public research institutes. Here, an 
increase in the publication rate stimulates regional investments as well as the employment rate. 
From the results of this study we may carefully draw the following policy implication: If policy 
makers aim at strengthening the short-run regional economic effects of public research activities, 
this should be done through an increase in the direct interaction between public research actors and 
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firms. Public funds for collaborations of these actors seem to be a good tool to foster regional 
development. The regional effects of research conducted by universities seems to be currently low, 
but this might change if the collaboration behaviour of universities changes. Moreover, one also 
needs to consider that higher education institutes, particularly universities, obviously have signifi-
cant supply- and demand-side linkages with the regional economy beyond the level of research 
activities (see, for instance, Bleany et al., 1992; Florax, 1992; Garrido-Yserte and Gallo-Rivera, 
2010). Although these general income and expenditure effects should be considered when as-
sessing the overall regional importance of research and higher education institutions, they were not 
in the focus of our empirical investigation.   
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A5. Appendix 
Table A5.1. Recent empirical studies on the regional economic effects of public research 
Authors 
Data and econometric 
approach Regional Unit 
Outcome Variable(s), 
Questionnaire question(s)  (Significant) Effects 
Beise and 
Stahl 
(1999) 
Cross-sectional data (1993-
1996), Probit model (Maxi-
mum-Likelihood-Estima-
tor (MLE)), multiple linear 
regression model (Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) Esti-
mator) 
Approximately 
2300 firms from 
the Mannheim In-
novation Panel 
(MIP) 
Outcome variables: public-research-based innova-
tion, Distances between firm and the public re-
search institute 
Questionnaire: Share of companies with innova-
tions which could not have been developed without 
recent public research (%) between 1993 and 1996; 
Distribution of sources without which innovations 
from 1993 to 1996 could not have been developed 
(%); Size distribution of firms with innovations in-
troduced between 1993 and 1996 which could not 
have been developed in the absence of public re-
search (%); Average share of sales of new prod-
ucts, which could not have been developed in the 
absence of public research (%); Estimated sales 
with new products introduced between 1993 and 
1996, which would not have been developed with-
out public research, Distance between firm and 
cited public research institution 
Public research contributes to product and process innova-
tions of firms in Germany. Especially the size of firms and 
their own research intensity increase the probability of inno-
vations related to public research. Proximity to research in-
stitutes is only of minor importance, only technical colleges 
are more likely to have a regional priority. 
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Table A5.1 (continued) 
Authors 
Data and econometric 
approach Regional Unit 
Outcome Variable(s), 
Questionnaire question(s) (Significant) Effects 
Fritsch 
and 
Schwirten 
(1999) 
1020 Questionnaires filled 
out by professorships at 
universities, technical col-
leges and non-university 
public research institutes 
(overall response rate 41 
%), Chi-square tests 
3 Regions: Baden, 
Hannover-Bruns-
wick-Göttingen, 
Saxony 
Questionnaire: Forms of co-operation between 
public research institutions and private firms, Co-
operation between public research institutions and 
private firms by type of innovation and stage of the 
innovation process, Regional distribution of the co-
operation partners, Forms of co-operation between 
public research institutions, Regional distribution 
of co-operation partners (other public research in-
stitutions)  
Publicly financed research institutes do contribute to the innova-
tion process of firms (mostly to early stages by developing new 
ideas). Co-operations across publicly funded research institutes 
are important as well, especially for universities. Spatial proxim-
ity is more important for co-operations between public and pri-
vate actors, than across public institutes. This applies especially 
for technical colleges.  
Glorius 
and 
Schultz 
(2002) 
Case Study Martin Luther 
University Halle-Witten-
berg 
Administrative 
district Halle 
Outcome variables: Regional income and employ-
ment effects 
Regarding direct and indirect effects, the existence of the univer-
sity contributes to an income of 369.1 Mio. Deutsche Mark per 
year and creates 7.060 jobs within the region.  
Audretsch 
et al. 
(2005) 
Cross-sectional data (1997-
2002), multiple linear re-
gression model (OLS Esti-
mator and Least Absolute 
Deviation (LAD) Estima-
tor) 
281 high-technol-
ogy firms 
Outcome variable: Distance (kilometres of a firm 
to the closest university): natural logarithm, abso-
lute number of kilometres, Median and 92% per-
centile  
Geographical proximity to universities matters for firm location. 
Firms locate closer to universities the more publications they 
have in social sciences and the more students they educate in 
natural sciences. In turn, higher publications in natural sciences 
and students in social sciences allow firms to locate more far 
away from universities. 
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Table A5.1 (continued) 
Authors 
Data and econometric 
approach Regional Unit 
Outcome Variable(s), 
Questionnaire question(s) (Significant) Effects 
Audretsch 
and Leh-
mann 
(2005) 
Cross-sectional data (1997-
2002), Binominal regres-
sion model (MLE) 
281 high-technol-
ogy firms and 54 
universities 
Outcome variable: Number of high-tech start-ups 
located closest to a university 
The results emphasise that start-ups locate often within spatial 
proximity to universities. The number of firms closely located to 
a university is influenced by the number of students in natural 
and social sciences, the publications in natural sciences and the 
regional absorptive capacity. These results also depend on the 
particular industry. 
Spehl et 
al. (2005) 
Case Study Federal State 
Rhineland-Palatinate 
Federal State 
Rhineland-Palati-
nate 
Outcome variables: Turnover, value added and 
employment effects 
The multiplier analysis (Input-Output-Analysis) shows that the 
total turnover effect amounts to €1.480 million (€1.280 Mio.), 
while the effect on the value added (income effect) is approxi-
mately €890 million (€440 Mio.). Finally, 20.240 (18.650) full 
time jobs are created. 
Fritsch 
and 
Slavtchev 
(2007) 
Panel data (1995-2000), 
sum of private sector and 
university R&D for neigh-
bouring regions are in-
cluded, multiple negative-
binomial regression model 
(Fixed- (FE) and Random 
Effects (RE) Estimator) 
West German 
NUTS-3 regions 
(Kreise) 
Outcome variable: Patent applications Regular funds to universities (sources for teaching, training or 
equipment) that are allocated based on the amount of personnel 
and students, do not have significant effects. External funds to 
universities received from private firms, government depart-
ments or the German Science Foundation have significant posi-
tive effects on regional patent activity. 
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Table A5.1 (continued) 
Authors 
Data and econometric 
approach Regional Unit 
Outcome Variable(s), 
Questionnaire question(s) (Significant) Effects 
Spehl et 
al. (2007) 
Panel data (1995-2003), 
Technological growth (pa-
tents) and academic staff in 
the neighbouring regions 
are considered, multiple 
linear regression model 
(General-Least-Squares 
(GLS), FE- and RE-Esti-
mator) 
Federal State 
Rhineland-Palati-
nate 36 regional 
units (Kreise) 
Outcome variables: Real gross value added, Pa-
tents  
Regional public knowledge capital as well as the regional human 
capital increases the real value added. However, the results indi-
cate that both input factors do not have significant effects on la-
bour and physical capital. 
The academic staff in the region itself has no significant effects 
on patent applications, while constructing a variable including 
the academic staff from neighbouring regions leads to significant 
positive effects on regional patent applications. This applies only 
for technical colleges. 
Glückler 
and Kö-
nig 
(2011) 
Case Study Ruprecht-
Karls-University Heidel-
berg 
Heidelberg Uni-
versity Region 
(Heidelberg, 
Mannheim and 
Rhein-Neckar dis-
trict) 
Outcome variables: Regional income and employ-
ment effects 
Regarding direct and indirect effects, the existence of the univer-
sity contributes to an income of €673 million per year and facil-
itates 21.600 jobs (conservative estimation).  
Schubert 
and Kroll 
(2013) 
Panel data (2001-2009), FE 
and RE-Estimator 
German NUTS-III 
Regions  
Outcome variables: GDP per capita, Unemploy-
ment rate, Available income per capita, Patent ap-
plication per capita 
Compared to an average region with local academic activities, a 
region without such activities has an approximately €4.500 
lower GDP per capita, a 3 % higher unemployment rate and 12.5 
% less patent volume. Especially the effects on the GDP per cap-
ita are regionally bounded (85 %), while the regional effects on 
the unemployment rate are limited (19%). 
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Table A5.2 Unit root test 
Variable 
IPS test-
statistic p-value Variable 
IPS test-
statistic p-value 
Regional economic variables     Third-Party Funds     
     lgdp -4.12 0.000   Received by Higher Education Institutes     
     lemp -0.34 0.365      ltpf_hei 16.41 1.000 
     lemp_detrended -16.08 0.000      ltpf_hei_detrended -9.09 0.000 
     lemp_ns 2.03 0.979      ltpf_hei_pub 16.43 1.000 
     lemp_ns_detrended -15.89 0.000      ltpf_hei_pub_detrended -7.73 0.000 
     lhk 0.13 0.552      ltpf_hei_ind -0.78 0.216 
     lhk_detrended -17.62 0.000      ltpf_hei_ind_detrended -16.96 0.000 
     linvq -17.58 0.000      w_ltpf_hei -3.41 0.000 
     lpat -17.76 0.000      w_ltpf_hei_pub -5.28 0.000 
     w_lgdp -3.38 0.000      w_ltpf_hei_ind -8.46 0.000 
     w_lemp -1.41 0.079   Received by Universities     
     w_lemp_detrended -17.76 0.000      ltpf_uni 13.82 1.000 
     w_lemp_ns 4.64 1.000      ltpf_uni_detrended -18.51 0.000 
     w_lemp_ns_detrended -17.44 0.000      ltpf_uni_pub 12.81 1.000 
     w_lhk 0.01 0.504      ltpf_uni_pub_detrended -30.71 0.000 
     w_lhk_detrended -18.11 0.000      ltpf_uni_ind 18.08 1.000 
     w_linvq -15.19 0.000      ltpf_uni_ind_detrended -23.88 0.000 
     w_lpat -13.68 0.000      w_ltpf_uni 1.61 0.947 
Publications          w_ltpf_uni_detrended -20.83 0.000 
     lpubli_hei 4.02 1.000      w_ltpf_uni_pub -0.52 0.300 
     lpubli_hei_detrended -23.78 0.000      w_ltpf_uni_pub_detrended -21.46 0.000 
     lpubli_uni -2.43 0.008      w_ltpf_uni_ind 4.48 1.000 
     lpubli_fh 5.02 1.000      w_ltpf_uni_ind_detrended -15.32 0.000 
     lpubli_fh_detrended -24.19 0.000   Received by Technical colleges     
     lpubli_ri 21.26 1.000      ltpf_fh 18.05 1.000 
     lpubli_ri_detrended -16.79 0.000      ltpf_fh_detrended -17.48 0.000 
     lpubli_fraun 30.72 1.000      ltpf_fh_pub 13.74 1.000 
     lpubli_fraun_detrended -21.70 0.000      ltpf_fh_pub_detrended -10.17 0.000 
     lpubli_mp -11.21 0.000      ltpf_fh_ind 7.66 1.000 
     w_lpubli_hei -8.74 0.000      ltpf_fh_ind_detrended -18.21 0.000 
     w_lpubli_uni -11.02 0.000      w_ltpf_fh -7.59 0.000 
     w_lpubli_fh -20.33 0.000      w_ltpf_fh_pub -10.17 0.000 
     w_lpubli_ri -0.54 0.295      w_ltpf_fh_ind -11.92 0.000 
     w_lpubli_ri_detrended -25.51 0.000       
     w_lpubli_fraun -1.51 0.066       
     w_lpubli_fraun_detrended -26.89 0.000       
     w_lpubli_mp -14.50 0.000       
Notes: Number of Regions = 258 and t = 12. IPS: Im et al. (2003) panel unit root test. H0: All panels contain unit roots. HA: Some 
panels are stationary. Suffix “_detrended” denotes detrended variable; see text for details. 
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6. Effects of R&D subsidies on regional economic dynamics – Evidence from Chinese prov-
inces  
 
Notes: The paper was submitted to Research Policy (8 May 2019). The paper is co-authored by Philipp Boeing. A 
related version of this paper was published as Working Papers on Innovation and Space (Vol. 03.19). 
 
Abstract: We investigate the impact of research and development (R&D) subsidies on R&D inputs of large- and 
medium-sized firms and on additional innovation and economic activities in Chinese provinces. A panel vector auto-
regressive (VAR) model and corresponding impulse response function (IRF) analysis allow us to differentiate between 
direct and indirect effects, which add up to total effects. We find that an increase of R&D subsidies significantly 
decreases private R&D investments, although there is a significant positive effect on the R&D personnel employed in 
firms. We interpret these findings as a partial crowding-out effect because public funds substitute some private funds 
while total R&D inputs still increase. Complementarily, we find a positive secondary effect on the provincial patent 
activity, our measure of technological progress. Interestingly, we also find potentially unintended effects of R&D 
subsidies on increases in the investment rate in physical capital and residential buildings. Although R&D subsidies fail 
to incentivise private R&D expenditures, firms increase total R&D inputs, and provincial economies benefit from 
secondary effects on technological progress and capital deepening. 
Keywords: China, R&D subsidies, regional economic activity, regional economic development, panel VAR, impulse 
response function analysis 
JEL Classification: C33, R11, R58, O38, O47 
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6.1 Introduction 
In recent years, China has been shifting from a capital-led towards a more innovation-led growth 
model. Although China reached outstanding output growth of more than 8% annually between 
1978 and 2007 (Zhu, 2012), more recently the pace of output and productivity growth has been 
slowing down in the overall economy and manufacturing industries (Bai and Zhang, 2017). This 
slowdown may be attributed to diminishing returns to higher levels of physical and human capital 
and a deterioration in the efficiency of resource allocation (Wei et al. 2017). As China moves closer 
to the global technology frontier, the creation of domestic innovation is seen not only as an im-
portant complement to the absorption of technologies developed elsewhere, but also as a main 
driver of productivity and economic growth. The government comprehensively supports China’s 
transformation towards more innovation-led growth with numerous targets and policies (Cao et al., 
2013). 
A first-order policy target is to increase research and development (R&D) inputs in firms. To this 
end, the government quadrupled annual R&D subsidies allocated to large and medium-sized enter-
prises (LMEs) between 2000 and 2010, the time period underlying this study. Simultaneously, the 
relative contribution of private R&D investments101 and employment of R&D personnel in the 
business sector increased from around 35% to 54% for investments and 36% to 54% for personnel 
(own calculations). These figures emphasise the importance of the corporate sector within China’s 
innovation system. Against the background of aggregate dynamics at the national level, a striking 
feature of China’s economic development is persistent provincial disparities (Tsui, 2014), which 
are also observable for innovation inputs and output. To appropriately consider heterogeneity 
                                                 
101 Following the standard approach in the literature, private R&D investment is calculated by subtracting R&D subsidies from total 
firm R&D expenditures (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). Private R&D corresponds to “net,” “self-financed,” or “own” R&D expenditures 
and does not discriminate between R&D expenditures by state-owned and non-state-owned firms. 
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among provincial production and innovation systems, our evaluation of China’s R&D subsidies is 
conducted at the provincial level.102 
Although it is well known that market failure in the private production of knowledge may require 
an adjustment of private R&D by public subsidies (David et al., 2000), the evaluation literature 
shows that R&D subsidies could function as both complements and substitutes (Dimos and Pugh, 
2016; Zúñiga‐Vicente et al., 2014). Most impact evaluations of public R&D subsidies on private 
R&D expenditures are conducted for developed economies. Until now, only a few studies provide 
an evaluation for China and the results are somewhat inconclusive (see Boeing 2016; Boeing and 
Peters 2019; Hu and Deng 2019; Liu et al., 2016). Chen (2018) is the only study at the provincial 
level and finds a partial crowding-out effect. 
The contribution of our study is at least twofold: First, we estimate not only direct but also indirect 
effects of R&D subsidies on R&D inputs, which are unobservable in single equation approaches. 
Second, we estimate the total (direct plus indirect) effects of R&D subsidies on various economic 
variables in the provincial production system. In this way, we can detect secondary effects on the 
provincial capital deepening, technological progress, labour, and output, and thus draw conclusions 
on the role of R&D subsidies for the development of provincial innovation and economic activities. 
To this end, we are the first to use a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) model and corresponding 
impulse response function (IRF) analysis to analyse the effects of R&D subsidies on the economic 
performance of Chinese provinces. This econometric approach explicitly allows for the identifica-
tion of total effects on a defined set of economic variables. 
                                                 
102 In the Chinese context the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises from the National Bureau of Statistics and the Administrative 
Enterprise Income Tax Records from the Chinese State Administration of Tax are sources of micro data for the quasi-population of 
LMEs. However, these data are not appropriate for the proposed evaluation because only total subsidies but not R&D subsidies are 
observed. In contrast, provincial-level data allows us to observe R&D subsidies. 
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For R&D inputs of LMEs, we find that an increase of R&D subsidies significantly decreases private 
R&D investments, while there is a significant positive effect on the R&D personnel employed. We 
interpret these findings as a partial crowding-out effect because firms substitute some private funds 
with public funds but total R&D inputs still increase. Complementary to this result, we find a pos-
itive effect on provincial patents, our measure of technological progress. Interestingly, we also find 
some evidence for potentially unintended effects because R&D subsidies also increase the invest-
ment rate in physical capital and residential buildings. Although investments in physical capital 
may be complementary to R&D in general, investments in residential buildings more likely suggest 
some misallocation of R&D subsidies. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Section 6.2, we review the institutional setting 
and prior studies on R&D subsidies in China. Section 6.3 provides the theoretical framework. In 
Section 6.4, we specify our empirical strategy, data and descriptive statistics. In Section 6.5, we 
present the main results and robustness tests, and discuss our findings and policy implications. We 
conclude in Section 6.6.  
6.2 Institutional setting and prior literature 
According to Romer (1990), business R&D plays an essential role in fostering innovation and eco-
nomic growth. However, market failure in private knowledge production may lead to suboptimal 
innovation rates and the deceleration of economic growth. Due to externalities in knowledge pro-
duction that are difficult to internalise, private and social returns to innovation activities differ (Ar-
row, 1962). In conjunction with moral hazard and risky financing of R&D, this difference in private 
and social returns may lead to systematic underinvestment in R&D. This market failure may require 
policy intervention and an upward correction of business R&D activities by the provision of public 
subsidies (David et al., 2000).  
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Although governments offer public funding to spur R&D in firms – to incentivise more private 
R&D investments – R&D subsidies might also crowd out private financing of R&D. A firm invests 
in R&D if and as long as the marginal rate of return to R&D is larger or equal to the marginal cost 
of capital. The marginal cost of capital reflects the opportunity costs of investing funds in R&D 
versus non-R&D projects and thus depends on, among others, the expected returns to other uses of 
available funds, such as investment in physical assets, available internal finance, and costs of ex-
ternal capital. Based on a theoretical concept developed by Hall (2008), Hottenrott and Peters 
(2012) show that optimal R&D investment increases only if grantees were initially financially con-
strained, implying insufficient internal financial means. The empirical evaluation literature indeed 
shows that R&D subsidies may function as both complements or substitutes, depending and the 
specific setting, and might have crowding-out, neutral, or additionality effects on the private R&D 
investment of firms (see Dimos and Pugh, 2016; Zúñiga‐Vicente et al., 2014). 
6.2.1 The institutional setting 
The Chinese State Council aims to develop China into an innovative country by 2020 and a world 
leader in science and technology by 2050. Against this target, China’s ratio of gross expenditures 
for R&D to GDP has already overtaken the ratio of the European Union; and in gross R&D ex-
penditures, China is projected to overtake the United States around 2020 (OECD, 2014). In order 
to stimulate additional business R&D expenditures, the Chinese government invests heavily in in-
novation policy, e.g. through direct grants and tax incentives. Major national R&D programmes 
include the National High-Tech R&D Programme (the 863 Programme), the National Key Tech-
nologies Programme, and the State Basic R&D Programme (the 973 Programme). In addition, 
firms receive R&D subsidies from programmes administered by sub-national agencies. 
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During the time period we study, the ratio of total real R&D investments and private real R&D 
investments by LMEs to real GDP has continuously increased and doubled between 2000 and 2010 
(Figure 6.1). Given China’s strong growth in GDP over this time period, the increase in R&D 
intensity is even more striking.  
Figure 6.1 Dynamics of private real R&D investments LMEs and total real R&D investments per real GDP in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on aggregated provincial data. Data on total provincial R&D investments are based on China’s 
statistical yearbook on science and technology activities of industrial enterprises (various years). For the remaining variables see 
Table 6.1.  
The major innovation policies in this period are formulated in the 10th and 11th Five-Year Science 
and Technology Development Plans (2001-2005 and 2006-2011) and, more importantly, the Mid- 
to Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan 2006-2020 (MLP). The MLP aims to foster 
R&D expenditures of domestic firms, as well as to better coordinate the existing R&D policies to 
increase the effectiveness of government support (Liu et al., 2011). After 2006, a more mission-
oriented policy approach was implemented and amendments of major national R&D programmes 
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took place, paralleled by substantial increases in government funding. Between 2000 and 2010 
annual R&D subsidies to LMEs quadrupled from 4.31 to 16.95 real billion RMB, while the private 
R&D expenditures of LMEs increased twelvefold from 30.84 to 371.86 real billion RMB (Figure 
6.2).103  
Figure 6.2 Dynamics of private real R&D investments LMEs and real R&D subsidies in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on aggregated provincial data (see Table 6.1). Absolute values are presented. 
 
These efforts lead to a continuous increase in the ratio of private firm to total R&D investments as 
well as the ratio of firm to total R&D personnel in China, emphasising the increasing relevance of 
firms for the China’s innovation system (Figure 6.3). However, the key question to ask is whether 
R&D subsidies have contributed to the rise in private R&D expenditures. 
                                                 
103 Using the 2005 RMB-EUR year-end exchange rate, this corresponds to an increase from 3.225 billion EUR to 38.888 billion 
EUR. 
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Figure 6.3 Dynamics of innovation activities by LMEs in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on aggregated provincial data. Data on total provincial R&D investments and total provincial R&D 
personnel are based on China’s statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of industrial enterprises (various years). For 
the remaining variables see Table 6.1. Ratio per total real R&D investments and ratio per total R&D personnel is presented. 
6.2.2 Prior Chinese studies 
Most evaluations of the effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditures are conducted 
for developed economies. Only a few studies provide an analysis for developing economies. In this 
section, we focus on the Chinese economy and first discuss prior firm-level studies and hereafter 
provincial-level studies. For the early period 2001 to 2006, Boeing (2016) estimates the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and finds a partial crowding-out effect. Liu et al. (2016) 
observe high-tech manufacturing firms in Jiangsu province based on cross-sectional survey data 
for the year 2012. They estimate the ATT and find that grantees increase private R&D expenditures 
by 14.3 %. Hu and Deng (2019) use survey data for private-owned manufacturing firms, observed 
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between 2007 and 2011, and find that treated firms almost double private R&D expenditures com-
pared to the pre-treatment year. Most recently, Boeing and Peters (2019) observe misappropriation 
of R&D subsidies by firms and separately estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) and complier-aver-
age-causal-effect (CACE). Between 2001 and 2011, they show partial crowding-out for the actual 
effectiveness of R&D policy, whereas the efficacy among compliers (i.e., non-misappropriating 
firms) confirms additionality. In summary, these studies suggest heterogeneous effects. Boeing 
(2016) and Boeing and Peters (2019) fail to reject partial crowding-out for the population of firms, 
but R&D subsidies have a higher effectiveness for high-tech and private firms, which is similar to 
the results by Liu et al. (2016) and Hu and Deng (2019). Confirming theoretical predictions, these 
findings emphasise that higher returns to R&D and financial constraints, as expected for high-tech 
firms and private firms in China, result in higher effectiveness of R&D subsidies compared to the 
population effect.  
To the best of our knowledge, the only provincial-level study that evaluates the effect of R&D 
subsidies on business R&D expenditures is Chen (2018). For the population of firms, he finds 
insignificant effects on total R&D expenditures, while the effects on private R&D expenditures are 
significant negative, which one may interpret as evidence for crowding-out. Other related studies 
mainly investigate the effect of R&D subsidies, tax allowances, and public R&D investment on 
provincial patent activity. Sun (2000) shows that patent applications are spatially concentrated on 
provincial level and public R&D (investments and employment) does not significantly increase 
provincial patent activities. Li (2009) finds significant positive effects of provincial governments’ 
science and technology expenditures on invention patents, but insignificant effects on utility model 
patents (in contrast to utility patents, invention patents are more closely related to technological 
inventions). Fan et al. (2012) show that public R&D investments contribute to provincial inequal-
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ities in innovation outputs as measured by patents. The findings by Cheng and Zhang (2018) sug-
gest that public R&D subsidies and tax incentives increase the funds that firms devote to R&D 
collaborations with universities and research institutes. Moreover, both public R&D support 
measures increase the joint patent output of firms, universities, and research institutes. In a nutshell, 
these studies confirm, for the most part, positive effect of public support measures on patent output 
at the provincial level. 
Although prior studies at the provincial level investigate the direct effects of R&D subsidies on 
firms’ R&D input and provincial patent output, we aim to contribute to the literature by analysing 
the total (direct plus indirect) effects of R&D subsidies on a larger set of theory-based economic 
variables. For this exercise, we follow recent applications of a VAR approach at the regional level 
(e.g. Eberle et al., 2019; Mitze et al., 2018; Ramajo et al., 2017). In the Section 6.3, we present a 
theoretical framework that motivates our subsequent empirical analysis.  
6.3 Theoretical framework 
Based on Solow (1956), the theoretical growth literature has emphasised the importance of human 
and physical capital accumulation for economic growth (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). Although cap-
ital deepening is essential for growth in developing economies, with accelerating economic devel-
opment the contribution of capital accumulation decreases while the importance of technological 
progress increases (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 2009). This is because innovation offsets the dimin-
ishing returns to capital by a continual rise in technology. Thus, innovation drives both technolog-
ical progress and capital deepening, the two main components of economic growth. Once an econ-
omy is fully industrialised and has reached the steady state, per capita income and growth is solely 
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driven by innovation and technological progress.104 However, in the case of China, provincial econ-
omies are strongly heterogeneous and display a high level of variation regarding the general eco-
nomic development (Tsui, 2014) and innovation activities (Li, 2009). Therefore, we apply a pro-
vincial-level analysis to evaluate the outcomes of public R&D subsidies in China.  
We assume the following production function for each province i 
    Yi = Kiα Hiβ (Ai λiPi)1-α-β,         (6.1) 
where Yi is provincial output, Ki provincial physical and Hi human capital, Ai denotes the level of 
the provincial technology, λi is the provincial employment rate, and Pi denotes provincial resident 
population. Decreasing returns to scale are imposed by α > 0, β > 0 and α + β < 1. Following Eberle 
et al. (2019), we specify provincial labour as Li = λiPi, with λi as the in long-term fixed provincial 
employment rate (Li
Pi
), while provincial population Pi grows at the exogenous rate ni. By dividing 
Equation (6.1) by Pi, the provincial per capita production function can be expressed as 
       yi = kiα hiβ (Ai λi)1-α-β.                  (6.2) 
Equation (6.2) defines the provincial GDP per capita as the output factor, and physical and human 
capital per capita, and the level of technology and the employment rate as core production factors 
in the provincial economic system. Note that, due to data limitations, we use the physical capital 
(fixed assets) investment rate (subsequently labelled as sk,i) instead of the physical capital stock (ki) 
and the technological growth rate (subsequently labelled as gi) instead of the provincial technolog-
ical level (Ai). 
                                                 
104 Whereas Mankiw et al. (1992) assume that technological process is exogenously given and equally distributed across economies, 
Romer’s (1990) growth model explicitly endogenises the accumulation processes of technology in a R&D sector. 
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R&D is a human capital intensive activity (Aghion and Howitt, 2009; Romer, 1990) and a substan-
tial share of current business R&D cost are labour cost for internal R&D personnel, hence invest-
ments in human capital.105 We formulate the dynamics of per capita human capital (e.g. Mankiw 
et al., 1992) as 
    
h
.
i
hi
 = sh,i(kiα hiβ-1 (Aiλi)1-α-β) – (ni+δ).            (6.3) 
In Equation (6.3), sh,i is the investment rate in human capital that depreciates with a constant rate δ 
(Mankiw et al., 1992). With respect to Equation (6.3), R&D investments are accounted for by sh,i 
and the R&D personnel is captured by hi. 
To identify the effects of R&D subsidies (labelled by sh_public,i), we augment our model with private 
R&D investments by LMEs (labelled by sh_private,i). The parameter will be informative whether or 
not the crowding-out hypothesis can be rejected. Alternatively, we will also augment the model 
with firms’ R&D personnel (hi).106 If crowding-out cannot be rejected for private R&D invest-
ments, the parameter for firms’ R&D personnel will allow us to differentiate the extent of crowd-
ing-out: a neutral effect implies full and a positive effect partial crowding-out of private R&D 
expenditures. Using firms’ R&D personnel instead of total R&D investment has the additional 
advantage that this measure implicitly controls for potential wage-adjustments of R&D personnel 
as a result of a policy-induced demand shock for scientists.  
                                                 
105 In developed economies, this share is usually higher than in developing economies. It was 64.5% for Germany (in 2011) and 
52.3% for the United Kingdom, 44.8% for Japan, 44.1% for Korea, and 30.4% for China (all in 2009) (OECD Statistics, 2019). 
Please note that this is only a theoretical assumption; our flexible empirical approach accounts for alternative transmission channels 
of R&D investments (Section 6.4.1). 
106 The simultaneous inclusion of both variables (sh,i and hi) would require our model to consider the same information twice and 
should be avoided. The correlation coefficients between the variables R&D personnel LMEs per capita and private real R&D 
investments LMEs per real GDP support this concern: ρ1 = 0.8834 (all provinces), ρ2 = 0.88 (Tibet excluded), ρ3 = 0.8707 (Tibet 
and provincial-status municipalities excluded). Correlation coefficients for logarithmised variables are even higher. 
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An increase in the provincial human capital may also affect other economic variables in the pro-
vincial system in Equation (6.2) via economic secondary effects. First, the physical capital invest-
ment rate is assumed to be constant and thus unaffected by increases in R&D subsidies (e.g. 
Mankiw et al., 1992). Second, policy makers allocate R&D subsidies to incentivise corporate R&D 
investments to promote provincial technological growth.107 We assume that technological growth 
(gi) is determined by input factors that are effective in the provincial corporate research sector (e.g. 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Romer, 1990).108 In contrast to Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer (1991), we allow public R&D subsidies (temporarily) to incentivise a varying input of hu-
man capital in the research sector (according to the accumulation process of human capital in Equa-
tion (6.3)), which is assumed to be given in the original model setups. Third, the provincial em-
ployment rate is assumed to be fixed in the long run, temporary effects may depend on substitution 
and output effects.109 R&D subsidies to firms may lower the costs for R&D personnel (human 
capital) and basic labour may become more expensive comparative to R&D personnel, which may 
lead to a substitution effect. Conversely, if R&D subsidies raise provincial output, they may sub-
sequently also trigger a higher demand for labour (output effect). Lastly, shifts in the provincial 
                                                 
107 R&D subsidies may predominantly foster human capital (investments) in the research sector (e.g. Romer, 1990) and thus one 
may argue that technological growth gi is a main target variable of R&D subsidies. For the reasons mentioned above, human capital 
is considered a main target variable (transmission channel) of R&D subsidies; but, in line with the applied flexible empirical model, 
we do not discriminate between human capital that is either productive in a production or research sector (the dynamics of human 
capital in Equation (6.3) are modelled by Mankiw et al. (1992) for the production sector). A potential effect on the provincial patent 
rate (proxy for technological growth) is interpreted as secondary effect here.  
108 This assumption is consistent with our flexible empirical panel VAR approach that relates all variables in the economic system 
among each other. As emphasised by Romer (1990), the role of human capital in the research sector may be of particular importance 
for the accumulation of technology. Please note the distinction at this point between human capital in a one sector model with 
diminishing returns (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992) and in a multiple sector model with a distinct role in the research sector (e.g. Romer, 
1990), which has different implications of human capital for long-term economic growth. 
109 See Schalk and Untiedt (2000) for a brief discussion of substitution and output effects on regional employment in the context of 
physical capital subsidies in Germany.  
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per capita output can be written as a function of changes of provincial input factors presented in 
Equation (6.2) 
    
y. i
yi
 = α
k
.
i
ki
+ β
h
.
i
hi
+ (1-α-β) 
A
.
i
Ai
+ (1-α-β) 
λ
.
i
λi
.        (6.4) 
According to our theoretical framework, we expect provincial R&D subsidies to lead to a (tempo-
rarily) higher human capital investment rate sh,i and level of human capital hi, given that firms are 
financially constrained. Moreover, positive secondary effects may arise especially on the provincial 
technological growth rate gi, on the provincial per capita output yi and employment rate λi. Due to 
substitution effects in the very short run, the latter effect is expected to arise after a phasing-in of 
several years. 
6.4 Empirical strategy, data and descriptive statistics 
6.4.1 Empirical strategy  
The VAR system that we model is composed of six equations with six dependent variables: (1) 
R&D subsidy intensity lsub, (2) human capital lprdef and lhk (proxied by private R&D invest-
ments or R&D personnel of LMEs), (3) technological growth rate lpat (provincial patents), (4) 
physical capital investment rate linvq (provincial investments in fixed assets), (5) employment rate 
lemp (provincial employed persons), and (6) real GDP per capita lgdp (provincial output). In order 
to investigate the total effects of Chinese R&D subsidies to the provincial corporate research sector, 
we consider not only direct effects (denoted by the estimate in a partial analysis approach) but also 
mutual indirect effects between the defined provincial variables. To this end, we propose a panel 
VAR and associated IRF analysis that allows us to determine the total effects of an increase in 
Chinese R&D subsidies on all provincial variables. 
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The reduced-form VAR system, both flexible and atheoretical, can be specified compactly in ma-
trix notation (e.g. Love and Zicchino, 2006; Rickman, 2010) as 
yt = Ayt-1 + fi + tt + et.          (6.5) 
In Equation (6.5), yt denotes a vector of the six provincial endogenous variables [lsub, lprdef/lhk, 
lpat, linvq, lemp, lgdp], the matrix A is containing reduced-form coefficients, fi is a vector of pro-
vincial fixed effects to capture time constant heterogeneity, and tt is a vector of time dummies to 
capture general external shocks, respectively, while the vector et comprises (reduced-form) resid-
uals (e.g. Love and Zicchino, 2006; Rickman, 2010). From a methodological perspective, the in-
clusion of provincial fixed effects has the considerable advantage that all time-invariant confound-
ers are controlled for.110 To account for the influence of additional time-variant confounders, in 
Section 6.5.2 we test the robustness of our model after augmenting several time-variant controls.  
As a response to criticism of the atheoretical reduced-form VAR approach, the structural VAR 
approach has been developed (e.g. Rickman, 2010), which can be formulated as 
Byt = Cyt-1 + fi + tt + Dεt.         (6.6) 
In Equation (6.6), the matrix B includes contemporaneous (structural) parameters, the matrix of 
polynomials C is connecting contemporaneous to time-lagged variables, and, eventually, diagonal 
matrix D links uncorrelated (exogenous) shocks εt to the provincial endogenous variables (e.g. 
Keating, 1992; Rickman, 2010).111 As Rickman (2010) points out, theory-based restrictions (see 
Section 6.3) in the structural VAR model are set on the matrix B. To this end, in order to identify 
our structural panel VAR approach, we follow Di Giacinto (2010), who advances an approach by 
                                                 
110 We are estimating six dynamic panel equations (in the reduced-form specification) incorporating provincial fixed effects, which 
is why the basic fixed-effects estimator suffers from a dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). To account for this issue and to yield 
unbiased estimates, we use a bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator that is proposed by Everaert and Pozzi (2007). 
111 Please note that A = C*B-1 and et = εt*B-1 (Rickman, 2010). 
 229 
 
 
Number of contemporaneous linkages to other variables at time t. 
lhk (4) 
 
lprdef (4) 
 
lgdp (0) lemp (1) linvq (2) lsub (5) lpat (3)    
Wold (1954) to presume a recursive causal ordering of the included provincial endogenous varia-
bles at period t (Choleski decomposition). Based on the developed theoretical framework in Section 
6.3, we define the causal ordering at time t (see Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4 Defined causal ordering across the provincial variables at time t (contemporaneous linkages) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own illustration. 
Variables to the left (e.g. R&D subsidy intensity) have contemporaneous and delayed effects on 
the remaining provincial variables more to the right. Conversely, variables on the right have only 
time lagged (feedback) effects (e.g. GDP per capita). With respect to Equation (6.2), GDP per 
capita is the key outcome variable in the provincial system and thus the most endogenous variable 
with solely time lagged effects on the remaining provincial variables, while the investment rate and 
the employment rate are ordered on the basis of their flexibility in the short run and thus appear 
more to the left in Figure 6.4 (e.g. Eberle et al., 2019). We define the R&D subsidy intensity as the 
most exogenous variable in the provincial economic system. R&D subsidies are assumed to directly 
(contemporaneously) affect R&D investments and personnel of LMEs, which are seen as important 
input factor in knowledge production (Romer, 1990) and thus directly affect provincial technolog-
ical growth gi (patents), while labour and capital goods are assumed to trigger (delayed) secondary 
effects on gi. 
An important concern is reverse causality. If human capital determines R&D subsidies and not vice 
versa, a picking-the-winner strategy would imply a non-random allocation of public funds to firms 
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with more human capital and R&D investments and an upward bias of the estimated effect. Because 
this corresponds to a different causal ordering, in Section 6.5.2 we perform a robustness test to 
control for different effects of R&D subsidies on other variables in the economic system (this cor-
responds to a change of R&D subsidies and R&D investments and personnel of LMEs in Figure 
6.4).  
By applying the moving-average (MA) presentation of the VAR, we illustrate the responses (total 
effects) of the provincial variables to an orthogonal increase in the R&D subsidy intensity (Lüt-
kepohl, 2005), while the calculated confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo simulations 
(Love and Zicchino, 2006). 
6.4.2 Data 
The data is mainly obtained from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and contains infor-
mation at the province-year level observed between 2000 and 2010.112 Table 6.1 present’s details 
for the variable definitions and data sources, and in Appendix A6.1 we discuss some features of 
China’s officially reported data. In the remainder of this paper, we use the variable abbreviations 
presented in Table 6.1. Table A6.1 in the Appendix provides summary statistics of the six economic 
core variables. We construct real values for monetary output and investment measures by using the 
provincial consumer price index (CPI). Technological growth is measured by granted invention 
patents obtained from China’s patent office (CNIPA).113 
 
                                                 
112 In 2011, the NBS survey was amended and the availability of consistent information on R&D investments and R&D personnel 
of LMEs restricts our analysis until 2010. LMEs are defined as firms with at least 300 employees, 30 million RMB sales revenue, 
and 40 million RMB assets (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2003) 
113 In this context, we regard granted patents as a superior measure compared to patent applications, as granted patents have passed 
two selections. First, the expected economic value exceeds the cost of patenting (application), and second, the invention has passed 
examination at the patent office (grant). This two-step selection also helps to mitigate the distortion of application-based patent 
subsidies on patents as an indicator of technological growth in China. 
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Table 6.1 Variable descriptions and data sources 
Variable          
abbreviation Description Data sources 
Core variables VAR model 
lgdp (y) Real GDP per capita (per resident population). CPIs are 
used to calculate real values. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
lemp (λ) Employment rate (Number of employed persons at year-
end by region per capita (per resident population)). 
Missing data for 2003 and 2006 are calculated on the ba-
sis of the formula: (Employed Personst-1 + Employed 
Personsit+1)/2 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China statistical year-
book (various  years) 
 
linvq (sk) Real investments in fixed assets per real GDP. National Bureau of Statistics of China 
lhk (h) R&D personnel LMEs per capita (per resident popula-
tion). 
Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of in-
dustrial enterprises (various years) 
lprdef (sh_private) Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (R&D 
subsidies subtracted from R&D investments LMEs). 
Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of in-
dustrial enterprises (various years) 
lpat (g) Patents per 100 Mio. real GDP (Granted Patents, Inven-
tion). 
CNIPA (various years) 
lsub (sh_public) Real R&D subsidies to LMEs per real GDP. Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of in-
dustrial enterprises (various years) 
Control variables VAR model 
lcontrol1 Real non-firm R&D investments per real GDP. Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of in-
dustrial enterprises (various years) 
lcontrol2 Ratio private firms to state-owned firm. National Bureau of Statistics of China 
lcontrol3 Ratio loss making state-owned firms to total state owned 
firms. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
lcontrol4 Ratio innovative LMEs to total LMEs. Statistics yearbook on science and technology activities of in-
dustrial enterprises (various years) 
lcontrol5 and lcontrol6 Ratio valued-added sector 1 and sector 2, respectively, to 
total value-added. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
lcontrol7 Ratio coal deposit to total coal deposit China. Figures of 
2003 used for missing earlier years.  
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
control8 (not in ln) Exports minus imports as share of the sum of ex- and im-
ports: (Exportsi – Importsi) / (Exportsi + Importsi).  
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
linvq_rb Real investments in residential buildings in the whole 
Country per real GDP. 
National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm (ln). 
As a robustness test, we augment several time-variant provincial characteristics that may influence 
the coefficients of the core VAR variables. First, we control for non-LMEs R&D investments, 
mainly from universities and research institutes, in order to account for further determinants of 
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technological growth at the province level. R&D personnel and private R&D investments of LMEs 
are likely to be correlated with non-LMEs R&D investments, and this may lead to omitted variable 
bias. Second, we include the ratio of private to state-owned firms and the ratio of loss-making state-
owned firms. We hereby we aim to control for heterogeneity in financial constraints. In comparison 
to state-owned firms, China’s private firms are constrained in access to external finance, and among 
state-owned firms loss-making ones are more likely to encounter internal financial constraints. 
Third, we include the ratio of innovative LMEs to total LMEs as a measure for potential knowledge 
spillovers at the province level, because the expected value of firms’ R&D, and hence the decision 
to perform R&D, is also dependent on the degree of spillovers. Fourth, the ratios of the valued-
added of the primary and the secondary sectors to total valued-added are added as indicators for 
the provincial economic composition. Fifth, provincial coal resources are added because these may 
absorb short-term oriented investments to the detriment of long-term economic development, also 
known as resource curse, which would increase the opportunity cost of R&D. Finally, we use the 
trade specialization index proposed by Li (2009) that measures export activities and the absorption 
of foreign technological knowledge, which is embodied in foreign goods. 
6.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
For each core variable in each province, we report the long-term growth rate from 2000 to 2010 in 
Figure 6.5 and the summarised economic activities for the entire period 2000 to 2010 in Table 
A6.2. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, which are relatively developed provincial-status municipal-
ities, have the highest GDP per capita, as well as the highest patents-to-GDP ratio (Table A6.2). 
However, municipalities may benefit from agglomeration effects, and a comparison restricted to 
the remaining provinces provides a more conservative analysis. Developing provinces with lower 
initial- and average GDP per capita show the highest growth in physical capital investments (e.g. 
Jiangxi, Anhui, or Liaoning; see Figure 6.5). More developed provinces, such as Zhejiang and 
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Guangdong, have high growth rates in private R&D investments, R&D personnel, and patenting. 
As a stylised fact, and confirming theoretical predictions, this suggests that less developed prov-
inces have relatively higher marginal returns to physical capital, whereas more developed prov-
inces pursue innovation to substitute capital- with technology-driven growth.  
Figure 6.5 Provincial changes from 2000 to 2010 for various economic indicators (in %) 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on provincial data (see Table 6.1). 
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R&D subsidies may be an important policy instrument to support the transition towards innovation 
and technology-led growth. Figure 6.6 shows that provinces that allocate higher levels of R&D 
subsidies also have higher levels of private R&D investments and receive more granted patents 
between 2000 and 2010 (scaled by real GDP). The pattern suggests that an increase in the intensity 
of R&D subsidies to GDP is accompanied by an increase in the private intensity of R&D and 
patents to GDP. While acknowledging that these figures do not allow for a causal interpretation, in 
the subsequent section we perform an analysis that addresses identification issues.  
Figure 6.6 Scatterplot average private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (first panel) and average patents per 
100 Mio. real GDP (second panel) in relation to average real R&D subsidies to LMEs per real GDP (values for the 
entire period 2000 to 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on provincial data (see Table 6.1). The shortcuts for the provinces are: AH: Anhui, BJ: Beijing, CQ: 
Chongqing, FJ: Fujian, GS: Gansu, GD: Guangdong, GX: Guangxi, GZ: Guizhou, HI: Hainan, HE: Hebei, HL: Heilongjiang, HA: 
Henan, HB: Hubei, HN: Hunan, NM: Inner Mongolia, JS: Jiangsu, JX: Jiangxi, JL: Jilin, LN: Liaoning, NX: Ningxia, QH: Qinghai, 
SN: Shaanxi, SD: Shandong, SH: Shanghai, SX: Shanxi, SC: Sichuan, TJ: Tianjin, XZ: Tibet, XJ: Xinjiang, YN: Yunnan, ZJ: 
Zhejiang. 
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6.5 Empirical results 
In this section we present the results of our panel VAR approach and the IRF analysis. To avoid 
having our results influenced by outliers, in the basic model we exclude Tibet and the municipali-
ties Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin but include the municipalities in a robustness test. 
Due to substantial economic dynamics in Chinese provinces, we apply a panel unit root test (Im et 
al., 2003) as a pre-estimation check to control for stationarity of the variables. As shown in Table 
6.2, for some variables the test indicates non-stationarity, and thus we detrend these variables. 
Table 6.2 Panel unit root tests 
  Years 
IPS test-
statistic p-value 
lgdp 11 2.91 0.998 
lgdp_det 11 -2.31 0.011 
lemp 11 0.88 0.810 
lemp_det 11 -4.02 0.000 
linvq 11 -1.25 0.105 
linvq_det 11 -4.76 0.000 
lhk 11 -2.10 0.018 
lnrdef 11 -3.32 0.000 
lpat 11 1.36 0.913 
lpat_det 11 -7.04 0.000 
lsub 11 -6.23 0.000 
Notes: Panel unit root tests are based on Im et al. (2003) 
for the core variables over the time period 2000-2010. 
The outliers Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing and 
Tibet are excluded. The null hypothesis (H0) states that 
panels comprise unit roots, the alternative hypothesis 
(HA) states that panels are stationary. We add to the 
detrended variables the suffix “_det”. Control variables 
are also detrended if the unit root test reports non-sta-
tionarity. 
As noted in Section 6.4.1, the econometric approach allows us to calculate the total (direct plus 
indirect) effects of an increase in public R&D subsidies on all economic variables in Equation 
(6.2). The total effects on private R&D investments and personnel of LMEs (captured by human 
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capital in Equation (6.2)) are considered as primary effect because the human capital variable is 
seen as primary transmission channel of Chinese R&D subsidies. Moreover, R&D subsidies may 
have additional (unintended) effects on the remaining variables that are interpreted as economic 
secondary effects. 
6.5.1 Basic model 
In Figure 6.7, we investigate the total effect of R&D subsidies on the R&D personnel and private 
R&D investments of LMEs and total effects on our secondary variables. We report the reaction of 
our core variables to an orthogonal increase in the R&D subsidy intensity in the amount of one 
standard deviation (multiplied by 100 [in %], y-axis). The figures illustrate the estimated responses 
by the solid lines and the dashed lines show the calculated confidence intervals for the various IRFs 
(x-axis denotes years). 
We start with the effect of R&D subsidies on R&D inputs of LMEs. Panel 1 shows that an increase 
in the R&D subsidy intensity leads to a contemporaneous significant negative effect on the private 
R&D investment rate. Panel 2 shows that an increase in the R&D subsidy intensity leads to a con-
tinuous positive effect on R&D personnel, while the confidence intervals suggest that this effect is 
only significant in the first year. We interpret these findings as a contemporaneous partial crowd-
ing-out effect because firms substitute some private funds with public funds, but total R&D inputs 
still increase.  
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Figure 6.7 IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions). 
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In addition to the effect on R&D, Panels 1 and 2 show that an increase in the R&D subsidy intensity 
has a significant positive effect on the provincial physical capital investment rate and patent activ-
ity. The effect on physical capital suggests that R&D subsidies have an effect on investments into 
assets, which may be research or non-research related, and we will explore this point further in 
Section 6.5.2. Increases in patents may be explained by a simultaneous increase in R&D inputs, 
emphasised by a closely related shape of the two response functions (see Panel 2 of Figure 6.7).114 
Moreover, the positive effects on the physical capital investment rate may also emanate positive 
secondary effects on patents. 
For the regional employment rate, we find a negative effect in the short run, potentially through 
substitution and adjustment effects, but a rather (insignificant) positive effect in the medium run. 
As for the real provincial GDP per capita, our results also suggests a short-run negative effect; 
however, the responses in Panels 1 and 2 show a delayed significant positive effect. In conclusion, 
there is some evidence that R&D subsidies have a positive effect on the provincial economy in the 
medium run. 
6.5.2 Robustness tests 
In this section we report five robustness tests. First, we augment our basic model with several 
control variables to address a potential omitted variable bias (see Table 6.1 for an overview of 
variables). The results in Figure A6.1 confirm the significant negative contemporaneous effect on 
the private R&D investments of LMEs (Panel 1) and a significant positive contemporaneous effect 
on R&D personnel (Panel 2). Furthermore, in Panel 2 the effect on the patent activity turns insig-
nificant, while the positive effect on the physical capital investment rate remains robust in both 
                                                 
114 Griliches (1990) mentions that the relationship between patents and R&D inputs “is close to contemporaneous with some lag 
effects which are small and not well estimated” (p. 1674). 
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panels. The significant negative effects on the employment rate and GDP per capita are restricted 
to the short-term perspective, while the significant positive effect on the GDP per capita diminishes 
in this setting.  
Second, we account for changes in China’s innovation policy introduced after the National Con-
ference on Technological Innovation in 1999 (Liu et al., 2011). Because the enforcement of na-
tional policies at the provincial level takes time, we extend the implementation period by three 
years and restrict our analysis to the years 2003 to 2010 (Figure A6.2).115 The effect on the private 
R&D investment rate of firms is still contemporaneously negative but turns insignificant afterwards 
(Panel 1). The results also show that an increase in the R&D subsidy intensity has a long-lasting 
significant positive effect on the R&D personnel of LMEs (Panel 2). The estimated response of the 
physical capital investment rate and the provincial patent activity remains significant positive. We 
do not find a significant effect on the employment rate, nor on the per capita income. These findings 
largely support our main results and indicate no substantial increase in the effectiveness of R&D 
subsidies in more recent years. 
Third, we return to the question whether the effect of R&D subsidies on the physical capital in-
vestment rate suggests the use of R&D subsidies for non-research investments. We use investments 
in residential buildings as an indicator for short-term profit maximising investments, which, how-
ever, are unlikely to be complementary to R&D. Due to data limitations, this analysis is restricted 
to the years 2003 to 2010. The corresponding IRFs in Figure A6.3 show that a shock in the R&D 
subsidy intensity has a significant positive short-run effect on the investment rate in residential 
                                                 
115 We also apply unit root tests for this time period before estimation. Please note that we also detrend the variable linvq, although 
the unit root test reports stationarity for the time period 2003-2010; however, IRF analysis does not work otherwise.  
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buildings. Thus, the results support that R&D subsidies are partially misallocated to non-research 
investments. 
Fourth, we include provincial-status municipalities. We fail to note changes on the responses of 
our core variables, except for the employment rate and GDP per capita, which are a significant 
negative in the short term but convert into positive effects in the medium run (Figure A6.4). As a 
further sensitive analysis, we test the inclusion of the four municipalities in the time period 2003 
to 2010. The significant positive effect on the R&D personnel employed in firms and the negative 
effect on the private R&D investments of LMEs remains robust (Figure A6.5). However, the pos-
itive response of the physical capital investment rate is non-significant in the setting where R&D 
inputs are measured by private R&D investments of firms (Panel 1). 
Fifth, different to our prior assumption that public funding has a rather exogenous effect on firms’ 
R&D personnel and private R&D investments, we now assume that R&D personnel and private 
R&D investments at time t endogenously determine the allocation of public funds. To this end, the 
causal ordering between human capital and R&D subsidies at time t in Figure 6.4 is reversed. In 
the model, this restricts any potential effect of R&D subsidies on private R&D investments at time 
t to zero. The findings suggest that the effects of R&D subsidies on R&D personnel and private 
R&D investments are only of contemporaneous significance, as they disappear in this setting (Fig-
ure A6.6). Firms instantaneously substitute own funds with public funds, while there is no effect 
in subsequent periods. Accordingly, there are no significant effects on the R&D personnel at all. 
The results confirm a contemporaneous effect of R&D subsidies on R&D inputs of firms, while 
there is no crowding-out effect in subsequent time periods where the R&D activities remain con-
stant. The significant positive effect on the patent activity, investment rate as well as partially on 
the real GDP per capita remains unchanged. 
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6.5.3 Discussion 
Our main empirical insight is that an increase of R&D subsidies significantly decreases private 
R&D investments, while there is a significant positive effect on the R&D personnel employed in 
firms. We interpret these findings as a partial crowding-out effect because public funds substitute 
some private funds while total R&D inputs still increase. Hence, R&D subsidies have not contrib-
uted to a rise in private R&D expenditures but still led to an increase in total R&D inputs. This 
finding corroborates prior investigations of China’s R&D subsidies at the firm (Boeing, 2016) and 
provincial level (Chen, 2018).  
In addition, we find positive secondary effects on the provincial patent activity and the investment 
rate in physical capital. Through increases in total R&D inputs, provincial economies benefit from 
technological progress and capital deepening. The former empirical finding especially confirms the 
prediction of our theoretical framework. What is more, we find some evidence for potentially un-
intended effects as R&D subsidies also increase the investment rate in residential buildings. Alt-
hough investments in physical capital may be complementary to R&D in general, investments in 
residential buildings more likely suggests partial misallocation of R&D subsidies. This finding is 
in line with the firm-level evidence presented in Boeing and Peters (2019), which show that mis-
appropriated R&D subsidies are partially used for investments in physical capital. In particular, 
real-estate investments seem to increase the opportunity cost of R&D investment in China. Based 
on data for manufacturing firms in 35 Chinese cities, Rong et al. (2016) find that housing price 
appreciation creates opportunities for high earnings of real estate investments. For this reason, 
manufacturing firms enhance diversification in the real estate sector and thereby decrease invest-
ments in innovation, which may provide a possible explanation for the effect of R&D subsidies on 
the investment rate in residential buildings. 
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In general, our findings imply that China’s R&D subsidies have effectively stimulated R&D activ-
ities of firms, as well as further economic activities of provinces, but failed to increase private R&D 
funding. Although a first-order goal of China’s innovation policy is to increase R&D activities in 
firms, this goal could be reached more efficiently under an additionality rather than partial crowd-
ing-out regime. Thus, a crucial question is how to improve China’s R&D policy towards a higher 
effectiveness in stimulating private R&D expenditures. Below we discuss three potential avenues.  
First, rigorous monitoring may increase the odds of R&D subsidies being invested in research, 
instead of non-research, and this is a necessary condition for any effect on R&D activities. Second, 
selection of financially constrained recipients and strict monitoring of funding contract rules, es-
pecially in the case of matching grants, reduces the risk that public funds become a substitute for 
private funds. Even if grantees fulfilled matching criteria of supported R&D projects by using pri-
vate funds from non-supported R&D projects, this reallocation does not lead to crowding out of 
private funds. Third, China’s increasing emphasis on mission-oriented R&D programmes bears the 
risk of disproportionally lower marginal returns to supported projects relative to non-supported 
projects. A strict mission-oriented policy may enhance government failure in the identification of 
R&D projects with the highest social returns and results in resource misallocation to the detriment 
of welfare and growth. Rigorous ex-post evaluation will help to identify and adjust ineffective 
policies in time. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this study, we investigate the impact of R&D subsidies on R&D inputs of large- and medium-
sized firms in Chinese provinces. A panel VAR model and corresponding IRF analysis allow us to 
differentiate between direct and indirect effects, which add up to total effects. Based on this ap-
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proach we can identify the impact of R&D subsidies on additional measures of provincial innova-
tion and economic performance. A main result is that R&D subsidies fail to incentivise private 
R&D expenditures while firms increase the total employment of R&D personnel. We interpret 
these findings as a partial crowding-out effect because public funds substitute some private funds 
while total R&D inputs still increase. Beyond that, we gain novel insights into additional transmis-
sion channels of R&D subsidies. Notably, we find positive effects on measures of technological 
progress, capital deepening, and growth, while there is a negative effect on employment in the short 
run. Politically unintended effects of R&D subsidies on investments in residential buildings sug-
gests partial misallocation of public funds. 
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A6. Appendix 
Appendix A6.1 Data properties. 
The use of China’s provincial data is not without challenges, and in this section we briefly discuss 
some main issues.  
1. Due to a decentralised accounting approach, the sum of provincial GDP is not equal to China’s 
national GDP. For example, data on the national GDP is approximately 5.9 % smaller compared to 
the summed provincial GDP for the year 2010. Differences also applies to employed persons, pop-
ulation, investments in fixed assets and patents in our data. 
2. NBS calculates resident population data for the years 2000, 2001 and 2010 based on the National 
Population Census 2000 and 2010, while data for the remaining years is based on annual national 
sample surveys on population changes. According to the National Population Census in 2010, pop-
ulation data for Beijing (2006 to 2009) as well as for Tibet (2001 to 2009) was corrected in retro-
spect and we use the corrected data.  
3. Data on the employed persons by regions is obtained from various issues of China’s Statistical 
Yearbooks. As mentioned in Table 6.1, there is no data available for the years 2003 and 2006. Until 
the year 2010, the annual provincial data is based on the National Population Census in 2000, as 
well as on the annual Sample Survey on Labour Force. Data for the year 2010 is based on the 
National Population Census 2010 and the annual Sample Survey on Labour Force (similar to the 
data on resident population). According to the novel Census in 2010, data on the national wide 
employed persons is also corrected in retrospect for the period 2001 to 2009. However, corrected 
data on provincial level is, to our knowledge, not available. The modifications on national level 
show only moderate differences (e.g. modified data on the employed persons on national level is 
1.55 % smaller for the year 2005), implying that modified data on provincial level would be slightly 
smaller than the applied extrapolated provincial data in this study. 
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4. The data on the R&D personnel and investments of LMEs was collected from the Statistics year-
book on science and technology activities of industrial enterprises (various years). In order to en-
sure the consistency of the time series, we calculate the annual sum by aggregating the provincial 
values. The calculated national value for both variables corresponds in each year to the variables 
“Full time Equivalent of R&D Personnel” and “Expenditure on R&D” in the category “Basic Sta-
tistics on Science and Technology Activities of Large and Medium-sized Industrial Enterprises” in 
various Chinese Statistical Yearbooks. This confirms the consistency of our main R&D variables. 
5. The patent data from China’s patent office CNIPA (formally State Intellectual Property Office 
of China (SIPO)) is equal to the published provincial data by the NBS, only for the provinces 
Zhejiang and Guangzhou the patent count differs by one patent.  
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Table A6.1 Summary statistics, 2000-2010 
(1) All Provinces 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
gdp 341 17525.02 13130.93 13448.59 2755.85 72296.29 
emp 341 0.5128 0.5114 0.0741 0.3637 0.7324 
invq 341 0.4909 0.4636 0.1577 0.2576 0.9339 
hk 341 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0 0.0026 
prdef 341 0.0045 0.0039 0.0031 0 0.0147 
pat 341 0.0884 0.0614 0.0996 0 0.8133 
sub 341 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0 0.0039 
(2) Without Tibet 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
gdp 330 17792.19 13483.73 13572.57 2755.85 72296.29 
emp 330 0.5127 0.5115 0.0751 0.3637 0.7324 
invq 330 0.4826 0.4495 0.1523 0.2576 0.9339 
hk 330 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.00001 0.0026 
prdef 330 0.0047 0.0039 0.0030 0.0001 0.0147 
pat 330 0.0906 0.0636 0.1004 0.0093 0.8133 
sub 330 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000009 0.0039 
(3) Without municipalities 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
gdp 297 14695.55 12246.18 9398.49 2755.85 50716.66 
emp 297 0.5129 0.5116 0.0687 0.3637 0.7324 
invq 297 0.4977 0.4752 0.1607 0.2576 0.9339 
hk 297 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0 0.0026 
prdef 297 0.0041 0.0036 0.0028 0 0.0132 
pat 297 0.0664 0.0561 0.0429 0 0.3068 
sub 297 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0 0.0039 
(4) Without municipalities and Tibet 
  Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
gdp 286 14895 12338.08 9492.73 2755.85 50716.66 
emp 286 0.5129 0.5116 0.0696 0.3637 0.7324 
invq 286 0.4885 0.4704 0.1552 0.2576 0.9339 
hk 286 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.00001 0.0026 
prdef 286 0.0042 0.0036 0.0027 0.0001 0.0132 
pat 286 0.0681 0.0581 0.0426 0.0093 0.3068 
sub 286 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000009 0.0039 
Notes: Own calculations based on provincial data (see Table 6.1). Summary statistics are shown for the variables before ln-trans-
formation and before detrending. 
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Table A6.2 Summarised economic activities of Chinese provinces, 2000-2010 
Province 
Province 
code 
Real GDP per 
capita (in 
RMD) 
Employment 
rate (in %) 
Real invest-
ments in fixed 
assets per real 
GDP (in %) 
Private real 
R&D invest-
ments LMEs 
per real GDP 
(in %) 
R&D personnel 
LMEs per cap-
ita (%) 
Patents per 100 
Mio. real GDP 
Real R&D sub-
sidies to LMEs 
per real GDP 
(%) 
Anhui AH 9931.11 57.63 64.99 0.53 0.03 0.06 0.06 
Beijing BJ 47487.28 60.40 39.24 0.61 0.12 0.57 0.06 
Chongqing CQ 13838.82 61.58 64.19 0.59 0.05 0.09 0.06 
Fujian FJ 21119.31 53.34 42.87 0.55 0.06 0.05 0.02 
Gansu GS 8355.77 52.03 54.59 0.40 0.03 0.07 0.04 
Guangdong GD 26118.49 50.59 30.95 1.00 0.11 0.17 0.03 
Guangxi GX 9664.27 56.56 51.88 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Guizhou GZ 6164.53 59.47 55.21 0.33 0.01 0.08 0.08 
Hainan HI 12557.51 46.24 47.12 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Hebei HE 15589.74 51.48 53.15 0.39 0.03 0.04 0.01 
Heilongjiang HL 15125.84 43.25 42.54 0.45 0.06 0.10 0.08 
Henan HA 12159.59 60.03 52.80 0.44 0.04 0.05 0.02 
Hubei HB 13366.52 47.46 49.68 0.59 0.05 0.11 0.04 
Hunan HN 11743.63 56.40 46.46 0.43 0.03 0.10 0.03 
Inner Mongolia NM 20497.95 44.04 65.77 0.27 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Jiangsu JS 26810.00 52.37 47.31 1.04 0.12 0.11 0.04 
Jiangxi JX 10653.52 48.70 64.57 0.48 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Jilin JL 15600.97 41.25 65.99 0.35 0.03 0.10 0.02 
Liaoning LN 21680.34 46.85 62.56 0.84 0.08 0.12 0.09 
Ningxia NX 12574.28 50.34 72.49 0.40 0.03 0.06 0.06 
Qinghai QH 11595.21 48.95 65.93 0.31 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Shaanxi SN 12436.36 51.15 60.92 0.47 0.06 0.14 0.20 
Shandong SD 21597.89 54.89 49.67 0.95 0.07 0.07 0.03 
Shanghai SH 50526.30 42.75 35.26 1.13 0.15 0.27 0.05 
Shanxi SX 13576.99 44.75 50.49 0.52 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Sichuan SC 10321.21 56.96 58.13 0.39 0.03 0.09 0.06 
Tianjin TJ 39663.56 40.69 50.41 1.13 0.13 0.20 0.03 
Tibet XZ 9682.03 51.59 78.14 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Xinjiang XJ 13864.87 37.78 54.99 0.20 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Yunnan YN 8664.30 56.43 56.94 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.02 
Zhejiang ZJ 28861.31 65.49 45.65 0.72 0.10 0.13 0.03 
Notes: Own calculations based on provincial data (see Table 6.1). 
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Figure A6.1 IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010 (control variables included) 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions). 
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Figure A6.2 IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2003-2010 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions). 
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Figure A6.3 IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2003-2010 (linvq_rb denotes investment 
rate in residential buildings). 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions). 
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Figure A6.4 IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010 (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing included) 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions). 
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Figure A6.5 IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2003-2010 (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing included) 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions). 
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Figure A6.6 IRF analysis for an increase in R&D subsidy intensity (lsub), 2000-2010 (Changed causal ordering). 
1. Private real R&D investments LMEs per real GDP (lprdef) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. R&D personnel LMEs per capita (lhk) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The solid lines are the estimated IRFs, while the dashed lines illustrate the 95 % confidence intervals that are calculated by 
conducting Monte Carlo simulations (500 repetitions). 
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7. General conclusions 
The thesis at hand contributes five research papers, whereas the overarching objective is to inves-
tigate and compare the effects of different policy measures on regional economic growth and de-
velopment in Germany and China. In doing so, each individual research paper analyses a specific 
policy and raises specific research questions that are presented in Sections 2 to 6.  
In Section 2, the complex effects of the “Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional Economic 
Structures” (GRW), the most important German policy framework to stimulate regional economic 
development in less developed regions, are analysed. The main pillars are to spur the investment 
activity of regional firms and to improve the regional infrastructure (Alecke et al. 2012, 2013; 
Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). Implied target variables are the private as well as the public physical 
capital. 
Subsequently, the analysis on the economic effects of GRW funding is extended by considering 
potential regional conditions that facilitate an effective use of the provided funds. That said, the 
basic contribution of the second research paper is to analyse the conditional overall effects of GRW 
investments by estimating and comparing the responses in regions with low and high levels of 
absorptive capacity and economic freedom (see Section 3).  
In Section 4, the unconditional and conditional effects of regional fiscal equalisation are investi-
gated. In addition, the estimated unconditional economic responses are compared to these of GRW 
funding. This policy measure particularly aims to provide additional financial means to regions 
with higher needs to assure an adequate local supply of public goods. Thus, the policy has also a 
distinct redistributive dimension (Lenk et al., 2013). The implied target variable of regional fiscal 
equalisation is essentially the public physical capital.  
The research paper presented in Section 5 is focused on public research activities (measured by 
publications and received third-party funds) of various public actors in Germany and can be linked 
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to the concept of regional innovation processes and innovation-led growth strategies. Contrary to 
the first two policy measures, public research activities are not restricted to particular regions. 
However, they are an important component for regional innovation processes and economic devel-
opment (Fritsch and Schwirten, 1999; Schubert and Kroll, 2013). In this setting, the regional tech-
nology and research sector is seen as the primary transmission channel. 
Finally, the last research paper analyses the economic effects of Chinese research and development 
(R&D) subsidies to firms (see Section 6). The Chinese government currently transforms the eco-
nomic system by implementing a more innovation-based development agenda (Cao et al., 2013; 
Liu et al., 2011). To implement this agenda, firms play an increasingly important role for Chinese 
innovation systems and economic development (Boeing, 2016). The implied target variables are 
the private R&D investment rate and R&D personnel of Chinese firms (human capital).  
The empirical findings in each research paper emphasise that German and Chinese policies matter 
considerably for regional development paths. In the remainder of Section 7, the key unconditional 
and conditional findings are summarised and (policy) implications are derived. Moreover, possible 
limitations (Section 7.2) and lines to future research are briefly discussed (Section 7.3). 
7.1 Main findings and policy implications 
Research Question 1: What are the overall economic effects of the analysed policy measures in 
Germany and China on different regional input and output factors of a regional production func-
tion? (Unconditional effects) 
Overall GRW investments trigger significant positive effects on the regional gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per workforce, the employment and human capital rate.116 Differences between industry 
                                                 
116 As explained in Sections 1.1.3 and 1.2, the first two research questions deal with unconditional funding effects (see Figure 1.2).  
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and infrastructure investments are moderate but become particularly visible for regional GDP: 
GRW industry investments do not have significant positive effects at all, while statistically signif-
icant increases of a shock in GRW infrastructure investments are restricted to single years.  
Regional fiscal equalisation payments in Germany are associated with a significant positive effect 
on the regional employment rate, whereas the effects on other economic variables are statistically 
insignificant. This finding may be explained by a missing industry-related policy dimension and 
associated minor economic secondary effects. However, no statistically significant differences in 
the magnitudes of the effects between German structural funding and regional fiscal equalisation 
are identified.  
The unconditional effects of public research activities on regional economies are heterogeneous: 
An increase in the publication rate of public research institutes triggers significant positive effects 
on the physical capital investment and (total) employment rate of regional economies. Conversely, 
the findings reveal that research activities of universities are not associated with statistically sig-
nificant impacts on regional development, at least in the analysed short-run perspective. However, 
by combining public third-party funds received by regional universities and technical colleges (la-
belled as higher education institutes), the estimated responses suggest significant positive effects 
on regional technological, employment and GDP development. Finally, an increase in the (public) 
third-party funds received by technical colleges is associated with increases in the regional physical 
capital investment, employment and human capital rate.  
The empirical findings for Chinese provinces suggest that R&D subsidies to firms contemporane-
ously crowd out private R&D investments. Conversely, a significant positive impact on the R&D 
personnel of firms is identified, hinting at a partial crowding-out effect because total R&D inputs 
of firms rise. Although R&D subsidies do not incentivise additional private R&D investments, 
Chinese provinces gain from positive secondary effects on the provincial patent activity and the 
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physical capital and residential building investment rate. However, carefully speaking, the latter 
finding suggests a partial misallocation of R&D subsidies to non-R&D related projects. 
Figure 7.1 Significant unconditional effects of the analysed German and Chinese policy measures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The conducted analyses on the complex economic effects of different policy measures account for 
mutual dependencies across the input and output factors in a regional economic system. Figure 7.1 
is based on the estimated significant economic responses in Sections 2, 4, 5 and 6 and shows that, 
with the exception of regional fiscal equalisation payments, the analysed policy measures have a 
multifaceted impact dimension by triggering significant positive effects on different economic in-
put and output factors. Consequently, the analysed regional policies do not have a multifaceted 
impact dimension per se, but at least the economic effects of structural funding and public research 
activities go beyond the expected transmission channel(s). That said, the first general implication 
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that can be drawn from the findings is that public polices foster regional development and add to 
regional economies in a complex and reciprocal fashion. This should be accounted for by scholars 
and policy makers, who should not fall short of focussing their interest solely on regional GDP 
measures (applies for Germany and China). 
Research Question 2: Do the analysed German policy measures add to regional development via 
different transmission channels and can unique characteristics be identified? (Unconditional ef-
fects) 
At first, all analysed German policy measures positively affect the regional employment rate.117 
However, only regional fiscal equalisation payments do not trigger statistically significant effects 
on additional economic variables. Consequently, regional fiscal equalisation does not have a unique 
characteristic in fostering regional development. 
Second, German structural funding has a more comprehensive impact on regional economies be-
cause the funding increases are also associated with positive effects on both human capital and 
regional GDP development. Similar to structural funding, an increase of public third-party funds 
to higher education institutes also corresponds to an increased regional GDP per workforce. Ac-
cordingly, these two policy measures are the most likely ones to trigger regional GDP development.  
Third, a distinctive characteristic of public third-party funds to higher education institutes is that 
the funds are successful in transforming research activities into significant increases in the regional 
patent activity. Because no other analysed policy measure is associated with significant positive 
effects on the regional patent activity, this finding reveals a unique characteristic of higher educa-
tion institutes for regional development in Germany.  
                                                 
117  The discussion of research question 2 is restricted to Germany because only one Chinese policy is analysed in this doctoral 
thesis. 
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Fourth, a distinctive character of technical colleges and public research institutes is that they trigger 
significant positive effects on industry-related variables, such as the private physical capital invest-
ment rate. Moreover, like structural funding, research activities of technical colleges are positively 
connected to regional human capital development.   
Table 7.1 Policy implications unconditional effects of the analysed German policy measures 
Target variable Policy Implication 
GDP per workforce 
y 
Provide GRW funding (infrastructure and total funding) and/or provide public third-
party funds to higher education institutes (technical colleges and universities com-
bined). 
Private physical in-
vestment rate sk 
Stimulate regional research activities of public research institutes and/or provide over-
all third-party funds to technical colleges. 
Human capital h Provide GRW funding (industry, infrastructure and total funding) and/or provide public 
third-party funds to technical colleges. 
Technological 
growth rate g 
Provide public third-party funds to higher education institutes (technical colleges and 
universities combined). 
Employment rate λ Provide GRW funding (industry, infrastructure and total funding) and/or provide re-
gional fiscal equalisation payments and/ or provide public third-party funds to tech-
nical colleges and/ or provide public third-party funds to higher education institutes 
(technical colleges and universities combined) and/ or stimulate regional research activ-
ities of public research institutes. 
The second main contribution of the thesis is to identify unique characteristics of the analysed 
German policies. The empirical findings hint at different transmission channels of the analysed 
policies in stimulating regional development. Table 7.1 formulates concrete implications for each 
economic input and output variable. With the exception of regional technological development, the 
economic input and output variables are affected in a statistically significant way by several re-
gional policy measures. It can be drawn from the empirical results that policy makers are flexible 
to pick different policy options to stimulate the development of a particular economic input and 
output factor, except the technological development. However, it is also highly important that fu-
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ture allocation decisions are more attuned to regional needs. In the first instance, it becomes in-
creasingly important for policy makers to concretely identify regional economic components that 
are not well developed. Thereupon, it becomes necessary to provide only these policy measures 
that predominately stimulate the development of the identified less developed economic compo-
nents (applies to Germany).  
Research Question 3: Do economic responses to an increase in German structural funding and 
regional fiscal equalisation funding depend on conditioning factors such as a region’s absorptive 
capacity, economic freedom and political-economic conditions? (Conditional effects) 
The empirical findings of the conditional effects of German structural funding and fiscal equalisa-
tion payments give rise to a more sophisticated look at policy evaluations and conceptual designs 
by explicitly incorporating regional conditions of target regions.  
For the most part, the effects of structural funding on the human capital rate are similar and largely 
independent on regional initial conditions (applies especially for the absorptive capacity), while 
the findings hint at significant positive effects on the employment rate solely in regions with a high 
level of economic freedom. In these regions, the estimated responses of the employment rate to a 
funding increase are also statistically significantly higher.  
Furthermore, traditional funding channels of structural funding via the private sector-investment 
rate are predominantly associated with low levels of absorptive capacity and economic freedom. 
Conversely, significant positive responses of the regional patent activity and GDP per workforce 
are rather connected with high levels of absorptive capacity and economic freedom. The estimated 
responses of these two variables are also statistically significantly higher in regions with high levels 
of absorptive capacity and economic freedom. 
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The effects of regional fiscal equalisation funding reveal slightly different response patterns be-
tween Eastern and Western German regions as well as between Social Democratic Party (SPD) and 
Christian Democratic Party/Christian Social Party (CDU/CSU) preferring regions. At first, the em-
pirical findings suggest statistically significant positive effects on the employment rate in Western 
German regions and on the investment rate in Eastern German regions. Furthermore, fiscal equal-
isation increases are not associated with statistically significant positive effects on the remaining 
economic variables in this setting. Second, the response patterns of the regional human capital and 
investment rate are significantly positive in pro-business CDU/CSU preferring regions, while the 
estimated response of the GDP per workforce is significantly positive solely in SPD preferring 
regions (in the short run). In addition, fiscal equalisation increases are associated with positive 
effects on the employment rate in CDU/CSU and SPD preferring regions. That said, the estimated 
responses to an increase in the equalisation payments in East and West Germany as well as in 
CDU/CDU and SPD preferring regions appear to be statistically significantly different only in sin-
gle years. Thus, in contrast to structural funding, the concluded effect heterogeneity should be in-
terpreted more carefully. 
The third contribution of the thesis is made up of the analysis of conditioning factors on the effec-
tive use of structural funding and regional fiscal equalisation in Germany. The empirical findings 
suggest that regional initial conditions serve as a fertile ground for an efficient use of public invest-
ments in Germany. The resulting implication is that policy makers should, on the one hand, identify 
and improve these regional initial conditions. On the other hand, policy makers should provide a 
particular policy measure (especially structural funding) predominantly according to prevailing re-
gional initial conditions. This would facilitate an efficient use of public means, which is especially 
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important in times of easing funding volumes (applies for Germany). Table 7.2 provides an over-
view of the implications to foster the development of different variables (based on statistically 
significant responses in Sections 3 and 4). 
Table 7.2 Policy implications conditional effects of structural funding and regional fiscal equalisation 
Target variable Structural funding (GRW) Regional fiscal equalisation* 
GDP per workforce 
y 
Provide funding to regions with high levels 
of absorptive capacity and/or high levels of 
economic freedom (industry, infrastructure 
and overall GRW funding). 
Eastern German regions should not 
use this policy to foster this variable 
and/or improve the returns on payments 
in CDU/CSU preferring regions 
(and/or provide payments to SPD pre-
ferring regions). 
Private physical in-
vestment rate sk 
Provide funding to regions with low levels of 
absorptive capacity (industry and overall 
GRW funding) and/or low levels of economic 
freedom (industry, infrastructure and overall 
GRW funding). 
Eastern German regions should use 
this policy to foster this variable and/or 
provide payments to CDU/CSU prefer-
ring regions. 
Human capital h Provide funding to regions irrespective of re-
gional levels of absorptive capacity (infra-
structure and overall GRW funding) and/or 
low levels of economic freedom (industry 
and overall GRW funding). 
Provide payments to CDU/CSU prefer-
ring regions. 
Technological 
growth rate g 
Provide funding to regions with high levels 
of absorptive capacity and/or high levels of 
economic freedom (industry and GRW over-
all funding). 
Do not increase payments. 
Employment rate λ Provide funding to regions irrespective of re-
gional levels of absorptive capacity (industry, 
infrastructure and overall GRW funding) 
and/or high levels of economic freedom (in-
dustry, infrastructure and GRW overall fund-
ing). 
Western German regions should use 
this policy to foster this variable and/or 
provide payments to CDU/CSU prefer-
ring regions (and/or provide payments 
to SPD preferring regions). 
Notes: *Policy implications in parentheses are based on empirical findings that are not statistically significant in all estimated 
settings. 
7.2 Discussion of limitations 
The presented findings are based on a flexible VAR approach and IRF analysis, which have been 
used rarely in policy evaluation studies so far (Rickman, 2010). The choice of the econometric 
strategy is briefly discussed in Section 1.3 as well as in the research papers. In general, the major 
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concern for empirical studies aiming at making a causal statement about a particular relationship 
is the choice of a proper econometric identification strategy. On top of that, the use of adequate 
data and technical issues for the implementation of the research aims are further challenges the 
researcher faces. Data issues are already discussed in more detail in the research papers, the focus 
in this section is on potential drawbacks of the applied econometric strategy and technical limita-
tions for the analysis.  
In the case of VAR models, causality statements are valid if the full set of relevant variables is 
included (no omitted variable bias) and if the causal structure at time t across the included variables 
is properly identified (here: theory-guided ordering), where the latter is especially a highly chal-
lenging task (see Hoover, 2012, for a discussion). Both requirements are, as in any empirical stud-
ies, impossible to prove by means of econometric analysis but only by argumentation. As discussed 
in the following, the conducted analyses in this thesis take into account several econometric issues. 
Although the selection of economic core variables is theory-guided and based on a regional pro-
duction function, (spatial) control variables are additionally included in each research paper for 
Germany (Sections 2 to 5) to control for a potential omitted variables bias and spatial dependencies 
on the small-scale regional level. Adding further control variables does not considerably alter the 
empirical results of the IRF analyses, neither whether regional age structures (Section 2) nor fund-
ing intensities of additional German policy measures (Section 4) nor several time-variant regional 
characteristics are included as control variables (Section 6). Furthermore, time dummies are in-
cluded in every regression model to control for business cycles and external shocks that may influ-
ence the regression results.  
In addition to an omitted variable bias or an inadequate definition of the contemporaneous causal 
structure, the selection of a proper estimator may also impair the validity of conducted empirical 
analyses. The inclusion of the time-space lag of the particular dependent variable causes a bias of 
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the applied bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator (Everaert and Pozzi, 2007) that only corrects for 
the dynamic panel bias. Therefore, the time-space lag of the particular dependent variable are ex-
cluded and several robustness checks are performed. The conducted robustness checks do not hint 
at a severe bias of the core variables in the VAR models (Sections 3 to 5), which is why the bias-
corrected fixed effects estimator is used for estimation in this thesis. In addition, tested alternatives 
– such as the System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) – confront the econometrician with several issues especially when 
it comes to instrument validity.118  
Finally, as mentioned in Sections 3 and 4, the empirical results may be influenced by potential 
endogenous composite indicators, which are used for the subdivision of regions (absorptive capac-
ity, economic freedom, political-economic conditions). However, this issue is accounted for by 
constructing the composite indicators for the presample period to ensure predeterminedness of the 
applied composite indicators.  
To sum up, the conducted empirical analyses in this thesis control for many potential econometric 
drawbacks to identify unbiased (and causal) policy effects. Nevertheless, causality statements and 
the formulated policy implications above should be interpreted carefully. 
Regarding the technical limitations, the conducted analyses mainly focus on the simulation of over-
all spatially direct effects to an increase in the respective policy intensity, while the spatially indi-
                                                 
118 The System GMM estimator transforms, on the one hand, the data to remove fixed effects (First-differenced GMM, Arellano 
and Bond, 1991), and, on the other hand, instruments endogenous variables (like yi,t-1) with internal instruments that are uncorrelated 
with the fixed-effects (System GMM, Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). However, a robust implementation is 
difficult as changes in the lag structure of the chosen instruments considerably affect the estimated coefficients in the model of this 
thesis. Moreover, as mentioned by an unknown referee, there are serious doubts regarding the use of internal instruments because 
these may be not truly exogenous or weak. This weak instrument problem is proven for the System GMM approach (Bun and 
Windmeijer, 2010). 
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rect effects are neglected (see Figure 1.3), with the exception of regional fiscal equalisation pay-
ments in Section 4. This brings out one limitation of the thesis and implies the need of future re-
search by adding two aspects: First, future research may draw on the applied VAR model of this 
thesis to simulate the overall spatially indirect effects of public policies. Second, the conducted 
analyses focus on the computation of isolated and unlinked short-term policy effects. Thus, a sec-
ond challenging task for future research is a current technical limitation: the extension and espe-
cially the implementation of long-term (spatially direct and indirect) effects in statistical soft-
ware’s, which would allow researchers to simulate comprehensive full space-time response func-
tions (e.g. Di Giacinto, 2010). 
7.3 Future lines of research in the discipline of policy evaluation 
Empirical policy evaluation remains an important scientific field to improve the future design of 
policy measures worldwide and thus to increase the incomes and living conditions of human be-
ings. The conducted research sheds light on the need for future research in this discipline.  
First, system equation (VAR) approaches are not applied to examine the effects of European struc-
tural and cohesion funds so far. Using a similar approach as in the thesis at hand may shed light on 
the multifaceted transmission channels of European development funds. Second, the empirical re-
sults of this thesis emphasise the existence of regional conditional effects of policy measures. As 
it exceeds the content of the doctoral thesis, future research should focus on the regional abilities 
to use public means efficiently (e.g. by examining regional conditions that improve the outcomes 
of public research activities in Germany and R&D subsidies to firms in China). Third, the empirical 
findings suggest rather minor effects of the analysed polices in Germany on regional patent activ-
ities. This may hint at minor effects on regional structural changes and innovation capacities. How-
ever, Germany is facing major structural challenges, such as the pull-strategic retreat from coal 
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mining or the aspired change to an environmentally friendly energy production and traffic system. 
These challenges induce the massive need for future research that investigates which policies sup-
port these aims by explicitly triggering structural changes and uncovering (additional) innovation 
capabilities. Fourth, the thesis carries out a variety of empirical analyses. The empirical findings 
may be a starting point for qualitative studies that explicitly examine the working of particular 
policies in case studies. Additional qualitative research would help to gain further insights into the 
working of policies and may identify best practice examples.   
7.4 Final remarks 
Policy and economic growth evaluation studies contribute to an important and much applied sci-
entific discipline that has the ability to directly influence the incomes and living conditions of hu-
man beings. This thesis contributes to this fascinating discipline and aims to improve the under-
standing of the working of various policy measures in Germany and China. The applied novel 
methodology in this research discipline, the comprehensive analyses on different policies and the 
consideration of potential conditioning regional factors hopefully influence the scientific and po-
litical discourse and, in the best case, add to future policy designs, evaluation strategies, incomes 
and living conditions of human beings.  
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